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The Grand Jury and Capital
Punishment: Rethinking the Role of an




"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury .... " This, the initial right guaranteed in the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution,2 is the only safeguard in that amend-
ment,3 and one of only two in the entire Bill of Rights, 4 that the states
are not required to observe in their criminal proceedings. Over a century
ago, in Hurtado v. Califomia,5 the Supreme Court upheld a capital
conviction over objection that the trial had been initiated by a prose-
cutor's information instead of by indictment. Hurtado has been reaf-
* Assistant Professor, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany.
Ph.D., State University of New York at Albany, 1987; J.D., Duke University School of Law,
1976, A.B., Indiana University, 1972.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2. A specific exception is made for certain cases, not relevant here. The grand jury clause
of the fifth amendment concludes: "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger. .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
3. The remaining provisions of the fifth amendment are: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
Id.
4. The other is the eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive bail. See infra note
150 and accompanying text.
5. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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firmed,6 and cited approvingly in dictum,7 in numerous Supreme Court
decisions. The Supreme Court, however, has not directly considered the
continued vitality of the Hurtado rule, as applied in state capital
proceedings, since Furman v. Georgia' ushered in an era of sweeping
constitutional reforms in death penalty procedures.
Re-examination of Hurtado in the very narrow context of the con-
stitutional role of grand juries in state capital proceedings is long
overdue. Since Hurtado, revolutionary changes have occurred in judicial
conceptions of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment as
applied in death penalty cases. 9 Meanwhile, evidence mounts that pros-
ecutorial decision-making is a major source of the arbitrariness that
continues to plague the administration of capital punishment
legislation10-the very sort of problem that resulted in the inclusion of
the right to indictment by grand jury in the federal constitution. These
legal developments and empirical revelations mandate dusting off the
Hurtado rule and considering it de novo.
This Article examines the historical purposes of the grand jury, and
then re-examines them in light of contemporary systems of capital
punishment. It focuses upon the potential of grand jury review to help
guard against arbitrary capital prosecutions, and help legitimate the
administration of the death penalty. Evidence is reviewed concerning
grand juries' indictment decisions, along with data regarding prosecu-
torial decision-making in capital trials. The convergent analyses suggest
that it is time to rethink, if not rework, constitutional doctrine con-
cerning the role of state grand juries in the prosecution of capital crimes.
II. THE CONSTITUTION, THE GRAND JURY, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. The Grand Jury: Hurtado, Its Antecedents and Subsequent
Developments
1. Hurtado v. California
In February of 1882, three. years after the California state consti-
tution first authorized the prosecution of felonies upon a prosecutor's
6. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that death sentences
imposed at the unfettered discretion of the sentencing authority violate eighth amendment prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishments). See infra notes 162-168 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 128-174 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 232-242 and accompanying text.
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information and magistrate's examination, in lieu of indictment by
grand jury," the Sacramento County District Attorney filed an
information12 charging Joseph Hurtado with the first degree murder
of Jose Antonio Stuardo. Hurtado was arraigned and brought to
trial before a petit jury upon his pleas of not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity.' 3 Because the prosecution was commenced by
information, no grand jury had considered whether the allegations
warranted a charge of first degree murder with possible punishment
by death.
Hurtado did not contest that he had killed Stuardo. Hurtado's
wife testified at the trial that prior to the homicide she had confessed
to Hurtado that she had committed adultery with the deceased.1
4
This confession of adultery was Hurtado's asserted motive for killing
Stuardo, the basis of his insanity defense, and also the foundation
of his argument that the homicide, if criminal, was manslaughter
rather than murder. 5
11. "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by
information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury shall
be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county." CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 8 (1879),
(quoted in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 517). Enabling legislation authorized the use
of an information and examination by a magistrate to commence felony prosecutions. CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 809, 872, 888, 949 (1880). See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 517-18;
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Hurtado v. California, at 1-2, reprinted in 8 LANDMaARK BRIEFS
AND ARGumENTS OF THE SuPR. m COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397,
398-99 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975) (hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS). California was
admitted to statehood in 1850. See 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 196, California (Inter-
national Edition 1986). California's original constitution of 1849 required that serious crimes
be prosecuted only upon grand jury presentment or indictment. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1849).
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 557 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. An information is a charging instrument filed directly by an individual, usually a
prosecuting attorney, in order to initiate a criminal prosecution. A presentment, on the other
hand, is "an accusation made ex mero motu by a grand jury upon their own observation and
knowledge, or upon evidence before them, and without any bill of indictment at the suit of
the government." 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
544 (4th ed. 1873). Finally, an indictment is "a written accusation of an offence preferred to,
and presented upon oath as true, by a grand jury, at the suit of the government .... [A]n
indictment is usually, in the first instance, framed by the officers of the government and laid
before the grand jury." Id. at 544-45. See generally 4 W. BLACICSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 298-308 (1979, orig. pub. 1769); 1 S. BEAT & W. BRYSON, GRAND JURY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.08 (1986); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L.
REv. 101, 118-20 (1931). The information filed in the prosecution in Hurtado was preceded
by a magistrate's examination, as required under California law. Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 517-18 (1884).
13. Hurtado v. California 110 U.S. 516, 518 (1884); People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288, 290
(1883).
14. Other witnesses were prepared to corroborate this testimony. Mrs. Hurtado had been
seen entering a "house of ill-fame" with the deceased, and had made admissions similar to
her trial testimony. The offered corroborating evidence was excluded as irrelevant, and hearsay,
respectively. People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288, 290-91, 294-95 (1883).
15. Murder was defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice." CAL.
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The trial jury, perhaps relying upon evidence that Hurtado 'lay
in wait' for [the] deceased," ' 16 rejected these defenses and returned a
verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The jury, within its discretion
under law, affixed the punishment as death.'7 Both conviction and
sentence were affirmed on appeal to the California Supreme Court. 8
The trial court thereafter ordered Hurtado to appear and set forth
"any legal reason.. .why said judgment should not be executed
.... "19 Hurtado, through counsel, urged that he had been denied
due process by being tried for murder absent indictment by grand
jury.
20
The trial court denied Hurtado's claim for relief, and the California
Supreme Court again considered the case on appeal. Citing state
precedent, the court affirmed that the United States Constitution did
PENAL CODE § 187 (1872). First degree murder included "[a]U murder which is perpetrated by
means of poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem ...." Id. at § 189 (1874). All other murder was
second .degree murder. Id. See People v. Raten, 63 Cal. 421, 423-24 (1883). Manslaughter
included the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. "[T]he law, in consideration
of human weakness, makes the offense manslaughter when it is committed under the influence
of passion caused by an insult or provocation sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a
reasonable person, one of ordinary self-control." People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288, 292 (1883).
16. People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. at 292. There is a suggestion that Hurtado armed "himself
when he went to the Police Court." Id. at 293 (quoting the defendant's tendered jury
instruction). This suggests that the jury may have concluded that adequate "cooling time"
transpired before the killing, even if Hurtado had been reasonably provoked upon learning of
his wife's adultery. Interestingly, if Hurtado indeed "lay in wait" for the deceased, the offense
could be punishable by death under contemporary California law. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a)(15) (Deering 1985).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (1874); People v. Jones, 63 Cal. 168, 170 (1883). In
common with the practice at common law, the death penalty was mandatory upon conviction
for serious crimes in California, including first degree murder, prior to reform legislation
which took effect in 1874. This legislation gave the jury the discretion to impose either a
death sentence or one of life imprisonment. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200
n.11 (1971).
18. People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288 (1883). The alleged sentencing error was the trial
court's refusal to charge the jury, pursuant to the defendant's request, that: .'If you believe
defendant in truth and in fact when he killed deceased believed deceased had seduced his wife,
... it is proper for you to take such testimony into consideration in fixing the punishment if
you should find him guilty of murder in the first degree."' Id. at 295 (quoting jury instruction
tendered by the defendant).
19. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 518 (1884).
20. Hurtado specifically claimed that he:
had been held to answer for the said crime of murder by the district attorney of
the said county of Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had been
tried and illegally found guilty of the said crime, without any presentment or
indictment of any grand or other jury, and that the judgment rendered upon the
alleged verdict of the jury in such case was and is void, and if executed would
deprive [him]... of his life or liberty without due process of law.
Id. 110 U.S. at 519.
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not require that felonies be tried upon grand jury indictment or
presentment. 21 This holding was reviewed by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1884 in Hurtado v. California.
The parties in Hurtado agreed that the question before the Court
was whether California's procedures for commencing felony prose-
cutions upon examination by a magistrate and a prosecutor's infor-
mation, instead of by presentment or indictment by a grand jury
were consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2 Hurtado's brief argued that the common law required that
felony trials be initiated by action of a grand jury and that this
implicitly was a part of both the "law of the land," as provided in
Magna Charta, 23 and "due process of law," as guaranteed in the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 The brief made no concerted effort to
21. People v. Hurtado, 2 Cal. Unrep. 206 (1883), citing Kalloch v. Superior Court, 56
Cal. 229 (1880).
22. See Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 5-6, Hurtado v. California (assignments of error
nos. 1-4), reprinted in LANDr ARK BRmFs, supra note 11 at 402-03. The brief argues the question
as follows:
The Laws and Constitution of California, which were designed to authorize the
prosecution of capital cases and felonies, upon informations filed by the District
Attorneys, without the previous investigation of the charge by a Grand Jury, and
without a determination by that body of the existence or absence of probable cause
for the prosecution of same, are in conflict with and repugnant to that clause
contained in the Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, which provides: 'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.' The question presented by this proposition
is one purely of definition. What was the meaning of the words 'due process' of
law, as applied to criminal cases amounting to felony, at the time they were adopted
into the Fourteenth Amendment?
Id. at 7. See also Brief of Defendant in Error at 1, Hurtado v. California, reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 11 at 443, 444:
The question presented for determination is: Is Section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution of the State of California and the penal procedures thereunder adopted
by the Code of that State, in violation of and inhibited by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States? [para.] Still narrowed
down, does the phrase in said section, to wit: 'nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' as applied to criminal
procedure, prohibit States from accusing and prosecuting the accused for capital,
infamous, and other felonious crimes, without presentment or indictment by a grand
jury?
23. Chapter 29 of Magna Charta, as codified in the reissue of Henry III, in 1225,
stipulates that no free man shall be imprisoned, dispossessed, banished or destroyed "except
by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." SouRcEs OF OUR LmERTS:
Docm mNTARY ORIGiNs OF INDIVmUAL LiBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
BILL OF RIGHTs at 5 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959). See Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 21-
44, Hurtado v. California, reprinted in LANDMARK BRiEzs, supra note 11 at 418-41.
24. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 7, Hurtado v. California, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 11 at 404. The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part, that "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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narrow the inquiry to whether the Constitution required the use of
grand juries in capital cases.25 Nor, of course, was the fifth amend-
ment's grand jury clause relied upon as a source of this right; the
selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights, protections through the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, was not a viable theory
at the time that Hurtado's claim arose.26
The Supreme Court thus defined the question before it as follows:
The proposition of law we are asked to affirm is that an indictment
or presentment by a grand jury, as known to the common law of
England, is essential to that "due process of law," when applied
to prosecutions for felonies, which is secured and guaranteed by
[the fourteenth amendment] of the constitution of the United States,
and which accordingly it is forbidden to the states, respectively, to
dispense with in the administration of criminal law.27
With only Justice Harlan dissenting, the Court declined to accept
this interpretation of the Constitution based upon its perception of
the purposes underlying the historic, common law right to present-
ment or indictment by grand jury; its interpretation of the text of
the constitution; and its understanding of the scope of due process
of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority accepted that at common law, the prosecution of
felonies in the king's name could be commenced only by grand jury
action. 28 This was not interpreted as meaning, however, "that an
25. This is perhaps because at the time capital cases were not generally recognized as
deserving of special judicial solicitude. See infra notes 160 & 175 and accompanying text.
26. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). See infra
notes 128-150 and accompanying text.
27. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 520.
28. Numerous luminaries of English legal history, including Coke and Blackstone had
thus reported in their commentaries. The opinion noted that the common law right of
presentment or indictment by grand jury did not extend to misdemeanor prosecutions, and
had no application to private appeals, as distinguished from prosecutions by the crown. Id.
at 524-26.
Lord Coke's discussion of the "law of the land" clause of Magna Charta is given extensive
treatment in Hurtado. Id. 110 U.S. at 522-27. Referring to this clause, Coke wrote:
(1) No man shall be taken (that is) restrained of liberty by petition or suggestion to
the king, or to his council, unless it be by indictment or presentment of good and
lawful men, where such deeds be done. This branch and diverse other parts of this
act have been notably explained by divers acts of parliament, etc., quoted in the
margent.' The reference is to various acts during the reign of Edward III. And
reaching again the words 'nisi per legem terroe,' he continues: But by the law of
the land. For the true sense and exposition of these words see the statute of 37 E.3,
cap. 8, where the words "by the law of the land" are rendered without due process
of law, for there it is said, though it be contained in the great charter, that no man
be taken, imprisoned, or put out of his freehold without proces of the law; that is
by indictment of good and lawfull men, where such deeds be done in due manner,
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indictment or presentment of a grand jury was essential to the idea
of due process of law in the prosecution and punishment of crimes,
but ... only ... an example and illustration of due process of law
as it actually existed in cases in which it was customarily used."
' 29
Justice Matthews, for the Hurtado majority, attempted to bolster
this conclusion by examining the modus operandi of the grand jury
at its inception.
The grand jury accurately was characterized as appearing in English
law toward the end of the twelfth century, and functioning as an
institution whose "accusation is practically equivalent to a convic-
tion."30 Suspects accused by a grand jury originally were required to
undergo trial by ordeal. In the unlikely event that the accused survived
the ordeal, and was acquitted, banishment often followed."1 Although
the Court described this early history and the original functioning of
the grand jury, it ignored events of the succeeding centuries that
culminated with the inclusion of the grand jury guarantee in the
Fifth Amendment.12 This greatly facilitated the Court's task of es-
tablishing that the grand jury was not an indispensable component
of due process of law. The Court explained that the essential func-
tions of the grand jury could be as well served by prosecution by
information: "The same notice was given, the same process was
issued, the same pleas were allowed, the same trial by jury was had,
the same judgment was given by the same judges, as if the prosecution
had originally been by indictment."33
In his dissent, Justice Harlan identified additional reasons for the
existence of the grand jury, and repeatedly emphasized their relevance
or by writ original of the common law. Without being brought in to answer but by
due proces of the common law. No man be put to answer without presentment
before justices, or thing of record, 6r by due proces, or by writ original, according
to the old law of the land. Wherein it is to be observed that this chapter is but
declaratory of the old law of England.
Id. 110 U.S. at 523-24, quoting E. CorE, 2 INSTrrTUTEs 49-50. See 4 BL~cACsToNE, supra note
12 at 298-308. See also infra note 36 and accompanying text. See generally 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 12 at 305 ("[I]nformations (of every kind) are confined by the constitutional law
to mere misdemeanors only: for, wherever any capital offence is charged, the same law requires
that accusation be warranted by the oath of twelve men, before the party shall be put to
answer it.").
29. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added).
30. Id. 110 U.S. at 530, quoting 1 J. S PnN, HIsToRY OF Tm CRmNA.L LAW OF
ENGLAND 252 (1883).
31. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 529-30. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
33. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538, quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12 at 305. Similar
considerations are stressed in Hurtado at 524-25.
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to capital cases.34 By implication, he withheld opinion about whether
the constitution required indictment by grand jury to commence
noncapital state felony trials. Throughout English history numerous
felonies had been punishable by death,35 and many who chronicled
the development of the common law right to indictment by grand
jury placed special emphasis upon this fact. Blackstone, for example,
described the grand jury's consideration of a bill of indictment in
the following terms:
But, to find a bill, there must at least twelve of the jury agree: for
so tender is the law of England of the lives of the subjects, that
no man can be convicted at the suit of the king of any capital
offence, unless by the unanimous voice of twenty four of his equals
and neighbors: that is, by twelve at least of the grand jury, in the
first place, assenting to the accusation; and afterwards, by the whole
petit jury, of twelve or more, finding him guilty upon his trial.,6
Justice Harlan's review of these and related expressions 7 docu-
mented impressively that the requirement for indictment or present-
ment by grand jury in capital cases "is shown upon almost every
page of the common law." 38 However, the majority did not actively
dispute this point. The importance of the cited authorities lay in the
inferences to be drawn about why the common law grand jury
occupied such a central role in the accusatory process. Here, venturing
beyond the majority's analysis, Justice Harlan noted that the con-
temporary role of the grand jury was "not only.., bringing to trial
34. "[H]uman life is involved in the judgment rendered here ... ." Id. 110 U.S. at 539
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334-35 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment); T. PLucKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMI, oN LAw 442-54 (5th ed. 1956);
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AmEICA 6 (H. Bedau ed., 3rd ed. 1982); 1 L. RADziNowicz, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CaunNAL LAw AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 at 3.40 (1948). English
criminal law recognized eight major capital crimes by 1500, with the number ballooning to
over 200 shortly after 1800.
36. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12 at 301. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 5,14
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting identical passage).
Lord Erskine's celebrated remarks before the judges of the King's Bench were similar.
If a man were to commit a capital offense in the face of all the judges of England,
their united authority could not put him upon his trial; they could file no complaint
against him, even upon the records of the supreme criminal court, but could only
commit him for safe custody, which is equally competent to every common justice
of the peace. The grand jury alone could arraign him, and in their discretion might
likewise finally discharge him, by throwing out the bill, with the names of all your
lordships as witnesses on the back of it.
1 EasKInE's SPEECHES 275. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 543-44 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting same passage).
37. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 544-45 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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persons accused of public offenses upon just grounds, but also ...
protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation .... "39 When an
individual could be prosecuted for a capital crime upon the action
of a prosecutor and a magistrate, without the intervention of a panel
of citizens to check against governmental overreaching or arbitrari-
ness, the protections afforded by a grand jury were lost/ °
Justice Matthew's majority opinion in Hurtado did not dwell
exclusively upon the grand jury's history. The court relied upon the
doctrine of usus loquendi in support of the conclusion that the
framers of the constitution had not contemplated that indictment by
grand jury was a part of "due process of law." ' 41 The fifth amendment
provided for rights against double jeopardy, compulsory self-incrim-
ination, and to just compensation for the public taking of private
property, in addition to its grand jury provision. It also contained a
due process clause that was essentially identical to the corresponding
fourteenth amendment guarantee. 42 Referring to the fifth amendment,
the majority opined that
[w]e are forbidden to assume, without clear reason to the contrary,
that any part of this most important amendment is superfluous.
39. Id. at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting the charge to the grand jury by Mr.
Justice Field, as Circuit Justice, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 993, No. 18,255 (1872)). See infra note
120. See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "I submit, ...
with confidence, there is no foundation for the opinion that, under Magna Charta or at
common law, the right to a trial by a jury in a capital case was deemed of any greater value
to the safety and security of the people than was the right not to answer, in a capital case,
upon information filed by an officer of the government, without previous inquiry by a grand
jury. While the former guards the citizen against improper conviction, the latter secures him
against unfounded accusation." Id. (emphasis added).
40. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Thus, in California, nothing stands between the citizen and prosecution for his life
except the judgment of a justice of the peace .... Anglo-Saxon liberty would,
perhaps, have perished long before the adoption of our constitution had it been in
the power of government to put the subject on trial for his life whenever a justice
of the peace, holding his office at the will of the crown, should certify that he had
committed a capital crime. That such officers are, in some of the states, elected by
the people, does not add to the protection of the citizen; for one of the peculiar
benefits of the grand-jury system, as it exists in this country, is that it is composed,
as a general rule, of private persons who do not hold office at the will of the
government, or at the will of voters .... In the secrecy of the investigations by
grand juries, the weak and helpless-proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or
pursued by an unreasoning public clamor-have found, and will continue to find,
security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the machinations of false-
hood, and the malevolence of private persons who would use the machinery of the
law to bring ruin upon their personal enemies.
Id. (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 534 (The doctrine is to the effect that words are intended to be used as spoken;
in this context, that the framers did not use due process of law to include indictment by grand
jury, as they had stated the two rights separately in the fifth amendment).
42. See supra notes 1, 2 & 24.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
The natural and obvious inference is that, in the sense of the
constitution, "due process of law" was not meant or intended to
include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury
in any case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the
same phrase was employed in the fourteenth amendment to restrain
the action of the states, it was used in the same sense and with no
greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that amendment it
had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of the
grand jury in all the states, it would have embodied, as did the
fifth amendment, express declarations to that effect.
43
Such reasoning meant that any of the rights specifically mentioned
in the fifth amendment or, indeed, elsewhere in the bill of rights,
could be denied in state proceedings notwithstanding the fourteenth
amendment's due process guarantee. 44 The majority's logic, of course,
ultimately did not prevail under evolving due process doctrine, 5 thus
undermining the textual argument used to reject Hurtado's claim.
The Hurtado majority's conception of due process of law is
recognized today as a "classic fundamental fairness analysis. "46 In
this view, the fourteenth amendment provision "refers to that law
of the land in each state which derives its authority from the inherent
and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions. . . ."47 California's departure
43. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 534-35.
44. Justice Harlan forcefully urged against these implications in his dissent. Id. at 547-48
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
This line of argument, it seems to me, would lead to results which are inconsistent
with the vital principles of republican government. If the presence in the fifth
amendment of a specific provision for grand juries, in capital cases, along-side the
provision for due process of law in proceedings involving life, liberty, or property,
is held to prove that 'due process of law' did not, in the judgment of the framers
of the constitution, necessarily require a grand jury in capital cases, inexorable logic
would require it to be likewise held that the right not to be put twice in jeopardy
of life and limb, for the same offense, nor compelled in a criminal case to testify
against one's self,-rights and immunities also specifically recognized in the fifth
amendment-were not protected by that due process of law required by the settled
usages and proceedings existing under the common and statute law of England at
the settlement of this country. More than that, other amendments of the constitution
proposed at the same time expressly recognize [diverse other rights] .... Will it be
claimed that none of the rights were secured by the "law of the land" or "due
process of law". . .7
Id.
45. See infra notes 128-150 and accompanying text. Justice Harlan's dissents have proven
to be prescient in other contexts. Compare generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-
64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEo. L.J. 253, 279 (1982).
47. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). Accordingly, the Hurtado Court
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from the common law tradition of indictment by grand jury in felony
cases was considered simply a matter of procedure, and not incon-
sistent with due process of law.48
Perhaps ironically, the imperative that the Constitution be inter-
preted to keep pace with "an undefined and expanding future,"49 to
permit "change from time to time, with the advancement of legal
science and the progress of society," 50 is a dominant theme in the
majority opinion in Hurtado.5 1 Whether the Hurtado decision with-
stands scrutiny under this directive is questionable, given the radically
different notions of due process of law, and the constitutional
requirements that attend the administration of capital punishment
over a hundred years later. Before these matters are broached, the
origin and development of the grand jury, and the recognition of
that institution in the Bill of Rights, merit further consideration.
Many aspects of this history that could have figured significantly in
Hurtado were given short shrift in the majority opinion.
2. The Origins and Development of the Grand Jury
The origin of the common law grand jury is usually traced to 1166
and the Assize of Clarendon, during the reign of King Henry J1.52
observed, "[i]t follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in
furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law." Id. at 537.
48. Id. at 532.
49. Id. at 531.
50. Id. at 521 (quoting Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 149 (1872)).
51. See, e.g., Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529 ("But to hold that [settled usage] ... is essential
to due process of law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render
it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians."). "It is more consonant
to the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal
liberty and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and developed by a progressive
growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms and processes
found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of
self-government." Id. at 530. "The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true,
by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of the English law and history;
but it was made for an undefined and expanding future. . . ." Id. "[Als it was the characteristic
principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are
not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should
expect that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and
shape it into new and not less useful forms." Id, at 531.
52. See, e.g., I BEALE & BRYsoN, supra note 12 § 1.02, at 4-5; 1 F. POLLOCK & F.
MArrTLAND, Tan HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE Tnsn OF EDWARD I at 151-52 (2d ed.
1968, orig. pub. 1895); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIsToRY OF ENcLISH LAW 321 (4th ed. 1922);
1 STEPHN'S COIM NTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 47 (,V. Winder ed., 21st ed. 1950); R.
YouNoER, Tim PEOFYL'S PANEL 1 (1963). Some historians trace the origin of the grand jury
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The assize53 instructed "the twelve most lawful men of the hundred
and ... the four most lawful men of every viii," to appear before
the sheriffs and judges and disclose, under oath, whether any in the
jurisdiction were "accused or believed" to have committed designated
felonies.54 This body only made accusations, and did not render
judgment5 5 Accusations were based upon the collective knowledge
of the grand jury's members, rather than through the summoning
and testimony of witnesses. 6 The accused's guilt was determined by
ordeal57 Those found guilty suffered the loss of a foot, and forfeited
their property to the king..8 Even if acquitted by the ordeal, the
accused was often banished from the land. 9 In 1176, through the
Assize of Northampton, the accusing body was obligated to report
those suspected of a greater class of crimes, and punishment upon
to the Constitutions of Clarendon, signed in 1164. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic
Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am. CGnm. L. REV. 701, 705-07 (1972); Deutsch, The Improper
Use of the Federal Grand Jury: An Instrument for the Internment of Political Activists, 75
J. Cpan. L. & CRnANoLoGY 1159, 1163 (1984); Plucknett, supra note 35 at 113 n.l. Some
trace the grand jury to even earlier times, suggesting that antecedents of the institution were
used in ancient Athens. See I W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRu1AL PROCEDURE § 8.2(a) (1985);
G. EDWARDS, Tan GRAND JURY at 1-5 (1973, orig. pub. 1906).
53. "Assize" can take on several meanings. "[I]t began by signifying a solemn session of
a council or a court, and soon came to mean an enactment made at such a meeting. . . ." T.
PLUCKNETr, supra note 35 at 112.
54. Chapter 1 of the Assize of Clarendon of 1166, as quoted in T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 35 at 112-13, reads as follows:
First the aforesaid King Henry established by the counsel of all his barons for the
maintenance of peace and justice, that inquiry shall be made in every county and
in every hundred by the twelve most lawful men of the hundred and by the four
most lawful men of every vill, upon oath that they shall speak the truth, whether
in their hundred or vill there by any man who is accused or believed to be a robber,
murderer, thief, or a receiver of robbers, murderers or thieves since the King's
accession. And this the justices and sheriffs shall enquire before themselves.
A slightly different version is quoted in Schwartz, supra note 52 at 708 n.31.
55. The grand jurors were required to make accusations upon penalty of heavy fine.
Schwartz, supra note 52 at 708 n.31. They could even be imprisoned for failing to bring forth
accusations, upon the premise that they were concealing the truth from the King's officers.
Edwards, supra note 52 at 11-12. See also W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(a);
1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:02.
56. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYsON, supra note 12 at § 1:02. 1 STEPHEN'S COWoENTAuMS, supra
note 52 at 47. Accusations upon the initiative of the grand jurors were the original grand jury
"presentment," as distinguished from an indictment. See supra note 12.
57. Assize OF CLARENDON OF 1166, ch. 2, quoted in T. PLUCKNETrT, supra note 35 at 113.
The ordeal by water was used, and nearly always resulted in the accused's death. Schwartz,
supra note 52 at 708. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INsTrrUTION ON
TRIAL 7-9 (1977). See generally Tewksbury, The Ordeal as a Vehicle for Divine Intervention
in Medieval Europe, in BEFORE Ta LAW: AN INTRODUCTION rO TH LEGAL PaocEss 334 (3rd
ed. 1984).
58. 1 S. BEATE & W. BRYsON, supra note 12 at § 1:02.
59. Id.; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MATLAND, supra note 52 at 152; RADncuM & CRoss, Tim
ENGLISH LEGAL SYsTm 36 (G. Hand & D. Bentley eds., 6th ed. 1977); C. LOWELL, ENGLISH
CONSTrrUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY at 109 (1962); Morse, supra note 12 at 110.
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failing the ordeal was enhanced to the loss of both a hand and a
foot.6o
Contrary to much folklore, the original accusing jury was not
designed to help insulate citizens from unjust or unfounded criminal
prosecutions. Rather, the accusing jury served as an administrative
device to centralize and expand the king's power at the expense of
the church and the barons, and to help collect revenues. 6
1 Most
crimes previously had been prosecuted through private appeals rather
than in the name of the king. 62 The requirement in the Assize of
Clarendon that this local body report suspected offenders to the
king's agents, for further disposition, was among a series of Henry
II's maneuvers to enhance the authority of the crown and bolster his
finances .63
Accusations by this body naturally were much feared, given the
ensuing ordeal. In 1215, however, the Lateran Council divested the
clergy of authority to sanction trials by ordeal. Since ordeals de-
pended upon the premise of divine intervention for their legitimacy
they soon fell into disuse, leading eventually to trial by petit jury. 64
Until the petit jury became a distinct entity, however, the accusing
body also adjudicated suspects' guilt or innocence. 61
60. 1 S. BEAE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:02; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITAN,
supra note 52 at 152; Morse, supra note 12 at 110; G. EDWARDS, supra note 52 at 9 (Arson
and forgery were added to the list of crimes covered under the Assize of Clarendon).
61. Schwartz, supra note 52 at 701-03, 708-10; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MATAN, supra note
52 at 153; 1 S. BALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:02; M. FRANKEL & G. NAnsrAms,
supra note 57 at 6-7; 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(a); Deutsch, supra
note 52 at 1163; Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON L. REV. 33, 36
(1979); Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REv. 461, 463-65 (1959); Sullivan &
Nachman, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: Why the Grand Jury's Accusatory Function Should
Not Be Changed, 75 J. Canm. L. & CRIaMNOLOGY 1047, 1048 n.6 (1984).
62. Private parties continued to initiate criminal prosecutions in royal courts, known as
an "appeal of felony," with considerable regularity for at least 100 years after the inception
of the grand jury. Private appeals in murder cases continued as late as 1819 in England.
RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 59 at 37. See also C. LOWELL, supra note 59 at 109; 1
STEPEHEN'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 52 at 47; Morse, supra note 12 at 118-20. Whyte,
supra note 61 at 463; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 526 (1884).
63. Schwartz, supra note 52 at 707-10; T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 35 at 19; Morse, supra
note 12 at 107-08.
64. Subsequently, in 1219, King Henry III directed that modes of proof other than the
ordeal be employed in secular courts, a decision ultimately resulting in the petit, or trial jury.
J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY at 5 (2d ed. 1979); W. CARPENTER,
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN JURISPRUDENCE at 155-56 (1958); T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 35 at
118-19; J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OuR UNCERTAIN COmmMENT TO REP-
RESENTATIVE PANELS at 3 (1977).
65. G. EDWARDS, supra note 52 at 21-23; 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 52 at 322; 1 S.
BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:02; Whyte, supra note 61 at 466; Morse, supra
note 12 at 114.
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The obvious drawbacks in this arrangement produced a gradual
separation of the accusing jury and the trial jury. This division
became assured through legislation enacted by Parliament in 1352.66
"Le graunde inquest" thus emerged as a distinct accusatory body,
With the same essential functions of contemporary grand juries.6 It
originally was comprised of 24 members, or twice the size of the
traditional trial jury, and later was reduced to 23 to avoid the
possibility of tie votes.
68
As time passed the grand jury ceased relying exclusively upon the
knowledge of its own members in making accusations against sus-
pected felons, although it retained the authority to do so. Prosecu-
tions could be authorized on the initiative of the grand jury through
a charging instrument known as a "presentment." When a represen-
tative of the crown referred an accusation to the grand jury, and
presented supporting evidence, the charging instrument was an "in-
dictment." ' 69 If the grand jury found sufficient cause to bring the
accused to trial, it returned a "true bill." If, on the other hand, the
grand jury concluded that there were insufficient grounds to support
the accusation, it marked "ignoramus," or "not a true bill," upon
the indictment. 70 Misdemeanor trials could be commenced without
the prior endorsement of a grand jury, upon an information.7' Capital
crimes could be prosecuted only upon presentment or indictment.
72
Not until 1681, some 500 years after its inception (an epoch
virtually ignored by the Hurtado majority), did the grand jury come
to be perceived as protecting individuals from unjust or unfounded
accusations instead of as simply assisting the king in the administra-
tion of the law.7 3 The occasion was King Charles II's attempt to
66. 25 Edward 11, stat. 5, ch. 3 (1352). See T. PLuCKNETT, supra note 35 at 127; J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 64 at 4;. Van Dyke, The Grand Jury: Representative or Elite?, 28 HAsi jNS
L.J. 37, 38 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 52 at 711 n.47.
67. 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(a); Van Dyke, supra note 66 at 38;
Morse, supra note 12 at 114-16; G. EDWARDS, supra note 52 at 2, 25-27.
68. 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.4(a); Van Dyke, supra note 66 at 38;
G. EDWARDS, supra note 52 at 2.
69. See note 12, supra.
70. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12 at 301; 2 J. STORY, supra note 12 at 544-45; RADcLiFFE
& CRoss, supra note 59 at 197-98; 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(a).
71. See supra note 28, and accompanying text. The use of informations to initiate
misdemeanor prosecutions dates to the latter part of the 13th century, making this practice
nearly as old as the use of grand jury presentments. Informations later were used to bring
people before the court of Star Chamber. Whyte, supra note 61 at 469. See also Morse, supra
note 12 at 118-20.
72. See supra notes 28, 35-38 and accompanying text. See also Whyte, supra note 61 at
469; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885). Private appeals, however, were sometimes
used to commence prosecutions as well. See generally note 62, supra.
73. Schwartz, supra note 52 at 720-21; M. FR-AN=E. & G. NAPTALis, supra note 57 at 9;
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have treason charges lodged against Anthony Ashley Cooper, the
first Earl of Shaftesbury, and Stephen Colledge, one of Shaftesbury's
followers. An imbroglio had ensued between the Roman Catholic
king and a strong coterie of Protestant dissidents that resulted in
Charles' attempting to bring Colledge and Shaftesbury to trial.74
Notwithstanding pressure exerted by royal judges, different grand
juries refused to return true bills of indictment against the accused,
and the prosecutions were temporarily thwarted.75
The mettle displayed by the grand juries in resisting the crown's
considerable efforts to influence their decisions in these cases has
come to symbolize the shielding, or "buffering" function that is now
so closely associated with the institution of the grand jury. 76 In
reality, however, these cases more accurately portray the politicization
of the accusatory process rather than signifying grand jury fair-
minded independence. The grand juries that originally considered the
indictments against Colledge and Shaftesbury were predominantly
made up of Protestants who were not at all sympathetic to the King's
perorations. Colledge subsequently was indicted by a grand jury in
a different venue, convicted of the alleged offenses, and was executed.
Shaftesbury fled the country after the election of Tory sheriffs in
London gave Charles the authority to make appointments to the
grand jury, and he died while still in exile.
77
Nevertheless, the notion of the grand jury that was transported
from England to the American colonies was that of a "bulwark of
I W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(a); Van Dyke, supra note 66 at 39; Sullivan
& Nachman, supra note 61 at 1048 n.6; Deutsch, supra note 52 at 1163-64; R. YOUNGER,
supra note 52 at 2.
74. Charles II secretly was a Catholic who desired to restore England's relationship with
the Roman Catholic Church. Most of Parliament and most English subjects were adamantly
opposed to the Catholic Church resuming sovereignty. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the first Earl
of Shaftesbury, had formerly been one of the King's closest advisors, but was ousted from
his position and became a leader in the Anglican Church's opposition to King Charles. He
actively attempted to thwart the chances of Charles' brother, James, the Duke of York-who
openly was a Roman Catholic-of ascending to the crown. Steven Colledge was a supporter
of the Protestant cause and a follower of Shaftesbury. The Crown attempted to have Colledge
indicted before a London grand jury for plotting to seize the King and uttering treasonous
remarks about him. An indictment also was submitted to a London grand jury charging
Shaftesbury with treason. See Schwartz, supra note 52 at 711-18.
75. After the grand jury returned the ignoramus bill-i.e., did not return a true bill of
indictment-in Colledge's case, the Lord Chief Justice demanded an explanation. The foreman
of the grand jury was arrested, questioned, sent to the Tower and subsequently was forced to
flee the country. Schwartz, supra note 52 at 715. A number of irregularities marked the
indictment process in Shaftesbury's case. The presiding judge delivered a biased charge to the
grand jury, and evidence was presented in public instead of private. Id. at 716-18.
76. Id. at 720L21; 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12, § 1:02, at 8-9; M. FRANKL.
& G. NArnAms, supra note 57 at 9; 1 W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(a); Van
Dyke, supra note 66 at 39.
77. Schwartz, supra note 52 at 715, 718-21.
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•.. rights and privileges." 78 The esteem of the grand jury grew when
successive New York grand juries refused to return true bills of
indictment for seditious libel against John Peter Zenger, after he had
printed a newspaper containing articles which infuriated crown of-
ficials. 79 Grand juries were used in all of the colonies, 0 and prior to
the adoption of the United States Constitution each of the states
required that felony prosecutions be commenced by presentment or
indictment.81 Three of the states specifically provided for such in
their constitutions, s2 while in other states it was implicit that the
right of grand jury review was encompassed within "due process"
and "law of the land" provisions in state constitutions.83
The representatives of many states were concerned that the pro-
posed United States Constitution failed to require that federal pro-
secutions be commenced by grand jury presentment or indictment.
Some argued forcefully at their constitutional ratifying conventions
that the federal constitution should be amended to include this
protection.8 4
78. R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 21. The grand jury was "justly regarded as one of the
securities of the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and.. .one
of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty." Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329,
344 (1857). See Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
79. See generally V. BuaaNwEr , THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (1957); H. M=LLER, THE
CASE FOR LIBERTY 30-66 (1965); Whyte, supra note 61 at 484; Schwartz, supra note 52 at 723
n.105; Deutsch, supra note 52 at 1165 ri.32. Zenger subsequently was brought to trial upon
an information and acquitted. Colonial grand juries demonstrated their resistance to royal
prosecutions on numerous other occasions as well, including a Boston grand jury that refused
to return true bills of indictments against alleged leaders of the riots against the Stamp Act.
See R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 5-40; M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 57 at 10-12;
Deutsch, supra note 52 at 1165; 1 S. BEAIT & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:03.
80. The different colonies' experiences with the grand jury are discussed in R. YOUNGER,
supra note 52 at 6-16. See also 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:03. The earliest
specific guarantee of the right to grand jury review in the colonies was in the New York
"Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges" of 1683. It provided, inter alia, "That in all Cases
Capital or Criminal there shall be a grand Inquest who shall first present the offence and then
twelve men of the neighborhood to try the Offender who after his plea to the Indictment shall
be allowed his reasonable Challenges." Quoted in 1 B. ScHwARTz, THE BILL OF Rioirrs: A
Docuimlr AY HISTORY at 166 (1971).
81. 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAE, supra note 52 § 15.1(a), at 278; R. YOUNGER, supra note
52 at 37.
82. The North Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776 was the first state constitution to
guarantee the right to grand jury review of criminal charges. 1 B. ScHwARtTz, supra note 80
at 286. It provided: "That no freeman shall be put to answer any criminal charge, but by
indictment, presentment, or impeachment." N. C. DEC. RIGHTS art. VIII (1776), quoted in 1
B. ScnwARTZ, supra note 80 at 287. Pennsylvania and Delaware also guaranteed the right to
indictment or presentment by grand jury in their state constitutions. I S. BEALE & W. BRYSON,
supra note 12 § 1:04, at 18.
83. Id. See also R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 37.
84. 2 ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDmRL. CONSTIUnON 110 (2d ed. 1836). For example, Abraham Holmes, at the
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An article proposing that the federal constitution be amended to
remedy this omission was approved at the Massachusetts convention
and reported to Congress.8" New York and New Hampshire also
recommended at the conclusion of their ratifying conventions that
Congress consider the right of grand jury presentment or indictment
among the amendments to the Constitution that would be proposed
in 1789.86
James Madison received these and other submissions from the
states, eight of which had suggested constitutional amendments for
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, inveighed that:
there is no provision made in the Constitution to prevent the attorney-general from
filing information against any person, whether he is indicted by the grand jury or
not; in consequence of which the most innocent person in the commonwealth may
be taken by virtue of a warrant issued in consequence of such information, and
dragged from his home, his friends, his acquaintance, and confined in prison, until
the next session of the court, which has jurisdiction of the crime with which he is
charged (and how frequent those sessions are to be we are not informed of) and
after long, tedious and painful imprisonment, though acquitted on trial, may have
no possibility to obtain any kind of satisfaction for the loss of his liberty, the loss
of his time, great expenses, and perhaps cruel sufferings.
Id. See also 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 80 at 690; 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12
§ 1:04, at 19. In response, Mr. Gore discounted these fears, pointing out that the Massachusetts
state constitution did not specifically guarantee the right to grand jury presentment or
indictment, and that "no difficulty or danger has arisen to the people." Id. ELLIOT, supra at
113, quoted in 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at 22 n.13 (also noting that, "Article
XII of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was subsequently
interpreted as guaranteeing the right to indictment by grand jury. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass.
329, 342-349 (1857)"). The other germane comment registered at the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention of 1788 was by Mr. Adams:
Your excellency's next proposition is, to introduce the indictment of a grand jury,
before any person shall be tried for any crime, by which he may incur infamous
punishment, or loss of life; and it is followed by another, which recommends a trial
by a jury in civil actions.... These and several others which I have mentioned are
so evidently beneficial as to need no comment of mine....
2 B. Scm ARTz, supra note 80 at 698.
85. Massachusetts proposed nine articles as amendments to the United States Constitution.
The sixth article dealt with grand juries: "That no person shall be tried for any crime, by
which he may incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, until he first be indicted by a
grand jury, except in such cases as may arise in the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces." Id. at 677. See id. at 675; 1 S. BEAJE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 § 1:04,
at 19. This provision is considered the direct antecedent of the grand jury clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 424 (1885). See
also 2 B. ScHwARTz, supra note 80 at 676.
86. 2 B. ScHwA'Rz, supra note 80 at 761, quoting the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution proposed by the New Hampshire Ratifying Convention of 1788, which is
identical to the Massachusetts proposal, supra note 85; id. at 912, quoting the amendment
relevant to the grand jury proposed at the New York Ratifying Convention of 1788: "That
(except in the Government of the Land and Naval Forces, and of the Militia when in actual
Service, and in cases of Impeachment), a Presentment or Indictment by a Grand Jury ought
to be observed as a necessary preliminary to the trial of all crimes cognizable by the Judiciary
of the United States .... See generally 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 § 1:04, at
19; R. YoulaER, supra note 52 at 45.
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Congressional consideration. 7 On June 8, 1789 he introduced before
the House of Representatives nine separately numbered proposed
amendments to the United States Constitution. The seventh of the
amendments, which was to have been inserted in Article III, section
two of the Constitution, included a number of rights related to trial
by jury. Among these was a guarantee that, "in all crimes punishable
with loss of life or member, presentment or indictment by a grand
jury shall be an essential preliminary ... "I'
Madison's proposals were referred to the House acting as a Com-
mittee of the Whole, and eventually to a select committee, of which
Madison was a member. The committee made certain stylistic
changes,8 9 and on July 28 reported the proposed amendments to the
House. The right to grand jury was recognized in the language that
survived in its ultimate form: ".... and no person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury....
87. 1 B. ScHwARaz, supra note 80 at 983.
88. The entirety of the seventh amendment proposed by Madison was as follows:
That in article 3d, section 2, the third clause be struck out, and in its place be
inserted the clauses following, to wit:
The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or the militia when on actual service, in time of war or public
danger) shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite
of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed
requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member, presentment or
indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential preliminary, provided that in cases
of crimes committed within any county which may be in possession of an enemy,
or in which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be authorized
in some other county of the same State, as near as may be to the seat of the
offence.
In cases of crimes not committed within any county, the trial may by law be in
such county as the laws shall have prescribed. In suits at common law, between man
and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people,
ought to remain inviolate.
B. ScHwARrz, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKiND: A HISTORY OF THE AERIuCAN BL oF RIOrrs
233 (1977). See also Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 424 (1885).
89. The "Committee of Eleven" was comprised of one representative from each of the
11 states that had ratified the federal constitution (North Carolina and Rhode Island had not).
John Vining, of Delaware, was chair of the committee. Madison was the appointee from
Virginia, and Roger Sherman, the other well-known member of the committee, was from
Connecticut. The committee received the proposals on July 21, 1789, and issued its report
only one week later. B. ScawARaz, supra note 88 at 171-72. See also Ex parle Wilson, 114
U.S. 417, 424 (1885).
90. This clause remained embedded among other rights pertinent to trial by jury, and
was still to be inserted into Article III, section 2 of the Constitution. See note 88 supra; B.
ScnvArrz, supra note 88 at 236-37. This version applied the grand jury right to "capital or
otherwise infamous" crimes, instead of "all crimes punishable with loss of life or member,"
as in Madison's original proposal. Before the 1790's there were no penitentiaries in the colonies,
states, or federal jurisdiction. Local jails typically held only persons awaiting trial, and debtors,
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Debate began on the recommended amendments on August 13,
1789, and culminated on August 24. The proposals were adopted in
substantial part, in somewhat revised form. The House also voted
to collect the amendments and append them to the original consti-
tution, instead of inserting them piecemeal into the text, as had been
Madison's design. The grand jury clause received little debate, and
it was approved with slight modification as the tenth of the amend-
ments submitted for Senate consideration. 9
The United States Senate met behind closed doors until 1794. As
a consequence Senate debates on the proposed amendments were not
made public, and they were not otherwise preserved. The Senate had
received 17 amendments from the House. The right to grand jury
review was included in the seventh of the Senate's proposed amend-
ments, along with rights against double jeopardy and self-incrimi-
nation, and with those guaranteeing due process of law and just
compensation for the public taking of private property. This pro-
posal, including the grand jury guarantee, was subsequently approved
by the House and ratified by the states as the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution.92 The right not to be "held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury" thus assumed its place in the Bill
of Rights. 93
but rarely were used to punish convicted offenders. Thus, "loss of life or member" were
prevalent modes of punishment, as penitentiaries had not yet emerged as an alternative. See D.
RoTrmtAN, Tma DiscovERY OF TE As Lum, 52-62 (1971). The phrase, "or otherwise infamous
crime," later was to be interpreted to apply to felonies, i.e., offenses for which confinement in
a penitentiary could follow upon conviction. See also Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
91. The tenth article submitted to the Senate was as follows:
The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of War or
public danger) shall be by an Impartial Jury of the Vicinage, with the requisite of
unanimity for conviction, the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites;
and no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury; but if a crime be committed
in a place in the possession of an enemy, or in which an insurrection may prevail,
the indictment and trial may by law be authorized in some other place within the
same State.
B. ScvARr z supra note 88 at 240. See generally id. at 172-81.
92. Id. at 181-86, 191, 243. Twelve proposed amendments were submitted to the states,
with the one including the grand jury clause listed originally as the seventh. The first two
proposed amendments were not ratified, however, resulting in the grand jury clause being
among the rights guaranteed in the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. For
the text of the fifth amendment, as adopted and as it presently stands, see supra notes 1 & 2
and accompanying text.
93. An historian of the grand jury reports that: "The grand jury entered the post-
Revolutionary period high in the esteem of the American people. The institution had proved
valuable indeed in opposing the imperial government and indictment by a grand jury had
assumed the position of a cherished right." R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 41.
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Seven of the first eight states that entered the union after the
revolution specifically provided for the right to grand jury present-
ment or indictment in their constitutions. 4 Only Louisiana, a state
without a common law tradition, did not. Toward the mid 1800's,
however, concomitantly with Jeremy Bentham's caustic criticisms of
the English grand jury,95 support for the institution began to wane
in this country. Critics raised concerns about the broad inquisitional
powers retained by these citizens' panels, their cost-effectiveness, and
their necessity.
9 6
In 1850 Michigan became the first state to remove the right to
grand jury indictment from its constitution, and in 1859 the state
legislature authorized felony prosecutions to be commenced upon
information. 97 Indiana soon followed suit, and the new constitutions
of Kansas and Oregon did not require grand juries.98 Following the
Civil War the number of states that authorized the use of informa-
tions in lieu of grand jury action grew. 99
California's new constitution of 1879, which came under review in
Hurtado, authorized a similar reform. The Supreme Court's approval
of the prosecution of state felonies by information in Hurtado served
as a further impetus in this movement. In late 1884, just a few
months after Hurtado, the Iowa legislature was given the constitu-
tional authority to abolish grand juries by a special referendum.
94. 1 S. BALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 § 1:04, at 21 & notes 28-29, citing ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 12 (1819); ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 (1818); IND. CoNsT. art. I, § 12 (1816);
Ky. CONST. art. XII, § 10 (1792); Miss. CONSr. art. I, § 12 (1817); OMo CONST. art. VIII, §
10 (1802); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (1796); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (1812). The authors
further note that Connecticut's first constitution, which was not enacted until after that state's
admission to the union, also guaranteed the right of grand jury indictment or presentment.
Id. at 23 n.28, citing CONN. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 (1818).
95. See 2 TE WORKS oF JERaMY BENTHAM 139-40, 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843); J. BENrTHAM,
THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, As APPLIED TO SpECIAL Jutums 14-28 (1821), cited
and discussed in R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 56-57. See also Whyte, supra note 61 at 483.
96. R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 59-66. See also supra note 95 (discussing critical works
of Jeremy Bentham).
97. Id. at 66-68; 1 S. BEA.E & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:05. Coincidentally,
Michigan also was the first American jurisdiction to effectively abolish the death penalty, a
reform which antedated its abrogation of the requirement for grand jury indictment or
presentment. The Territory of Michigan voted in 1846 to prohibit capital punishment for all
crimes except treason, with such legislation becoming effective March 1, 1847. W. BowERs,
LEGAL HOIacIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 9 (1984).
98. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:05. During this same time period,
1850 through 1865, Ohio and Nevada adopted provisions in their state constitutions that
required indictment or presentment by grand jury for serious crimes. Id. See also R. YOUNGER,
supra note 52 at 67-71.
99. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:05. A Wisconsin referendum and the
constitutions of Illinois, Nebraska, and Colorado permitted such changes. Id.
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Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington and
Wyoming all were admitted to statehood in 1889, and none required
that felony prosecutions be initiated by grand jury action. Indicting
grand juries became rarities in the western states because of financial
constraints and the inefficiency of convening such bodies in expansive
judicial districts.?0
With the advent of World War I, England suspended its use of
grand juries. While many criticisms were made of the institution,
economics led to the grand jury's ultimate demise in the country of
its origin. In 1933, while the country was in the throes of the great
depression, Parliament abolished the grand jury by statute for most
crimes, 1 1 and it did so completely in 1948.102
In the United States, on the other hand, the grand jury began to
receive renewed support after World War I. Groups such as the
Grand Jurors' Association of New York actively lobbied on behalf
of grand juries. 0 3 The grand jury's utility in investigating government
corruption was heralded, °4 and the trend toward its elimination for
indictment purposes came to a virtual halt. Between 1930 and 1970
only one state, Oregon, eliminated the indicting grand jury.105
100. R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 151-54; 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at §
1:05. All states, however, retained the authority to convene and make use of indicting grand
juries, and used them with some regularity as investigative bodies.
101. Administration of Justice (Misc. Provisions) Act 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 36, § I.
See R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 224-26; Whyte, supra note 61 at 483; Lewis, supra note
61 at 61; Van Dyke supra note 66 at 41; Note, Some Aspects of the California Grand Jury
System, 8 STAN. L. REv. 631, 632 (1956); Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jury in England, 25
J. CRui. L., CR~dINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 623 (1934).
102. The Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 58, § 83, sched. 10, pt. I. See
Lewis, supra note 61 at 61. In Canada all provinces except Nova Scotia have abolished the
grand jury. I W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(b), at 604-05 n.7.
103. This association published and distributed The Panel, and actively promoted the
virtues of grand juries. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:05. The Grand Jurors'
Association of New York existed until 1971, when it went out of existence. M. FRAKEa.L &
G. NAFrALIS, supra note 57 at 17. See generally, R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 148, 228.
104. Among the more notorious instances of grand juries' investigating public corruption
involved the "Boss" Tweed scandal in New York City in the early 1870's, and a grand jury
working in New York City with special prosecutor Thomas Dewey during the mid 1930's to
investigate organized racketeering. See generally id. at 182-208, 234-36; 1 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 8.2(b); 1 S. BEATE & W. BRYsoN, supra note 12 at § 1:05.
105. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:05. This was notwithstanding continued
criticisms of the grand jury, including a recommendation for its abolition by the Wickersham
Commission. NATIONAL COMMMSSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION at 34-37 (1931). The American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure
authorized the prosecution of crimes either by information or indictment. ALI CODE CUM.
PROC. § 113 (Final Draft 1931). See Note, An Examination of the Grand Jury in New York,
2 COL. J. LAW & Soc. PROBS. 88, 89 (1966); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at §
15.2(a).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
Efforts to trim costs and enhance the efficiency of systems of
criminal justice then began to impact upon the grand jury. In the
1970's Illinois and Maryland enacted legislation that removed existing
requirements for indictment by grand jury. 106 Hawaii and Connecticut
did so by constitutional amendment in 1982.107 The fifth amendment's
grand jury clause, in the meantime, survived a series of hearings and
proposals that would have eliminated indictment by grand jury as a
federal constitutional requirement. 08
At present the constitution and statutes of 28 states authorize all
crimes to be prosecuted without grand jury indictment or present-
ment.1°9 Eighteen states and the District of Columbia require that
106. 1 S. BFAME & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 1:05. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §
592 (1972).
107. HAw. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1982); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 806-6 (1985); CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (1982); CONN. STAT. ANN. § 54-46 (1985). Pennsylvania adopted a
constitutional amendment and enabling legislation which authorized the several courts of
common pleas, upon the approval of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, to provide for the
initiation of criminal proceedings by information, deviating from the prior requirement of
grand jury indictment or presentment. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1973); 42 PA. CONSOL.
STAT. ANN. § 8931 (1982).
108. See Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H. R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 484
(1977); The Grand Jury Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 3405 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess,
154 (1978). See generally Arenella, Reforming the Grand Jury and the State Preliminary
Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MicH. L. RaV. 463, 537 n.376 (1980);
Sullivan & Nachman, supra note 61 at 1047.
109. Axuz. CONST. art. 2, § 30 (authorizing prosecution by information or indictment, but
if by information in felony cases, a preliminary hearing before a magistrate also is required,
absent a waiver); ARK. CoNsT. amend. 21, § I (indictment or information); CAL. CoNST. art.
I, § 14 (indictment or, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, by information);
CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 8 (until otherwise provided by law, felony prosecutions must be
commenced upon indictment); art. II, § 23 (authorizing the general assembly to regulate or
abolish the grand jury system); Colo. Rev. Stat. tit. 16-5-205 (1978) (authorizing prosecutions
to be commenced by indictment or information); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (crimes punishable
by death or life imprisonment require probable cause hearing, amending, in 1982, prior
requirement for presentment or indictment in such cases); CONN. STAT. ANN. § 54-46 (1985)
(all crimes charged on or after May 26, 1983 may be prosecuted by complaint or information;
capital crimes or crimes punishable by life imprisonment committed prior to that date require
presentment or indictment by grand jury); HAw. CONST. art. I, § 10 (requiring grand jury
indictment or presentment, or a finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing); HAWv.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 806-6 (1985) (authorizing prosecution by indictment or information); IDAHO
CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (presentment or indictment by grand jury, or prosecutor's information after
commitment by a magistrate); ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 (requiring that felony prosecutions be
commenced by grand jury indictment, but authorizing the General Assembly to abolish or
limit the use of the grand jury; further requiring that felony prosecutions be commenced either
by indictment, or after the accused "has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish
probable cause"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 111-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1987 supp.) (felonies
may be prosecuted by indictment or information, but if by information only after a preliminary
hearing has been held, and probable cause found, or after waiver of such hearing); IND.
CONST. art. 7, § 17 (authorizing the General Assembly to modify or abolish the grand jury
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the prosecution of serious crimes commence by action of a grand
system); IND. STAT. ANN. S 35-34-1-1(a) (Bums 1985) ("Any crime may be charged by indictment
or information."); IOWA CONST. 1884 amend. 3 ("... the General Assembly may provide for
holding persons to answer for any criminal offense without the intervention of a grand jury.");
IOwA CODE ANN. § 813.2, Rule 5.1 (1987 Supp.) (authorizing all indictable offenses to be tried
by information); Rule 5.4 (1987 Supp.) (requiring judge or magistrate to approve informations,
by finding that "the evidence contained in the information and the minutes of evidence, if
unexplained, would warrant a conviction by the trial jury;" informations not approved may
be presented to grand jury for consideration); Kansas' constitution is silent about grand juries;
KANS. STAT. ANN. § 22-3201(1) (1986 supp.) (authorizing prosecutions to be upon complaint,
indictment or information); MD. CoNsT. art. 21 (specifying only that those accused of crime
have "a right ... to have a copy of the Indictment or charge .. ." in order to prepare a
defense); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 592(a), (b)(3) (1986 Supp.) (authorizing felonies to be
prosecuted by information, after a preliminary hearing and a finding of probable cause, if
affirmatively requested; further specifying that if the prosecutor elects to proceed by grand
jury indictment, a preliminary hearing may be held at the court's discretion, but is not a
matter of right); the Michigan Constitution makes no mention of a right to presentment or
indictment by grand jury; MicH. Comrn. LAws ANN. § 767.1 (West 1982) (granting courts the
same power to try prosecutions upon information as upon indictment); Mo. CONsT. art. I, §
17 (authorizing prosecution of all felonies by indictment or information); Mo. STAT. ANN. §
545.010 (1987) (same); MONT. CoNsT. art. II, § 20(1) (all criminal actions tried in the district
courts, except those on appeal, to be prosecuted "either by information, after examination
and commitment by a magistrate or after leave granted by court, or by indictment without
such examination, commitment or leave"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-102(1) (1983) (authorizing
trial by indictment or information in the district courts); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 10 (specifying
that felonies be prosecuted by grand jury presentment or indictment, but providing that "the
Legislature may by law provide for holding persons to answer for criminal offenses on
information of a public prosecutor; and may by law abolish, limit, change, amend, or otherwise
regulate the grand jury system"); NEV. REV. STAT. STAT. § 29-1601 (1985) (granting courts
power to try crimes upon information or indictment); NEv. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (capital or other
infamous crimes to be tried upon grand jury presentment or indictment, or upon information);
NEv. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 173.025 (Michie 1986) (giving courts power to try cases upon
information or indictment); N. M. CONST. art. II, § 14 (presentment or indictment of grand
jury, or information plus preliminary hearing, or waiver of same); N. D. CoNsT. art. I, § 10
(requiring that felony prosecutions be commenced by indictment "[u]nless otherwise provided
by law," but specifying that "[t]he legislative assembly may change, regulate or abolish the
grand jury system"); N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-09-02 (1987 Supp.) (allowing prosecution
upon information and preliminary examination before a magistrate when no grand jury has
been convened); N. D. RuLE CRIM. PRo. 7(a) (authorizing the prosecution of crimes by
indictment or information); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17 (felonies to be prosecuted upon
presentment, indictment, or upon information and preliminary examination before magistrate,
unless such examination is waived); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 301 (Vest 1969) (felonies to
be prosecuted upon indictment or information); OR. CONST. art. VII, § 5(3)-(5) (felonies must
be prosecuted by indictment unless waived, or upon probable cause shown at a preliminary
hearing, in which case prosecution may be by information); PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibits
prosecution by information for "any indictable offense," but provides that "[e]ach of the
several courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Supreme Court, provide for
the initiation of criminal proceedings therein by information filed in the manner provided by
law."); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8931 (Purdon 1982) (same, and requiring that
preliminary hearings be conducted or waived for prosecutions commenced by information); S.
D. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (criminal offenses may be prosecuted upon presentment or indictment
of a grand jury, or information by a prosecutor, and providing that "the grand jury may be
modified or abolished by law"); S. D. CODFmD LAWS §§ 23A-6-1, 23A-6-3 (1979) (authorizing
prosecution by indictment, or information and preliminary hearing, unless hearing is waived);
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13 (indictable offenses may be prosecuted by information after
examination by magistrate, unless waived, or by indictment, with or without such examination;
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jury unless indictment is waived, u0 although no waiver is permitted
the formation, powers and duties of the grand jury "shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-5(a) (1982) (authorizing criminal prosecutions to be by information
or indictment); Vermont's constitution is silent about grand jury presentments or indictments;
VT. RULE CRi. PRoc. 7(a) (1983) ("Any offense may be prosecuted by indictment or
information at the option of the prosecutor."); WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 25 (authorizing
prosecution by information or indictment, "as shall be prescribed by law"); WAsH. REv. CODE
ANN., § 10.37.015 (1980) (felonies may be prosecuted by indictment or information); Wiscon-
sin's constitution makes no specific provision for grand juries; WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 967.05
(West 1985) (authorizing prosecution upon complaint, information or indictment); Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 971.02 (West 1985) (felonies charged by complaint require preliminary examination,
unless waived, or no indictment or information may be filed); Wyo. CoNsT. art. I, § 13
(felonies must be prosecuted by indictment "[u]nless otherwise provided by law. . . ."); Wyo.
STAT. § 7-1-06(a) (1987) (authorizing prosecution of crimes by indictment or information).
110. ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 8, as amended by amendment no. 37 (authorizing the legislature
to dispense with grand jury indictment in felony cases in which the accused pleads guilty upon
advice of counsel, except in capital cases); AxAsr.A CO ST. art. I, § 8 (prosecution by
information permitted upon accused's waiver of indictment or presentment); DEL. Co NsT. art.
I, § 8 (an "indictable offense" may not be prosecuted by information); Georgia has no explicit
constitutional requirement for grand jury indictment or presentment, but this is implicit under
the common law that is recognized in the state. Webb v. Henlery, 209 Ga. 447, 74 S.E.2d 7
(1953). See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-70(a) (1982), infra note 111; Ky. Co NsT. § 12 ("No person,
for an indictable offense, shall be proceeded against criminally by information .... "); Ky. R.
CR i. P. 6.02 (1986) (requiring prosecution by indictment unless waived by the accused); ME.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (presentment or indictment required for "capital or infamous crimes"); Mn.
REy. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 9(1)(2) (1983) (permitting prosecution by information upon waiver
of indictment, but specifying that murder shall be prosecuted by indictment); the Massachusetts
constitution contains no specific guarantee of the right to grand jury indictment or presentment,
but its "law of the land" provision has been interpreted to encompass such a right; Jones v.
Robbins, 74 Mass. 329 (1857); MAss. RuLE Canm. PRoc. 3(a), (b)(1) (Supp. 1988) (right to
indictment, which is deemed waived if accused requests probable cause hearing upon a criminal
complaint); Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 27 (prohibiting prosecution for "indictable offenses" upon
information, unless accused, represented by counsel, waives indictment by sworn statement);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-20 (Supp. 1986) (by implication, prohibiting waiver of indictment
in capital cases, see note 111, infra); New Hampshire's constitution makes no specific provision
for indictment or presentment by grand jury); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 601:1 (1986) (grand
jury indictment required for crimes punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one
year); N. J. CoNsT. art. I, para. 8 (presentment or indictment of grand jury required); N. Y.
CoNsT. art. I, § 6 (grand jury indictment required unless waived, in which case prosecution
may be by information; no waiver of indictment permitted if crime punishable by death or
life imprisonment); N. Y. Cuis. PRoC. L. § 195.10()(b) (McKinney's 1982) (no waiver of
indictment permitted in class A felonies, i.e., those punishable by death or life imprisonment);
N. C. CoNsT. art. I, § 22 (grand jury presentment or indictment required, but may be waived
in non-capital cases when accused is represented by counsel); Omo CoNsT. art. I, § 10
(requiring grand jury presentment or indictment for capital and otherwise infamous crimes);
Omo R. CaM. PROC. 7(A) (1987) (all felonies to be prosecuted by indictment; waiver permitted
if not punishable by death or life imprisonment); S. C. CONST. art. I, § 11 (presentment or
indictment required, although "[t]he General Assembly may provide for the waiver of an
indictment by the accused;" there appears to be no statutory authorization for the waiver of
same); TENN. CoNsT. art. I, § 14 (criminal offenses much be charged by indictment or
presentment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3-101 (1982) (same, but providing that an accused
represented by counsel may waive this right, and consent to be prosecuted upon information);
TEx. CoNsT. art. I, § 10 (requiring grand jury indictment); TEx. CODE CRnM. PROC. art. 1.141
(1977) (accused represented by counsel may waive right to indictment in open court for non-
capital felonies, and prosecution then shall be upon information); Virginia's Constitution is
silent about the right to grand jury; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-217 (1983) (requiring presentment
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in capital crimes or those punishable by life imprisonment in at least
nine of these states and the nation's capital."' Four states authorize
most felonies to be tried upon information, but require that capital
crimes or crimes punishable by life imprisonment be prosecuted by
indictment or presentment.Y2 Twenty-one of the 36 states in which
or indictment by grand jury in felonies, unless waived, in which case accused may be tried
upon warrant or information); W. VA. CONSr. art. III, § 4 (requiring presentment or indictment
by grand jury in felonies); W. VA. RuLE Ci u. PROC. 7(a) (1987) (offenses punishable by life
imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment; other felonies may be prosecuted by infor-
mation if indictment is waived); W. VA. RuLr Ciu. PRoc. 7(b) (1987) (prohibiting waiver of
indictment in cases punishable by life imprisonment); D. C. CODE ANN. § 23-301 (1981)
(felonies must be prosecuted by indictment unless waived in open court by the accused, and
if waived prosecution may be by information; capital offenses "shall be prosecuted by
indictment returned by a grand jury," which apparently may not be waived). Most of these
jurisdictions specifically authorize exceptions to indictment or presentment by grand jury for
cases arising in military service or the militia in time of war or public danger, similar to the
exception recognized in the fifth amendment's grand jury clause. See supra note 2. For other
recent summaries of jurisdictions that do and do not require presentment or indictment by
grand jury, and information about the size and selection procedures for grand juries in different
jurisdictions, see 1 S. BEAT & W. BRYsoN, supra note 12 at §§ 2:03-2:04, 6:37-6:38; SOURCEBOOK
OF CgnuNAL JusticE STATlsTcs-1985, at 81-84, Table 1.39 (T. Flanagan & E. McGarrell eds.
1986); VAN DYKE, supra note 64 at 264-70, App. B.
111. ALA. CoNsT. amend. 37, amending art. I, § 8 ("indictable offenses" may not be
prosecuted by information; however, grand jury may be dispensed with by the legislature if
the accused, in all felony cases "except those punishable by capital punishment," desires to
enter a plea of guilty); DELA. SuPER. CT. CRau. R. 7(a) (1975) (offenses punishable by death
shall be prosecuted by indictment; indictments may be waived, and prosecution may be upon
information for other crimes normally prosecuted by indictment); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-70(a)
(1982) (defendants in non-capital felonies may be prosecuted by district attorney "accusations,"
but must waive the right to grand jury indictment if they "goU to trial under such accusa-
tions .... "; MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-20 (1986 supp.) (seemingly requires indictment for
capital crimes, by invalidating capital convictions unless the offense has been "set forth in the
indictment by section and subsection number .... " (emphasis added)); N. H. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch. 601:2 (1986) (indictment may be waived for all crimes not punishable by death); N.
Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (no waiver of indictment in crimes punishable by death or life
imprisonment); N. Y. Caim. PRO. L. § 195.10()(b) (McKinney's 1982) (no waiver of indictment
in class A felonies, i.e., those punishable by death or life imprisonment); N. C. CONsT. art.
I, § 22 (permitting waiver of indictment only in non-capital cases); Omo R. CaM. PRoc. 7(A)
(1987) (indictment not waivable if crime punishable by death or life imprisonment); S. C.
CONST. art. I, § 11 (requires indictment or presentment by grand jury for all felonies, and
allows legislature to authorize waiver of same, but legislature appears not to have authorized
waivers for any indictable offenses); TEx. CODE Cams. PROC. art. 1.141 (Vernon 1977)
(authorizing waiver of indictment for "any offense other than a capital felony."); D. C. CODE
ANN. § 23-301 (1981) (requiring capital crimes to be prosecuted by indictment; permitting
waiver of indictment in other felonies, and prosecution upon information). (At present, the
death penalty is not available in the District of Columbia). In federal courts, of course, the
fifth amendment requires that felonies be prosecuted by indictment, and indictments are not
waivable for capital offenses. F. R. CaMs. PROC. 7(a) (1986); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S.
1 (1959). Congress recently enacted legislation authorizing capital punishment for a limited
class of intentional killings. See ANTi-DRUG AEUsE AcT OF 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001
et. seq., 102 Stat. 4390 (1988).
112. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(a) (capital crimes may be tried only upon presentment or
indictment by grand jury; other felonies may be tried upon a prosecutor's information); an
indictment apparently may not be waived in capital cases, FLA. R. Cent. PROC. 3.140(a)(1)
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the death penalty may be imposed permit capital trials to be initiated
without grand jury action,"' while seven of the 14 non-death penalty
states authorize murder to be prosecuted by information." 4
B. Post-Hurtado Changes: The Grand Jury, Due Process and
Capital Punishment
When the Hurtado Court in determined that the states were not
obliged to follow the common law and federal constitutional require-
ment of initiating felony prosecutions by grand jury presentment or
indictment, it espoused no virtue more highly than allowing state
legal systems flexibility in order to adapt to evolving conditions. The
Court refused to equate historical practice with the requisites of due
process of law, emphasizing that legal procedures necessarily change
(1975); LA. CONST. art. I, § 15 (capital crimes and crimes punishable by life imprisonment
must be upon indictment; other felonies may be prosecuted upon indictment or information);
no waiver of indictment apparently is permitted in these classes of cases, LA. CODE Cum.
PRoc. art. 382 (West Supp. 1987); Minnesota's constitution is silent about grand jury indict-
ments or presentments; MimN. RuLE Cm . PRoc. 17.01 (1987 Supp.) (offenses punishable by
life imprisonment shall be prosecuted by indictment, but other offenses may be prosecuted by
indictment or complaint); R. I. CONSr. amend. 40, § I (offenses punishable by death or life
imprisonment must be prosecuted upon presentment or indictment by a grand jury; other
felonies may be prosecuted by presentment, indictment or information, as provided by the
general assembly); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 12-12-1.1, 12-12-1.2 (1981) (requiring capital crimes to
be prosecuted by indictment, which may not be waived; requiring crimes punishable by life
imprisonment to be prosecuted by indictment, unless waived, and then upon information; and
authorizing other felonies to be tried by indictment or information).
113. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Mar-
yland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming authorize capital punishment and do not
require grand jury action for the trial of capital crimes. See supra note 109. California's
procedures for administering capital punishment are described more fully infra at notes 383-
389 and accompanying text. Pennsylvania permits deviation from grand jury indictments at
the option of local courts with the approval of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia authorize capital punishment and require
that capital crimes be prosecuted upon grand jury indictment or presentment. See supra notes
110 & 112. For a listing of the states that do and do not have capital punishment legislation
in effect, see NAACP LEoAL DETENSE AiN EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. I (May 1,
1988); BmREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BuuL'iN: CAPrrAL PUNISHNIENT, 1986 (1987). Vermont
is listed as a capital punishment jurisdiction in these publications, but recently eliminated its
death penalty provisions. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2303(a), 2311 (Supp. 1988).
114. Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, North Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin allow all
crimes to be tried without grand jury indictment or presentment, and do not authorize capital
punishment. See supra note 109. Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Rhode
Island and WVest Virginia generally require felonies to be prosecuted by indictment or present-
ment, (see supra note 110, or do so for crimes punishable by life imprisonment, (see supra
note 112). The District of Columbia requires that felonies be tried upon indictment, and is a
non-death penalty jurisdiction. In the federal courts felony trials are initiated by indictment.
See supra notes 110 & 111.
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with advancements in legal and social institutions."' Such declarations
were intended to liberate state procedures from federal constitutional
constraints; ironically, they have a hortative quality as well.
The concept of due process of law, and the doctrine governing the
application of bill of rights protections in state criminal procedure
matters, have changed radically since the Hurtado decision. Consti-
tutionally mandated reforms in the administration of capital punish-
ment have been equally profound. Accordingly, re-examination must
be made of the role for contemporary state grand juries in initiating
capital accusations, at this narrow intersection of the fifth amend-
ment's grand jury clause, the fourteenth amendment's due process
guarantee, and the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and
unusual punishments.
1. The Functions of the Grand Jury
Commencing a felony prosecution upon an information and ex-
amnination by a magistrate protects "the substantial interest" of the
accused, according to the majority opinion in Hurtado, because this
"is merely a preliminary proceeding, and can result in no final
judgment, except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial,
conducted precisely as in cases of indictment." 1 6 By definition, of
course, grand jury review is "preliminary, ' 117 as it has been since its
inception and inclusion in the fifth amendment. Indictment by grand
jury and prosecution by information cannot be equated simply be-
cause the accused has not yet been tried, however. Whether the
accused should be tried as charged is the critical issue that grand
juries must resolve.
In Ex parte Bain,"' decided just three years after Hurtado, the
Court invalidated a federal criminal conviction because a district
judge had stricken a material clause from an indictment returned by
a grand jury, and the accused had been tried under the charging
115. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
116. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
117. Grand jurors typically receive only partial evidence, submitted by prosecuting attorneys,
prior to making indictment decisions. They decide only whether probable cause or prima facie
evidence of guilt exists to justify binding an accused over for trial, rather than rendering final
judgments. 1 S. BEAE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 2:04; 1 W. LAFAVa & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 52 at § 8.4; 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, at § 15.2(b). Often only a bare majority
of grand jurors, e.g., 12 of 23, need concur before a true bill of indictment is returned, 1 S.
BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 12 at § 2:04; I W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 at §
8.4(a); VAN DYKE, supra note 64 at 264-70, App. B.
118. 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
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instrument as altered." 9 The Supreme Court disapproved of such
action because "[a]ny other doctrine would place the rights of the
citizen ... at the mercy or control of the court or prosecuting
attorney," instead of under the protection of the grand jury. 20
This shielding or buffering function of grand jury review, a purpose
virtually ignored by the Hurtado majority, is the preeminent rationale
explaining the place of the right to grand jury presentment or
indictment in the fifth amendment.' 2 ' The grand jury has been hailed
in a host of Supreme Court decisions as serving "the invaluable
function in our society of standing between the accuser and the
accused ... to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason
or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal
ill will."' The grand jury's historic function "as a protector of
citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action," as
acknowledged in recent Supreme Court decisions, "survive[s] to this
day." 23
Contrary to the suggestion made in Hurtado, the indictment and
information are not fungible'2 simply because the accused is placed
119. Id. at 4-5. The defendant had been indicted for making a false report as a cashier at
a national bank, with the intent to deceive the "comptroller of the currency and" a named
agent who had been appointed to examine the bank's records. Upon motion of the United
States Attorney the district court deleted the above-quoted words, opining that they amounted
to immaterial surplusage, and that the grand jury would have returned a true bill of indictment
against the accused if only the bank agent, and not also the comptroller, had been named.
Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 4-5. In United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985) the Court
disapproved Bain "[t]o the extent [it] stands for the proposition that it constitutes an
unconstitutional amendment to drop from an indictment those allegations that are unnecessary
to an offense that is clearly contained within it . . . ." Miller at 144.
120. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 13. As Justice Field had observed in delivering a charge
to a grand jury, while acting as a circuit justice:
... in the struggles which at times arose in England between the powers of the king
and the rights of the subject, [the grand jury] often stood as a barrier against
prosecution in his name; until, at length, it came to be regarded as an institution
by which the subject was rendered secure against oppression from unfounded
prosecutions of the crown .... [Tihe institution was adopted in this country, and
is continued from considerations similar to those which give to it its chief value in
England, and is designed as a means, not only of bringing to trial persons accused
of public offenses upon just grounds, but also as a means of protecting the citizen
against unfounded accusation, whether it comes from government, or be prompted
by partisan passion or private enmity.
Id. at 11 (quoting Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 993, No. 18, 255).
121. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; 1 W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note
52 at § 8.2(c); Schwartz, supra note 52 at 701.
122. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 391 (1962) (fn. omitted).
123. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). See also Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541, 582-83 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212,
215-18 (1960); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959); Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 362 (1956); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1951); United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512 (1943); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
124. See supra notes 33 & 116 and accompanying text.
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on notice of the charges equally well by information or indictment,
and has an opportunity to make the same pleas and be tried by a
fairly constituted petit jury. Grand juries are expected to shield
citizens against unjust or arbitrary criminal accusations because they
give lay members of the community the opportunity to apply their
collective judgment and notions of morality to the charges made. 12
Community participation in the charging decision, in turn, helps
legitimate the criminal process. 126 These are particularly important
objectives in capital trials.1 27 These aspects of grand jury participation
in the accusatory process received no recognition in Hurtado, further
undermining the decision's precedential value within the context of
contemporary capital proceedings.
2. The Due Process Revolution
The Hurtado Court ruled that the due process of law guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment did not require that state felony trials
be initiated by grand jury indictment or presentment. Whatever the
present merits of this conclusion, the analysis employed in its justi-
fication is no longer viable. Conceptions of due process of law have
changed so fundamentally since the late 19th century that the basic
premises of Hurtado have been eroded.
The Court began to retreat from portions of Hurtado's due process
rationale as early as 1897. Without directly discussing the Hurtado
decision, or mentioning the fifth amendment's just compensation
clause, 28 the Court ruled in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
125. Grand juries historically have had the power to nullify charges, i.e., to refuse to
return true bills even though sufficient evidence supports legal accusations. See, e.g.., United
States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting); United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 189-90 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); 2 W. LAFAvE &
J. Israel, supra note 52, § 15.2(b), at 286 n.19; Arenella, supra note 108 at 538 n.382.
126. If grand juries are used in state criminal proceedings, they must be selected consistently
with other constitutional principles, including equal protection of the law. See, e.g., Vasquez
v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 547 (1979); Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972). See also Ford v. Kentucky, 469 U.S. 984, 985-87 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Schwartz, supra note 52 at 702; 2 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 52 at § 15.2(b), at 289; Lewis, supra note 61 at 40; Whyte supra note 61
at 490; Arenella, supra note 108 at 538.
127. See infra notes 254-322 and accompanying text. See, e.g., People v. Smith 63 N.Y.2d
41, 77, 468 N.E.2d 879, 897, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706, 724 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985)
(invalidating mandatory capital sentence imposed upon life term inmate convicted of a murder
committed during the service of his sentence, and noting, inter alia that: "Execution is never
an inevitable consequence of a criminal act. In every case, including one where the death
sentence is mandatory upon conviction, . . . there are several points where the ultimate
imposition of the death penalty may be precluded .... Even if the defendant is apprehended,
the Grand Jury may not indict for a capital offense .... ").
128. See supra note 2.
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v. Chicago29 that due process under the fourteenth amendment
prohibited a state from taking private property without just compen-
sation.'30 This analysis was at odds with Hurtado, where the Court
had opined that the rights specifically enumerated in the fifth amend-
ment were not included within the scope of due process, since the
framers had taken pains to itemize the protections separately.' 31
Thirty-five years later the Court expressly renounced Hurtado's
"sweeping language" to this effect. 32
The occasion was the famous "Scottsboro boys" case, Powell v.
Alabama,3 3 involving a capital trial in which the defendants were
neither able to retain counsel to help prepare their defense, nor to
represent themselves adequately. The Court recognized that the due
process clause, under the circumstances, mandated a right to court-
appointed counsel. This holding was inconsistent with a literal reading
of Hurtado, since the sixth amendment's specific right to counsel
guarantee had been adopted at the same time as the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause. 34 The Powell Court, however, observed
that the usus loquendi rule was "not without exceptions. The rule is
an aid to construction, . . . [which] must yield to more compelling
considerations whenever such considerations exist."' 1
35
Powell was among the first in a sequence of Supreme Court
decisions that deviated from the brand of due process espoused in
Hurtado36 In Powell and subsequent cases the court retained a
"fundamental fairness" analysis 37 of due process under the four-
teenth amendment, but increasingly recognized procedural safeguards
within that guarantee that were akin to the protections in the bill of
rights. 38 The Court's approach did not involve "incorporating" the
129. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
130. See Israel, supra note 46 at 279.
131. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 534. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text.
132. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 71. The court in Powell recognized that
[t]he Sixth Amendment, in terms, provides that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
In the face of the reasoning of the Hurtado Case, if it stood alone, it could be
difficult to justify the conclusion that the right to counsel, being thus specifically
granted by the Sixth Amendment, was also within the intendment of the due process
of law clause. Id at 66.
135. Id. at 67.
136. See supra notes 46-48, and accompanying text. See Israel, supra note 46 at 279-82.
137. Powell, 287 U.S. at 67-68.
138. Israel, supra note 46 at 281-86.
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latter safeguards through the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause; this was a development that would not occur until much
later.13 9 Rather, the touchstone of due process under this approach
was whether the contested rights were "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,"' 14 or whether to not recognize them would "violate
a principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental." ' 141 This approach allowed
the court to consider, on a case by case basis, whether protections
such as court-appointed counsel, 142 and against double jeopardy, 143
and coerced confessions, 144 were due process requirements in state
criminal proceedings. Indictment by grand jury was not recognized
as essential to the concept of "ordered liberty" during this era, and
Hurtado thus was not disturbed. 45 Due process rights were, for the
most part, extended incrementally, and tied closely to the facts of
particular cases. 46 The fundamental fairness analysis was a flexible
approach, which placed a premium upon the interpretation of judi-
cially created and highly imprecise standards. These qualities even-
tually led to the demise of the fundamental fairness analysis, propelled
by Justice Black's strident criticisms, 47 and ultimately resulted in a
view of due process of law that was light years beyond the vision of
the Hurtado Court.
The case-by-case, fundamental fairness approach gave way to the
selective incorporation of bill of rights protections through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Once a right was classified
as "fundamental" under this analysis, or implicit within the concept
of "ordered liberty," the same essential protections that were required
in federal proceedings were held binding upon the states.'" Much
139. See infra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
140. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
141. Id. at 325, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). See generally I W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAnL, supra note 52 at § 2.4(c).
142. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
143. E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
144. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
145. Hurtado had been reaffirmed several times prior to the 1930's. See, e.g., Gaines v.
Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 86 (1928) (reaffirming that the federal constitution does not require
commencement of a state capital murder trial by action of a grand jury); Ocampo v. United
States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913) (authorizing
initiation of state murder trial, resulting in death sentence, upon a prosecutor's information
without further requirement of examination before magistrate, thus extending Hurtado); Ex
parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1887).
146. Israel, supra note 46 at 281-86, 291.
147. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 79-91 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
148. The correspondence between the federal and state constitutional requirements is not
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less inquiry was made into special case circumstances, resulting in
greater breadth being given to Supreme Court holdings than had
characterized the fundamental fairness approach. 49 Beginning in the
1960's nearly all of the Bill of Rights' protections were incorporated
through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and held to
be applicable in state criminal proceedings. 15 0 A notable exception
always precise. For example, in Apodaca v. Oregon, the court held that unanimous jury
verdicts are required by the sixth amendment in federal criminal trials, but that non-unanimous
verdicts are constitutionally permissible in state criminal trials. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972). The Court earlier had ruled that the sixth amendment right to trial by jury was
applicable to the states by operation of the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). See L. TRIBE, AmmRicAN CONsTrrmoNAL LAW 773 n.25 (2d ed. 1988).
149. The fundamental fairness and selective incorporation doctrines "differ in the scope
of the right assessed under the 'ordered liberty' standard when that right is found in a Bill of
Rights guarantee. The fundamental fairness doctrine focuses on that aspect of the guarantee
that was denied by a state in a particular case and often assesses the significance of that
element of the guarantee in light of the special circumstances of the individual case. The
selective incorporation doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on the total guarantee rather than
on a particular aspect presented in an individual case. It assesses the fundamental nature of
the guarantee as a whole rather than any one principle based on the guarantee." Israel, supra
note 46 at 291. Furthermore,
[u]nder selective incorporation, when a guarantee is found to be fundamental, due
process "incorporates" the guarantee and extends to the states the same standards
that apply to the federal government under that guarantee. Thus, under selective
incorporation a ruling that a particular guarantee is within the 'ordered liberty'
concept carries over to the states the same standards that apply to the federal
government under that guarantee.
Id.
The Court in Duncan expounded upon the rationale and the test for the selective incorpo-
ration of rights:
In one sense recent cases applying provisions of the first eight Amendments to
the States represent a new approach to the "incorporation" debate. Earlier the Court
can be seen as having asked, when inquiring into whether some particular procedural
safeguard was required of a State, if a civilized system could be imagined that would
not accord the particular protection .... The recent cases, on the other hand, have
proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary
and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of
the common-law system that has been developing contemporaneously in England
and in this country. The question thus is whether given this kind of system a
particular procedure is fundamental-whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to
an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty .... Of each of these determinations
that a constitutional provision originally written to bind the Federal Government
should bind the States as well it might be said that the limitation in question is not
necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined
but is fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the
American States.
Ducan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 at 149-50 n.14 (citations omitted). The Court then applied
this analysis to the issue in Duncan, whether the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury
was binding on the states by operation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Id.
150. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (search
and seizure); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (compelled self-incrimination); Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Duncan v.
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was the fifth amendment's grand jury guarantee. In the post-Duncan
period a number of federal courts have followed Hurtado and held
that the fifth amendment's grand jury right is not binding on the
states by operation of the fourteenth amendment.5 1 The Supreme
Court, moreover, has reaffirmed Hurtado several times in dicta in
recent years.
52
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, has not squarely re-examined
Hurtado in the modern era of due process of law. More importantly,
the Court has never done so in the context of a state capital trial
governed by modern death penalty procedures. Capital punishment
jurisprudence has changed even more dramatically than the due
process principles prevalent at the time Hurtado was decided.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confront
opposing witnesses); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishments).
The decisions of the 1960's had selectively incorporated all but four of the Bill of
Rights guarantees relating to the criminal justice process: public trial, notice of
charges, prohibition of excessive bail, and prosecution by indictment. Of these four
remaining guarantees, it seemed likely that all except prosecution by indictment
would be held to be fundamental once they were squarely presented for decision.
[Citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial, notice of charges); Schilb v.
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (excessive ball).] ... The only guarantee that
appeared unlikely to be incorporated was the fifth amendment requirement of
prosecution by indictment ....
Israel, supra note 46 at 296-97 (footnotes omitted).
151. See, e.g., Aldridge v. Marshall, 765 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Nix, 751
F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1985); Liner v. Phelps, 731 F.2d 1201, 1203-04 (5th Cir. 1984) (capital
murder conviction); Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330, 337 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1977); James v. Reese,
546 F.2d 325, 327-28 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1099-1102
(7th Cir. 1970); Boothe v. Wyrick, 452 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (W. D. Mo. 1978) (capital murder
conviction, with death penalty vacated in earlier proceeding); Mildwoff v. Cunningham, 432
F. Supp. 814, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
152. E.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 557 n.7 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
118-19 (1975); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962). In Reed v. Ross,
468 U.S. 1 (1984) the Court ruled that if a constitutional claim were so novel that its legal
basis was not reasonably available to counsel, failure to present the claim on direct appeal
would not result in a procedural forfeiture for federal habeas corpus purposes. The majority
opinion made the following point:
... [I]f we were to hold that the novelty of a constitutional question does not give
rise to cause for counsel's failure to raise it, we might actually disrupt state-court
proceedings by encouraging defense counsel to include any and all remotely plausible
constitutional claims that could, some day, gain recognition.
Id. 468 U.S., at 15-16. An illustrative footnote appended to this statement cited Hurtado.
For instance, in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), this Court held that
indictment by a grand jury is not essential to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Surely, we should not encourage criminal counsel in state court to
argue the contrary in every possible case, even if there were a possibility that someday
Hurtado may be overruled.
Id., 468 U.S. at 16 n.11.
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3. The Revolution in Capital Punishment Procedures
Hurtado was decided during the "prehistory" '153 of the Supreme
Court's death penalty jurisprudence. Joseph Hurtado had been con-
victed of first degree murder 54 and sentenced to death by a California
jury that had essentially unregulated discretion to recommend either
a capital sentence or a term of imprisonment. 5 His trial took place
in 1882, only eight years after legislation had granted such discretion;
previously, the death penalty had been mandatory upon conviction
for capital crimes, including first degree murder. 56
Mandatory capital punishment had been the uniform practice at
common law and within the states and the federal system when the
United States Constitution was adopted. 5 7 Discretionary capital sen-
tencing gradually supplanted the mandatory schemes, both to ame-
liorate their harshness and in recognition of the fact that if juries
were not given lawful authority to avoid imposing a sentence of
death they would do so by refusing to return capital convictions,
notwithstanding clear evidence of guilt. 58 Somewhat concurrently,
153. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L.
R v. 1741, 1744 (1987) (classifying Powell as the very beginning of the Supreme Court's
reforms of the administration of the death penalty).
154. See supra note 15. The separation of murder into degrees, with only first degree
murder punishable by death, is traceable to 1794 Pennsylvania legislation that later was copied
in several states. 1794 PA. LAWS ch. 1766. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
290 & n.21 (1976) (plurality opinion); McGautha v. California 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971);
Bowers, supra note 97 at 7-8; THE DEATH PENALTY iN AMERCA 4 (H. Bedau ed., 3rd ed.
1982). Prior to these reforms there was only one class of murder, and murder was punishable
by death.
155. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (1874). See People v. Jones, 63 Cal. 168, 170 (1883).
156. 1874 CAL. STAT. ch. 508 at 457. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200 n.11
(1971).
157. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976). See infra note 158.
158. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291-95. In 1809 Maryland made the death penalty optional as
punishment for crimes other than murder. Bedau, supra note 154, at 10. Tennessee, in 1838,
Alabama, in 1841, and Louisiana, in 1846, were the first states to authorize a discretionary
death penalty for murder. The trend in this direction accelerated rapidly and by the turn of
the century 20 additional states had followed suit. By 1963 all states that authorized capital
punishment provided for discretionary sentencing. Id.; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 291-92 (1976) (plurality opinion); Bowers, supra note 97 at 10-11. Mandatory capital
sentencing existed under federal law from 1790 until 1897, when discretionary sentencing was
substituted. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200 (1971); Bowers, supra note 97 at 11,
Table 1-2. Mandatory capital punishment has been declared unconstitutional under the eighth
and fourteenth amendments in a variety of contexts in contemporary times. See Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (murder by life term inmate); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431
U.S. 633 (1977) (murder of a police officer); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976) (murder); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (murder).
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the number of crimes for which the death penalty could be imposed
steadily diminished throughout the country. 5 9
Since Hurtado's death sentence had been imposed for the most
serious of crimes, and under a discretionary rather than mandatory
system, it was in significant respects the product of legislation that
was progressive by late 19th century standards. At the time, however,
capital punishment had yet to be recognized by the courts as different
from other criminal sanctions. 160 As a consequence, no unique pro-
cedures were constitutionally required to support death penalty de-
cisions. This is totally foreign to contemporary doctrine, which has
aptly been described as mandating "super due process" in capital
cases. 161
Furman v. Georgia'62 precipitated the new era of death penalty
jurisprudence. In this 1972 decision the Court invalidated capital
159. By around 1500, English common law recognized eight major capital crimes, treason,
petty treason, murder, larceny, robbery, burglary, rape and arson. By 1800, in the neighborhood
of 200 crimes were punishable by death in England, as a result of the so-called "Bloody
Code." In the American colonies capital punishment was never available for such a vast array
of crimes; while there were differences among the colonies it was not unusual for a dozen or
so offenses to be punishable by death during the 18th century. At the time of the American
revolution the colonies had roughly comparable death penalty statutes, which typically defined
murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary and sodomy as capital crimes, and
occasionally others. Bedau, supra note 154 at 6-7; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334-35
(1977) (Marshall, J., concurring); B. NAKLL & K. HARDY, THE ARaxr .Rmsss oF THE DEATH
PENALTY at 3-9 (1987). The trend to narrow the class of capital crimes generally continued in
the states through the 19th century. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-91 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 338 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Filler, Movements
to Abolish the Death Penalty in the United States, 284 Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 124 (Nov. 1952). Even well into the 20th century, however, first
degree murder by no means was the only capital offense recognized in many states. Bedau,
note 154 supra at 8-9 & Table 1-1. In the federal jurisdiction, by 1897, when a discretionary
death penalty replaced mandatory capital sentencing, the number of capital crimes had fallen
from about 60 to only military crimes and treason, murder and rape. Filler, at 124; J. GoRncKu,
CAPITAL Pu ismiErr: CaNmAL LAw AND SocIAL EvoLurroN 86 (1983). It is unlikely that the
death penalty would be considered constitutional in contemporary times for crimes other than
murder, and perhaps treason and espionage. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 485 (1977) (death
penalty unconstitutional as punishment for rape of adult woman); Eberheart v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 917 (1977) (summarily vacating death penalty imposed for crime of kidnapping).
160. Much of contemporary capital punishment jurisprudence is premised on the notion
that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from any other sentence." Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
That the Court had not recognized that "death is different" prior to the post-Furman reforms
was explicitly noted in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-38 (1977). See, e.g., Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year. or two. Because
of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.").
161. See, e.g., Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980).
162. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
punishment as administered in all states, the District of Columbia
and the federal jurisdiction. 163 The statutes that fell were essentially
identical to the one under which Joseph Hurtado had been sentenced
to die. They gave complete discretion to judges or juries to impose
either a sentence of death or imprisonment, without guidance or
standards to help regulate the exercise of this discretion. Although
there was no consensus about the supporting rationale, standardless
capital sentencing statutes were held to violate the eight amendment's
cruel and unusual punishments clause. 164
The justices individually expressed concerns that capital punishment
imposed at the unfettered discretion of sentencing authorities was
inflicted arbitrarily, and perhaps was tainted by racial and other
invidious discrimination. 165 Some were of the opinion that capital
sentences imposed so capriciously' 66 and infrequently 167 were unlikely
to serve legitimate penological objectives. 6 The result of Furman
was that if the states were to administer the death penalty at all,
they would have to do so under procedures that rectified the perceived
infirmities.
The legislative response was immediate. 69 In the four years that
passed between Furman and the Court's next ruling on capital
punishment in 1976, 35 states enacted death penalty legislation de-
signed to conform with the decision. 70 Ten states attempted to remove
discretion entirely from the capital sentencing process through statutes
that required that the death penalty be imposed automatically upon
conviction for designated crimes. The Court considered these and
subsequent mandatory schemes as ill-conceived attempts to comply
with Furman, and held that they were invalid under the eighth
163. Id., 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id., 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam). Furman was decided by a brief per curiam
opinion. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall filed separate opinions
concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist
filed separate dissents.
165. Id., 408 U.S. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id., 408 U.S. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
167. Id., 408 U.S. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
168. Justices Brennan and Marshall stated that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional,
irrespective of the procedural issues that were addressed by the other concurring justices. See
id. 408 U.S. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); 408 U.S. at 314-74
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
169. See generally F. ZmsaGo & G. HAwKyws, CasrAL PUNISmSIaNAD THm AtalcAN
AoENDA 38-45 (1986).
170. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
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amendment . 71 The remaining states did not attempt to eliminate
sentencing discretion, but adopted diverse systems that first narrowed
the range of cases in which the death penalty could be applied, and
then provided legislative standards to help guide and structure death
penalty decisions. 72 The "guided discretion" systems were upheld as
constitutionally sound, 73 and a new capital punishment jurisprudence
was in the making. 74
Hurtado v. California is a capital case that belongs to the 19th
century, and almost literally to an entirely different legal framework
than the one that governs contemporary death penalty decisions. The
conclusion in Hurtado that grand jury action is not required to
initiate state capital prosecutions-notwithstanding a specific fifth
amendment command to the contrary that is binding in federal
proceedings-is prima facie suspect, in light of the revolutionary
changes that have transpired since 1884 in due process of law and
in the constitutional jurisprudence of the death penalty. Whether this
conclusion still should be considered valid is examined next.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY GRAND JURY AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. Death is Different
Although Hurtado was a death penalty case, constitutional require-
ments did not begin to take on special significance in capital trials
until nearly fifty years later, in Powell v. Alabama.175 Post-Furman
171. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976). See supra note 158.
172. See generally Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. Rav. 1(1980); Note, Discretion
and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HAnv. L. Rnv. 1690 (1974).
173. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The facial constitutionality of the statutes was upheld in these
cases. Eleven years later Georgia's "guided discretion" statute survived a challenge that, as
applied, it produced arbitrary and discriminatory capital sentencing; the death penalty allegedly
had been imposed disproportionately in homicide cases involving white victims and black
defendants. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See infra notes 217-227 and accompa-
nying text.
174. The modem era of capital punishment began in 1976 when, in Gregg v. Georgia,
the United States Supreme Court held that capital punishment as such was not
unconstitutional but that certain safeguards must be imposed to ensure that there is
not "a substantial risk [that] the [death penalty will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.'
W. WITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EiaHTIEs: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (1987) quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality
opinion). See generally Burt, supra note 153 at 1765-81.
175. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See supra notes 133 & 153 and accompanying text.
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case law recognizes that capital punishment is qualitatively different
from other criminal sanctions, 76 and the Court has mandated a bevy
of constitutional reforms and protections to promote the integrity of
capital sentencing. The correlative seriousness of the capital sanction,
and the unique procedures required to ensure its appropriateness,
have resulted in a body of jurisprudence that in significant respects
is unique and distinct to death penalty trials.
Grand juries can perform two interrelated functions in the admin-
istration of modern capital punishment legislation. Each of these
functions is rooted firmly within the tradition of the grand jury, and
at the same time is consistent with basic principles of contemporary
death penalty jurisprudence. The first is to act as a buffer against
arbitrary prosecutorial decision-making, by helping to check the
district attorney's unregulated discretion to select which cases to
prosecute as capital crimes. The second is to help legitimate death
penalty proceedings, by enhancing community participation in the
capital punishment process.
1. The Grand Jury as Buffer
Foremost among post-Furman reforms in the administration of the
death penalty was the separation of capital trials into two distinct
stages, the first for guilt-determination, and the second for sentenc-
ing. 77 The Court's heightened concern for reliability in capital sen-
tencing has caused it to impose procedural safeguards that in many
respects make the penalty hearing analogous to a criminal trial.' At
the same time, however, the Court has ignored the potential for
176. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
177. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
302 (1987) (bifurcating capital guilt and sentencing proceedings allows the sentencer (the jury
in the Georgia scheme under review) to "receive all relevant information for sentencing without
the risk that evidence irrelevant to the defendant's guilt will influence the jury's consideration
of that issue.").
178. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985) ("This Court has repeatedly
said that under the Eighth Amendment 'the qualitative difference of death from all other
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination.' California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. [992,] 998-999 [(1983)]. Accordingly, many of
the limits that this Court has placed on the imposition of capital punishment are rooted in a
concern that the sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of
sentencing discretion .... ") (cites and footnote omitted). See supra note 160. See generally
W. WVrrE, supra note 174 at 9 (noting apparently premised on the view that the analogy
between the guilt trial and the penalty decisions "are apparently premised on the view that
the analogy between the guilt trial and the penalty trial is close enough to require that at least
some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights applied at the guilt stage be applied at the penalty
stage as well.").
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arbitrariness at the charging stage of capital proceedings. Procedural
reforms that govern only trial and sentencing border on the superficial
when prosecutors retain unregulated discretion to select who among
the class of alleged murderers should be subjected to the risk of
capital punishment upon conviction.
The Supreme Court recognized in Bullington v. Missouri,179 for
example, that double jeopardy rights apply at capital sentencing
hearings because of their similarity to guilt trials. Bullington had
been charged with and was convicted of capital murder. At the
ensuing penalty trial he was sentenced to life imprisonment. His
murder conviction was subsequently vacated and he was awarded a
new trial. 80 The prosecutor served notice that upon retrial, he would
again seek the death penalty. Bullington objected that he had been
"acquitted" at the penalty phase of the initial trial when the jury
declined to impose the death penalty and had sentenced him to life
imprisonment. He maintained that exposure to the risk of capital
punishment upon retrial would violate his right against double jeop-
ardy.
181
The Supreme Court agreed. The Court distinguished an earlier
decision, Stroud v. United States,5 2 which had unanimously upheld
a death penalty imposed upon retrial following the accused's suc-
cessful appeal of a conviction that had originally resulted in a sentence
of life imprisonment. 83 The death penalty statutes involved in Bul-
lington, in contrast to those in Stroud and other pre-Furman cases,
constrained the jury's sentencing discretion by imposing a series of
procedural requirements that helped regulate and formalize the pen-
alty decision. Bullington's sentencing hearing sufficiently resembled
a criminal trial in both format and consequences that double jeopardy
principles prohibited the prosecution from again seeking the death
179. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
180. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial after Missouri's practice
of giving women automatic exemptions from jury service was declared unconstitutional in
Duren v. Missouri (439 U.S. 357 (1979)). Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 436 (1981).
181. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that the fifth amendment's
double jeopardy protections apply to the states by operation of the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause).
182. 251 U.S. 15 (1919). See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981).
183. For example, the jury was not allowed to choose from an array of sentencing options,
but was required to impose either a death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole eligibility for a minimum of 50 years. It was required to abide by standards incorporated
in the capital sentencing statutes, and it could consider imposing the death penalty if and only
if, at a separate penalty hearing, the prosecutor proved at least one statutory aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981).
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penalty after it had failed to obtain a capital sentence at the initial
penalty trial.184
The court observed that "[t]he 'embarrassment, expense and or-
deal' and the 'anxiety and insecurity' faced by a defendant at the
penalty phase of a Missouri capital murder trial surely are at least
equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase of a
criminal trial."' 8 5 These concerns directly parallel a traditional func-
tion of grand juries, which is to spare 'individual citizens in the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial before probable cause
is established by the presentment and indictment of such a jury
...."' Grand jury review, in common with the right against
double jeopardy, was designed to ensure that criminal trials not be
commenced unjustly, and to guard against official abuses in the
initiation of criminal prosecutions. These are especially acute consid-
erations in the context of capital prosecutions. 87
The Supreme Court requires that many other special procedures
be observed at capital sentencing hearings, often relying upon recent
death penalty reforms in support of such requirements. In Gardner
v. Florida, s8 for example, the Court found that due process had
been violated when a judge placed partial reliance on a presentence
report in sentencing a defendant to death. The report had not been
disclosed to the defendant, thus denying him the opportunity to
refute or explain its contents. In invalidating the sentence, the court
departed from its ruling in Williams v. New York,'8 9 which had
upheld a death sentence imposed under similar circumstances.' 90 The
plurality opinion emphasized that since Williams had been decided
"almost thirty years ago, this Court has acknowledged its obligation
184. Id. "The presentence hearing resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like
the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the
issue of punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes." Id.
185. Id. at 455 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
186. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887) (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344
(1857)).
187. Requiring grand juries to review whether crimes are eligible to be prosecuted as capital
offenses would be consistent with the fifth amendment's textual mention of grand juries and
capital crimes, with the grand jury's function as a buffer against arbitrary prosecutorial
decision-making, and with the Court's expressed concerns for heightened procedural regularity
in capital cases.
188. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
189. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
190. The Gardner Court attempted to distinguish Williams by noting that the sentencing
judge had disclosed the significant facts from the presentence investigation report in the latter
case, in open court, before imposing sentence, thus giving the defendant the chance to refute
or explain them. No such opportunity had been provided in Gardner. Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 356 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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to re-examine capital-sentencing procedures against evolving stan-
dards of procedural fairness in a civilized society."' 191
Since Gardner, the Court has extended the fifth amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination to capital sentencing proceed-
ings, 192 and has evaluated the sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel at capital sentencing hearings under the same
standards that apply to trial counsel.1 93 The Court has also ruled that
191. Id. at 357. The Gardner plurality continued:
In 1949, when the Williams case was decided, no significant constitutional difference
between the death penalty and lesser punishments for crime had been expressly
recognized by this court. At that time the court assumed that after a defendant was
convicted of a capital offense, like any other offense, a trial judge had complete
discretion to impose any sentence within the limits prescribed by the legislature. As
long as the judge stayed within the limits, his sentencing discretion was essentially
unreviewable and the possibility of error was remote, if, indeed, it existed at all. In
the intervening years there have been two constitutional developments which require
us to scrutinize a state's capital-sentencing procedures more closely than was necessary
in 1949.
Id. The first of these developments was that a majority of the court had "now expressly
recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed
in this country." Id. The second concerned the extension of due process protection to some
aspects of criminal sentencing. Id. at 358. In a related vein, see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986):
Since this Court last had occasion to consider the infliction of the death penalty
upon the insane, our interpretations of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment have evolved substantially. In Soleesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950),
a condemned prisoner claimed a due process right to a judicial determination of his
sanity, yet the Court did not consider the possible existence of a right under the
Eighth Amendment, which had not yet been applied to the States.... Now that
the Eighth Amendment has been recognized to affect significantly both the procedural
and substantive aspects of the death penalty, the question of executing the insane
takes on a wholly different complexion ....
Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
192. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
"We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of
respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment
is concerned. Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the
state is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees
... ." (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. The accused in this case had undergone a court-ordered psychiatric examination to determine
his competency to stand trial. The examining psychiatrist subsequently testified as a witness
for the state at the capital sentencing hearing, expressing an opinion about the defendant's
likely future dangerousness that was based, in part, upon the competency examination. The
defendant had not been advised of his right to remain silent, nor that his statements to the
psychiatrist could be used as evidence against him at his trial or sentencing hearing, prior to
undergoing the examination. The competency examination took place after the defendant had
been indicted, and the court also ruled that the psychiatrist's testimony at the penalty hearing
was admitted in contravention of the defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel. Id. at 470-71.
193. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788 (1987) (A capital sentencing proceeding "is
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format, and in the existence of standards for decision,
that counsel's role in the two proceedings is comparable-it is to ensure that the adversarial
testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision.")
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984)).
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due process prohibits state hearsay rules from being applied to exclude
reliable evidence at death penalty hearings, 94 and may require that
expert psychiatric witnesses be appointed to assist indigent defendants
at capital sentencing proceedings. 195 One of the few trial protections
not held to be constitutionally required at the penalty phase of a
capital prosecution is the right to have the sentencing decision made
by a jury instead of a judge.
96
In Spaziano v. Florida, the Court conceded that "a capital [sen-
tencing] proceeding in many respects resembles a trial on the issue
of guilt or innocence,"'19 7 yet observed that jury sentencing had never
been considered a part of the sixth amendment right to jury trial. 98
"[D]espite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing proceeding involves
the same fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing pro-
ceeding-a determination of the appropriate punishment to be im-
posed on an individual."' 9 9 The Court was not persuaded that the
qualitatively different nature of the death penalty required that juries
make capital sentencing decisions. The Court explained that Furman
and its progeny emphasized
the "twin objectives" of "measured, consistent application and
fairness to the accused.". . . If a state has determined that death
should be an available penalty for certain crimes, then it must
administer that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish
between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction
and those for whom it is not.... It must also allow the sentencer
to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant, his back-
ground, and his crime....
Nothing in those twin objectives suggests that the sentence must
or should be imposed by a jury.
200
194. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (discussing analogous rule applied to criminal
trial proceedings in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
195. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83.84 (1985):
We have repeatedly recognized the defendant's compelling interest in fair adjudication
at the sentencing phase of a capital case. The state, too, has a profound interest in
assuring that its ultimate sanction is not erroneously imposed, and we do not see
why monetary considerations should be more persuasive in this context than at the
trial.
196. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). But see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (applying sixth amendment right to trial by jury for non-petty offenses to the states
through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause). The Court recently reaffirmed
Spaziano. Hildwin v. Florida, 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989) (per curiam).
197. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458.
198. Id. at 459.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 459-60 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982)) (citations
and footnote omitted).
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The task of grand juries in deciding whether to indict for capital
or non-capital offenses is distinguishable in many ways from petit
jury sentencing decisions. Grand juries historically have been em-
ployed to screen prosecutions alleging serious crimes, 20' while trial
juries, as Spaziano recognized, have never been considered essential
for sentencing purposes. Grand juries can be especially important to
screen potentially capital prosecutions, as the Court recently observed.
The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists
to believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not.
In the hands of the grand jury lies the -power to charge a greater
offense or a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and
perhaps most significant of all, a capital offense or a non-capital
offense-all on the basis of the same facts.2°2
This point is all the more critical in light of the fine lines that
frequently separate capital murder from other homicides 20a The grand
201. The grand jury protections within the fifth amendment apply to "capital, or otherwise
infamous crime," (see supra note 1 and accompanying text), with the latter restriction interpreted
to encompass offenses "punishable by imprisonment at hard labor in a penitentiary," Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885), or felonies defined by federal law. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 52 § 15.1(a), at 278.
202. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (emphasis added). In Vasquez, the Court
reaffirmed that when states do use grand juries they are bound by equal protection requirements
in selecting grand jurors. It also reaffirmed that a harmless error analysis is inapplicable to
cases originating with a tainted grand jury, even though a fair trial, conducted before a
constitutionally chosen petit jury, results in a conviction. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 US. 545
(1979). Several jurisdictions prohibit waiver of grand jury indictments in capital cases, which
also attests to the importance of grand jury action in capital trials. See supra notes 111 & 112
and accompanying text. This is reinforced by the fifth amendment's specific reference to
capital crimes, (see supra notes 1 & 201 and accompanying text), and the history of the grand
jury clause, (see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text). See generally Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Here, though there is no
dispute that respondent met the then-current definition of a habitual offender under Kentucky
law, it is conceivable that a properly instructed Kentucky grand jury in response to the same
considerations that ultimately moved the Kentucky legislature to amend the habitual offender
statute, would have refused to subject respondent to such an onerous penalty for his forgery
charge."). See also People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 77, 468 N,E.2d 879, 897, 479 N.Y.S.2d
706, 724 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
203, See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-208 (1971); B. NAKELL & K, HARDY,
supra note 159 at 8-9; C. BLAcK, CAPrrAL. PUNISHMENT: Ta INEvrrABILrrY op CAPRIcE AND
MIsTAKE (2d ed. 1981); B. CAIwozo, LAw AND LrraETURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSE S
99 (1931) (commenting on the distinctions between the different degrees of murder and
manslaughter):
I think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in our law .... The
statute is framed along the lines of a defective and unreal psychology .... The
present distinction is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly
be expected to assimilate and understand it. I am not at all sure that I understand
it myself after trying to apply it for many years and after diligent study of what
has been written in the books. Upon the basis of this fine distinction with its
mystifying psychology, scores of men have gone to their deaths.
Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
jury's function assumes further significance in connection with the
emphasis in Spaziano on ensuring that the death penalty be admin-
istered "in a way that can rationally distinguish between those
individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for
whom it is not.' '2 4 Grand jury review can promote this "distinguish-
ing function" and related objectives by helping to narrow the class
of offenders eligible for the death penalty, before ultimate decisions
are made about who will be sentenced to die. This narrowing or
screening function has repeatedly been affirmed as a constitutional
requirement in post-Furman capital cases.205 This is the crucial ca-
pacity in which grand juries can contribute to the administration of
modern capital punishment statutes, and the predicate for the argu-
ment that grand juries are constitutionally required to specifically
authorize the prosecution of cases as capital crimes.
a. Prosecutorial Discretion in Commencing Capital Trials
The criminal justice system is often portrayed as a funnel, which
progressively winnows a broad class of criminal suspects into sub-
classes consisting of the accused, tried, convicted and sentenced.
2ta
The prosecutor is near its largest aperture, at the critical intake and
charging stage, and has a hand in nearly every important decision
that will be made in a case. Justice Jackson once described the
prosecutor as having "more control over life, liberty and reputation
than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. "27
204. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
205. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303 (1987) ("[A] State must 'narrow the class of
murderers subject to capital punishment.' Gregg v. Georgia, [428 U.S. 153, 196 (1976) (plurality
opinion)] ... by providing 'specific and detailed guidance' to the sentencer. Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.." (footnote
omitted)). See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 305 ("[O]ur decisions since Furman have identified a
constitutionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is a
required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed. In this context the State
must establish rational criteria that narrow the decision-maker's judgment as to whether the
circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the threshold.. . ."). See also Lowenfield
v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 554-55 (1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877
(1983) (capital sentencing schemes must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980). See generally Gillers, supra note 172 at 23-26.
206. This familiar depiction is presented in pictorial fashion in PRasIrNT's Cor.usSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE, THE CHALLENOE OF CRIM IN A FREE
Sociry at 8-9 (1967).
207. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. Abi. JuD. Soc. 18, 18 (1940). This remark
was made while Jackson was United States Attorney General. He became Associate Justice to
the United States Supreme Court in 1941, and subsequently served as chief prosecutor for the
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The prosecutor's vast discretion typically is exercised under "low
visibility" conditions, making it especially difficult to review. 2°8 No-
where is this discretion more significant than in the charging decision,
where the prosecutor decides whether to pursue an indictment at all,
and if so, for which offenses. 209 The initial charge lodged in a case
greatly influences the boundaries of subsequent decisions, including
plea bargaining and, ultimately, conviction and sentencing.
210
Prosecutorial charging discretion is especially important in homi-
cide cases, because the definitional lines between the several forms
of criminal homicide are so murky,21' and the differences between
potential sanctions are so great.212 Nevertheless, the Court thus far
United States at the Nuremberg trials of alleged Nazi war criminals. See 4 THE JUSTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEm LivEs AND MAJoR OPIONS 2541, 2559-
69 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1980). Many have expressed sentiments similar to Jackson's
about prosecutors. See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 108 at 498 (the prosecutor "has become the
most powerful and important official in our criminal process."); Frase, The Decision to File
Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. Cm. L.
REv. 246, 247 (1980); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am. J.
ComP. LAW 532 (1970); Note, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints,
42 S. CAL. L. REv. 519 (1969); Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1057
(1955) ("The discretionary power exercised by the prosecuting attorney in initiation, accusation,
and discontinuance of prosecution gives him more control over an individual's liberty than
any other public official."); Baker, The Prosecutor - Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRM.
L. & CRmioLoar 770, 796 (1933) ("The law is written by legislators, interpreted occasionally
by appellate courts, but applied by countless of individuals, each acting largely for himself.
How it is applied outweighs in importance its enactment or its interpretation."). See generally
B. NAxEL. & K. HARDY, supra note 159 at 286 n.2.
208. See generally A. RosET & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY Co NsETrr: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE
AhmiucAN CoURThousE (1976); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WrrH A CRIUE (1969); J. SKoLmcK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1967); D. NEwmAN, ColwxcnoN:
TH DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WrmoUr TRIAL (1966).
209. See Newman, Role and Process in the Criminal Court, in HANDBOOK OF CRMNOLOGY
608 (D. Glaser ed., 1974):
Qualitatively, the question is whether, in the judgment of the district attorney, the
accused ought to be charged with a crime at all, or if in the interest of equity,
individualization of justice, or mitigating circumstance, it would be fairer, more just,
or sufficient for the purposes of law and the objectives of his office to refrain from
prosecuting at all. The quantitative facet relates to the vigor of prosecution once it
is determined to be possible and desirable. In some cases the prosecutor may charge
a crime as serious as the evidence permits, may multiply charges to their fullest, or
may even level "extra-Maximum" charges by invoking habitual-criminal statutes or
similar provisions.
Id. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (approving prosecutor's securing
a superseding indictment against the accused, alleging habitual offender status with consequent
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, after the accused refused to accept the terms of a
plea bargain offered to the felony charged in the original indictment).
210. See M. GOTTREDSON & D. GOTITREDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN COuMutAL JUSTICE:
ToWARD THE RATIONAL ExERCisE OF DIscRTON 145-69 (1980); Abrams, Prosecutorial Charge
Decisions Systems, 23 U.C.L.A. L. RPv. 1 (1975).
211. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
212. For example, in De Garmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Crim. App.) cert. denied,
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has rejected constitutional challenges to capital punishment laws
based upon the potential for prosecutors to seek the death penalty
arbitrarily, or for impermissible reasons. In Gregg v. Georgia,213 the
Supreme Court was satisfied that post-Furman statutory reforms had
narrowed and guided the exercise of sentencing discretion reposed in
the jury under Georgia's legislation. The Court also found no con-
stitutional infirmity with discretion remaining unregulated at other
stages of capital prosecutions. 2 4 Justice White's concurring opinion
observed:
Petitioner's argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless
fashion in deciding which cases to try as capital felonies is unsup-
ported by any facts .... Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be
assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging deci-
sions by factors other than the strength of their case and the
474 U.S. 975 (1985), the principal in a kidnap-murder was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death. His accomplice, who testified on behalf of the state at the principal's trial,
subsequently pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of murder, and received a sentence of 10
years' deferred probation. De Garmo, 691 S.W.2d, at 662. In dissenting from the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Brennan observed that "the decisions whether to prosecute,
what offense to prosecute, whether to plea bargain or not to negotiate at all are made at the
unbridled discretion of individual prosecutors. The prosecutor's choices are subject to no
standards, no supervision, no controls whatever." De Garmo, 474 U.S., at 974-75. See also
Radelet & Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 587, 588 (1985).
The prosecutor's role is probably most important in criminal homicide cases. In
these cases there is a wider range of sanctions available ... than for any other
criminal offense. In addition, homicide cases often reflect a much broader spectrum
of motivation and planning than do other types of serious criminal behavior....
[N]ot only is a prosecutor's work typically more difficult in criminal homicide cases,
but the stakes are also typically higher for the defendant on trial, and the prosecutor
may feel that his or her professional reputation will be affected by the outcome of
a high visibility homicide case.
Id.
213. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
214. Id. The plurality opinion, joined by Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens, rejected
arguments that the discretion of prosecutors to bring charges and consummate plea bargains
in capital cases, of juries to convict of non-capital offenses, and of the governor to commute
capital sentences, rendered the system essentially standardless and suffering from the same
infirmities that had characterized capital punishment when Furman was decided:
The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative of the issues before
us. At each of these stages an actor in the criminal justice system makes a decision
which may remove a defendant from consideration as a candidate for the death
penalty. Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the death sentence
on a specific individual who had been convicted of a capital offense. Nothing in
any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy
violates the Constitution. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that
the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders,
the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing
authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the
defendant.
Id. at 199 (footnote omitted).
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likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it con-
victs.25
Gregg upheld a challenge to the facial validity of Georgia's capital
punishment scheme, brought under the eighth amendment's cruel and
unusual punishments clause, in a case prosecuted shortly after post-
Furman legislation had taken effect. 216 There was little time to make
the sort of factual showing that Justice White expected. Eleven years
after Gregg was decided, however, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 2 7 the
Court again reviewed Georgia's capital punishment legislation. This
time it was in the context of a claim that the death penalty was
being applied in a purposefully discriminatory218 or arbitrary219 fash-
ion, in that the race of criminal homicide victims and defendants
appeared to correlate significantly with death penalty decisions.
220
215. Id. at 225 (white, J., concurring). The opinion continued:
Unless prosecutors are incompetent in their judgments, the standards by which they
decide whether to charge a capital felony will be the same as those by which the
jury will decide the questions of guilt and sentence. Thus defendants will escape the
death penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the offense is
not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently strong. This does not
cause the system to be standardless ....
Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White's concurring opinion.
216. Furman invalidated Georgia's former capital punishment legislation in 1972. The
statute ultimately upheld in Gregg had been in effect only a short time prior to the November,
1973 murder for which Gregg was tried and convicted in 1974. See Gregg v. State, 233 Ga.
117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974).
217. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
218. This was the necessary predicate for the claim that the petitioner's fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection rights had been violated. Id. at 292. See infra note 219.
219. The basis of this claim was that the statute, as applied, violated the protections of
the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause, as applied to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 299, n.22. As Justice Brennan
explained in his dissent, the eighth amendment claim, unlike the equal protection challenge,
did not focus on "the validity of the individual sentences before us." Id. at 323. Rather, the
"concern for arbitrariness focuses on the rationality of the system as a whole," id., and "the
risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence rather than the proven fact of one." Id.
"Arbitrariness" typically is used to describe decisions that do not appear to conform to legal
criteria and requirements, for any of a number of reasons. "Caprice," a type of arbitrariness,
connotes random, haphazard, inexplicable or unpredictable deviations from legal standards.
"Discrimination" is reserved for systematic departures from the legal criteria, sometimes used
with reference to defendant-characteristics, such as race or gender. "Disparity" sometimes
connotes systematic departures from legal standards based upon variables other than defendant-
characteristics, such as victim characteristics, or geographical location of a prosecution. See,
e.g., Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes,
26 Crime & Delinq. 563, 572-74 (1980); Radelet & Pierce, supra note 212 at 589; B. NAKEL
& K. HARDY, supra note 159 at 16-18; Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of
Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. Rnv. 27,
35-36 (1984).
220. For a detailed review of the McCleskey decision, and the relevant underlying facts,
see Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: Capital Punishment by the Numbers-An
Analysis of McCleskey v. Kemp, 23 Cans. LAW BuLt. 454 (1987).
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The challenge was founded on a sophisticated social science study
completed by Professor David Baldus and colleagues,22' which the
Court assumed to be "valid statistically."m
The McCleskey majority rejected the "as applied" challenge to
the Georgia statute, notwithstanding the evidence offered in its
support. The data showed, among other things,
that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70 percent of the cases
involving black defendants and white victims; 32 percent of the
cases involving white defendants and white victims; 15 percent of
the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 19
percent of the cases involving white defendants and black victims. 23
These were the raw, or unadjusted findings of the researchers. The
researchers reanalyzed the data after attempting to control for non-
racial factors that could help explain the apparent disparities in
prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty in homicide cases
involving white and black victims.2 After making these statistical
adjustments they concluded that the race of victim effects remained
substantial, and that "the leading source of the race-of-victim dis-
parities in Georgia's death-sentencing system for defendants convicted
of murder at trial is clearly the [prosecutor's] decision to advance
the case to a penalty trial."
Nevertheless, the five justices in the McCleskey majority declined
to infer from the aggregate data presented in the study that prose-
cutors, or other decisionmakers, were acting with purposeful discrim-
221. See Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Admin-
istration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 SteTsoN L. Rav.
133 (1986); Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death
Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 U. C. DAViS L. Ray. 1375 (1985); Baldus,
Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the
Georgia Experience, 74 J. Cum. L. & CiMnNoLooY 661 (1983); Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth
& Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death, 33 STAN. L. Rav. 601 (1980).
See generally Acker, supra note 220 at 457-64, 470-72.
222. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987).
223. Id. 481 U.S. at 287.
224. Under Georgia law prosecutors are not required to seek the death penalty, even if the
evidence would justify it. See id. at 284 n.2. The researchers controlled for over 230 nonracial
factors in analyzing the data, and based their final analysis on a more parsimonious model
that accounted for 39 variables, including race. See Acker, supra note 220.
225. Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences, supra note
221 at 710 n.131. Jury decisionmaking also helped account for the race-of-victim effects, but
prosecutorial decisionmaking accounted for more. Id. at 710 & n.132. After statistical adjust-
ments were made the researchers reported that "the odds of [prosecutors' initiating] a penalty
trial are 2.7 times higher if the defendant's victim is white." Id. at 709 n.131. Whether, and
how grand jury review of capital prosecutions could help eradicate race discrimination in
charging decisions is considered infra at notes 254-299, 323-393 and accompanying text.
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ination in individual cases.2 6 The Supreme Court accordingly rejected
the equal protection claim. Failing to find the systemic arbitrariness
that was presumed to permeate capital decisionmaking under pre-
Furman legislation, and suggesting the practical impossibility of
further rationalizing the administration of the death penalty through
additional procedures, the Court also rejected McCleskey's eighth
amendment challenge.227
In Gregg and McCleskey the justices essentially immunized pros-
ecutorial decisionmaking in capital cases from constitutional review
under either fourteenth amendment equal protection principles or
eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment grounds.22 Strongly
motivating these decisions were the views that post-Furman statutory
reforms had gone far enough, and that to expect more of the states
226. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-99 (1987). Justice Powell's majority opinion
maintained:
It is also questionable whether any consistent policy can be derived by studying the
decisions of prosecutors. The District Attorney is elected by the voters in a particular
county.... Since decisions whether to prosecute and what to charge necessarily are
individualized and involve infinite factual variations, coordination among D.A.
offices across a State would be relatively meaningless. Thus, any inference from
statewide statistics to a prosecutorial "policy" is of doubtful relevance.
Id. at 295-96 n.15 (citation omitted). The majority further commented upon the improvidence,
and impracticality, of making prosecutors come forward with an explanation of their decisions
in capital cases. Id. at 296-97. "Accordingly, we hold that the Badus study is clearly insufficient
to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with
discriminatory purpose." Id. at 297. Justice Blackmun took sharp exception with this analysis
in his dissent, which was joined by three other justices. Id. at 353-61.
227. Id. at 306-13. Stressing the necessary role of discretion in prosecutorial decisionmaking,
the majority responded to the dissenters' criticisms of Georgia's failure to require prosecutors
to adhere to guidelines or standards that presumably would help channel their exercise of
discretion. Id. at 311-12. "Prosecutorial decisions necessarily involve both judgmental and
factual decisions that vary from case to case .... Thus, it is difficult to imagine guidelines
that would produce the predictability sought by the dissent without sacrificing the discretion
essential to a humane and fair system of criminal justice." Id. at 314 n.37 (citation omitted).
The majority noted the various procedures required by the Georgia legislation designed to
promote reliable capital sentencing, and charged: "Given these safeguards already inherent in
the imposition and review of capital sentences, the dissent's call for greater rationality is no
less than a claim that a capital-punishment system cannot be administered in accord with the
Constitution." Id. at 315 n.37. Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices in dissent,
disagreed with Justice Powell's eighth amendment analysis. Id. at 320-45. The three justices
who authored dissents in McCleskey also took issue with the contention that Georgia had
done all that could reasonably be expected in bringing rationality to the administration of the
death penalty. Justices Brennan and Blackmun each commented on the lack of standards to
guide prosecutorial decisionmaking in capital cases. Id. at 333-34 & n.9 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); id. at 364-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that there appeared
to exist a narrow class of highly aggravated homicides, in which racial considerations were
dwarfed by the heinousness of the offense, to which capital punishment could be limited
without significant risk of racially discriminatory application. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Of course, traditional claims of prosecution for constitutionally impermissible reasons
remain. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
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would be to impose impossible conditions on the administration of
capital punishment.2 9 Whether or not these holdings are justifiable
on doctrinal grounds, there is a burgeoning body of social science
research that identifies prosecutorial decisionmaking as a major source
of arbitrariness in the application of capital punishment statutes.
Study after study has produced evidence that race discrimination and
other forms of arbitrariness continue to plague post-Furman death
penalty decisions. Why this happens, and why it is likely to keep
happening absent legal controls, in part relates to the prosecutor's
role in initiating capital trials.
District attorneys make the charging decision in jurisdictions that
authorize the use of informations, and generally are assumed to
control the indictment process.? 0 Decisions made early in the charging
process will alternatively limit or expand subsequent options about
seeking the death penalty. Prosecutors thus may initially charge
"high" in homicide cases, to reserve the death penalty as a possible
sanction if it seems warranted upon further investigation, or to use
the threat of a death sentence for plea bargaining leverage. 23' Evidence
exists, however, that racial considerations can be important deter-
minants of whether district attorneys will prosecute homicides as
capital offenses.
Prosecutors are significantly more likely to treat white-victim hom-
icides as capital cases than black-victim homicides, especially when
the accused are black. This is true even when other salient features
of homicides are comparable, at least insofar as researchers can
ascertain. The Baldus study at issue in McCleskey arrived at this
conclusion about the administration of capital punishment in Geor-
gia,232 and this essential finding has been replicated by other research-
229. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell
& Stevens, J.J.); id. at 225-26 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Petitioner's argument
that there is an unconstitutional amount of discretion in the system which separates those
suspects who receive the death penalty from those who receive life imprisonment, a lesser
penalty, or are acquitted or never charged, seems to be in final analysis an indictment of our
entire system of justice. Petitioner has argued, in effect, that no matter how effective the
death penalty may be as a punishment, government, created and run as it must be by humans,
is inevitably incompetent to administer it."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313-15 n.37
(1987); id. at 319 ("McCleskey's wide ranging arguments ... basically challenge the validity
of capital punishment in our multi-racial society. . ").
230. This assumption is examined infra notes 254-299 and accompanying text.
231. See generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See also White, supra note
174 at 31-50; Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REv. LAw & Soc. CHANGE 797, 800 (1986). See
generally Arenella, supra note 108 at 498.
232. See supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text.
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ers studying the death penalty in Georgia, 233  Florida, 23 4 South
Carolina, 235 Illinois 236 and Texas. 237 Additionally, there are suggestions
that prosecutors are more apt to define white-victim homicides as
capital cases in Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma
and Virginia. 238 While few of these other studies have the methodo-
logical rigor of Professor Baldus' research on the Georgia death
penalty system, 239 the essential unanimity of their findings strongly
suggests that race considerations do influence district attorneys' de-
cisions to prosecute homicides as capital crimes. 24
Another form of arbitrariness that rather consistently correlates
with prosecutorial decisionmaking in death penalty cases is the lo-
cation within jurisdictions in which homicides are committed. Similar
homicides generally are more apt to be prosecuted as capital murders
in rural areas than in urban centers. 241 The charging and plea bar-
233. Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at 54-92.
234. Radelet & Pierce, supra note 212 at 591-92 (containing an excellent review of the
relevant literature); Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at 54-92; Bowers, The Pervasiveness of
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRnI. L. &
CRiHNOLOGY 1067, 1071-74 (1983); Foley & Powell, The Discretion of Prosecutors, Judges,
and Juries in Capital Cases, 7 Cans. JusT. REv. 16 (No. 2, Fail, 1982); Radelet, Racial
Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 918, 922-26 (1981);
Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95
HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981); Bowers & Pierce, supra note 219 at 607-16.
235. Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of
Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 437 at 439-41 (1984) (literature
review of related studies); Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing:
Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. Cns. L. & CRII NoLooY 379 (1982).
236. Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at 54-92.
237. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 219 at 607-16.
238. Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at 92-98, 105-06. Preliminary research in New Jersey
suggests similar findings. Bienen, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RurTGEs L. REv. 27 (1988). For a general review of
evidence concerning race discrimination in the administration of capital punishment during
earlier eras see Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of
the Evidence With Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783 (1981).
239. This is not to criticize the methodology of the other studies. Professor Baldus'
undertaking has been lauded as 'far and away the most complete and thorough analysis of
sentencing' ever carried out." McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 907-08 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985)
(Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of Dr. Richard Berk, National Academy of
Sciences), aff'd 481 U.S. 279 (1987); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 341-42 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (characterizing Baldus' study as "far and away the most refined data ever
assembled on any system of punishment... "). See Acker, supra note 220 at 454-55 & n.8.
240. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 189 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("The chief strength of respondent's evidence lies in the essential unanimity of the results
obtained by researchers using diverse subjects and varied methodologies."). Using different
research methods to test a study's findings, known as "triangulation," is a common technique
in the social sciences designed to lend confidence to the results. E. BABm, THE PRACTMCE OF
SocIAL RESAscii at 110 (2d ed., 1979).
241. Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death
Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. Canm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983) (South Carolina); Bowers,
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gaining decisions made by individual prosecutors in different counties
or judicial districts within a state may vary widely, as well, due to
unpredictable and idiosyncratic considerations. 242 Although few would
argue that this is a relevant consideration in a rational system of
capital punishment, where a homicide was committed, and not simply
how it was, or by whom, may emerge as an important determinant
of prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty.
While it is disheartening that extralegal considerations continue to
influence death penalty decisions, including those made by local
prosecutors, it is not surprising. Statutory reforms alone cannot be
expected to countermand the prejudices and other social forces that
influence those who administer the laws.2 3 District attorneys are
subject to the same, and in many respects more of these pressures
than the public at large, while being bound by essentially no legal
constraints in their capital charging decisions.24
Local prosecutors are elected officials in most jurisdictions.25 This,
by design, makes them responsive to community sentiment, especially
supra note 234 at 1072-75 (Florida); Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at 64-66 (Florida and
Georgia, but not Illinois); Bowers & Pierce, supra note 219 at 601, 616-19 (Florida and
Georgia).
242. See B. NAxEHU & K. HARDY, supra note 159 at 152-58 (North Carolina); Foley &
Powell, supra note 234 (Florida); Carney & Fuller, A Study of Plea Bargaining in Murder
Cases in Massachusetts, 3 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 292 (1969) (pre-Furman study of prosecutors'
plea bargaining and indictment decisions in diverse counties in Massachusetts). See also
Edmonds v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 894, 896-97 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (noting that Illinois is divided into 102 counties, each with a different prosecuting
attorney and observing: "Each of these 102 individuals, subject to the different political
pressures of his own constituency, can establish his own policy-or no policy at all-on how
to narrow the group of individuals convicted of crimes punishable by death, and in this
endeavor he is not aided by any legislatively imposed standard or limited by any legislatively
imposed constraint."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 354-60 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
243. Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at 106-10; Bowers, supra note 234 at 1068-69; Bowers
& Pierce, supra note 219 at 569, 572-74, 629-32.
244. See supra notes 207-229 and accompanying text. See also DeGarmo v. Texas, 474
U.S. 973, 974 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari):
When Gregg was decided several members of the Court expressed the belief that
channeling juror discretion would minimize the risk that the death penalty 'would
be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders,' thereby making it
unnecessary to channel discretion at earlier stages in the criminai justice system. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens,
JJ.). But discrimination and arbitrariness at an earlier point in the selection process
nullify the value of later controls on the jury. The selection process for the imposition
of the death penalty does not begin at trial; it begins in the prosecutor's office. His
decision whether or not to seek capital punishment is no less important than the
jury's. Just like the jury's, then, where death is the consequence, the prosecutor's
'discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action.' Id. at 189.
Id.
245. Bowers, supra note 234 at 1069 (noting that district attorneys are elected in 44 of the
states).
82
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what they perceive to be the attitudes shared among the majority
and politically powerful segments of the community.2 The death
penalty remains very much a political issue,247 infused with strong
moral overtones. 24s Prosecutors desire to get the maximum return on
the precious resources that must be allocated to capital cases, which
are notoriously expensive and time-consuming undertakings, 2 9 when
they decide which homicides to pursue as death penalty cases. 20
Either consciously251 or subconsciously,5 2 district attorneys are apt
to respond more readily to the dominant community's sense of
outrage and shock that accompanies white-victim homicides, than
246. See generally Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 331, 340-41
(1970).
247. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 459 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The risk of the "overzealous prosecutor and ... the compliant, biased or eccentric
judge." Duncan v. Louisiana, [391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)] is particularly acute in the
context of a capital case. Passions, as we all know, can run to the extreme when
the State tries one accused of a barbaric act against society, or one accused of a
crime that-for whatever reason-inflames the community. Pressures on the govern-
ment to secure a conviction, to "do something," can overwhelm even those of good
conscience. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. [1025, 1053 (1984)] (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). When prosecutors and judges are elected, or when they harbor political
ambitions, such pressures are particularly dangerous.
Id. See also ZrUNG & HAwKiNs, supra note 169 at 95-106; White, supra note 174:
The prosecutor's attitude toward plea bargaining will be affected not only by his
own values and experience but also by his political situation at the time the case
arises. Nearly every defense counsel I talked to echoed the view ... that in predicting
the likelihood of a plea bargain offer in a capital case often the most important
factor is whether the prosecutor involved is "within two years of an election."
Several attorneys went on to say that they would consider the impact of an upcoming
election in shaping their plea-bargaining strategy. (Footnote omitted).
White, supra note 174 at 33. See generally Symposium, Model Penal Code Conference
Transcript - Discussion Six, 19 RuTrERS L.J. 913, 913 (1988) (remarks of Professor Yale
Kamisar). . . [l]t's no accident that every person running for public office-even the
candidates for borough president or dogcatcher-comes out in favor of capital punishment.
The politicians know where the votes are." Id.
248. See infra notes 300-302 and accompanying text.
249. Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1221, 1245-66 (1985); NEw YORK STATE DEFENDERS Ass'N, CAPITAL
LossEs: Ta PRICE OF ma DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YoxRK STATE (1982); Nakell, The Cost
of the Death Penalty, 14 CRm. L. BuLL. 69 (1978). See also Von Drehie, Capital Punishment
in Paralysis, Miami Herald, July 10, 1988, § IA, col. I (estimating that Florida taxpayers
have spent over $57 million on capital cases between 1973 and mid-1988, which cost, if
imputed only to the 18 cases actually resulting in executions, would be in excess of $3 million
per execution).
250. See, e.g., Radelet & Pierce, supra note 212 at 587-88, 616-17; Zeisel, supra note 234
at 466-67; Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, Punishing Homicide in Philadelphia: Perspectives on
the Death Penalty, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 227, 243 (1976). See generally Myers & Hagan, Private
and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 Soc. PRoBs. 439
(1979); LaFave, supra note 207 at 533-34.
251. See Zeisel, supra note 234 at 467.
252. Id. at 466-67; Radelet & Pierce, supra note 212 at 616-17; Paternsoter, supra note
235 at 472-73; Bowers, supra note 234 at 1068-70, 1077; Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at
106-07; Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, supra note 250 at 243.
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they do when minority group members are killed. This sentiment,
and the perceived need to respond, may be most acute in smaller,
predominantly rural communities, and if 'social "boundary lines" are
crossed 2 3 when black assailants slay white victims.
Grand jurors, of course, are a part of the same community to
which the prosecutor must answer, and many can be expected to
share similar values and attitudes. As a body, however, the grand
jury will at least reflect a broader spectrum of views than possessed
by a single official, and is not likely to be influenced by the same
institutional constraints that may affect prosecutorial decisionmaking
in potentially capital cases. Whether the grand jury can be expected
to act effectively to limit this aspect of the prosecutor's charging
discretion-the initial decision to define a homicide as a capital
murder-is considered next.
b. The Grand Jury: Rubber Stamp or Bulwark?
The Supreme Court has rather consistently given lip-service to the
proposition that the grand jury functions as a "protector of citizens
against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action, ' 254 and stands
"between the accuser and the accused ... to determine whether a
charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating
power or by malice and personal ill will." 5 There is good reason
not to embrace these pronouncements too literally. The Court has
253. Bowers & Pierce, supra note 219 at 630-32; Zeisel, supra note 234 at 467:
[Tihe crossing of social boundaries into tabooed areas within a society invokes the
society's most punitive and repressive responses .... [I]f the death penalty is reserved
for the most tabooed border crossings-the low status person's crimes against the
high status person-the expected pattern will be exactly what we see., ."
Zeisel, supra note 234 at 467-68 (i.e., the death penalty imposed at a disproportionately high
rate in black defendant-white victim homicides, sometimes in white defendant-white victim
homicides, and rarely in black-victim homicides). See Paternoster, supra note 235 at 472-74.
As Justice Blackmun put it in his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp:
[T]here are many ways in which racial factors can enter indirectly into prosecutorial
decisions ... Since death penalty prosecutions require large allocations of scarce
prosecutorial resources, prosecutors must choose a small number of cases to receive
this expensive treatment. In making these choices they may favor homicides that are
visible and disturbing to the majority of the community, and these will tend to be
white-victim homicides.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 360-61 n.13 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Gross & Mauro, supra note 219 at 106-07, and citing Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983)). See also Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STANt. L. Rv. 317 (1987).
254. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). See supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
255. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (footnote omitted). See generally supra
notes 118-126 and accompanying text.
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given continued obeisance to Hurtado, 2 6 and has even begrudgingly
conceded that "[tihe grand jury may not always serve as a protective
bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an over-
zealous prosecutor . "...-257 Justice Douglas once broke rhetorical
ranks entirely, charging that "[ilt is ... common knowledge that
the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the
citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive."1
258
Largely because of its powers to subpoena records and witnesses
and to compel non-privileged testimony as part of its role in inves-
tigating suspected wrongdoing, the grand jury has incurred much
criticism.2 9 In the process, swipes are often taken at the efficacy of
grand juries in performing their historic shielding or buffering func-
tion. Terms like "rubber stamp, ' 260 "putty in the hands of ...
prosecutors, '261 and being the prosecutor's "darling," ' 21 2 or "alter
ego ' 263 have been applied unremittingly to grand juries.264 A federal
256. See supra notes 145 & 152 and accompanying text.
257. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (holding that requiring grand jury
witness to produce voice exemplars does not violate a witness' right against compelled self-
incrimination or unreasonable searches and seizures).
258. Id. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55
F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972)).
259. See, e.g., L. CLARK, THE GRAND JuRy: TnE USE AND ABUSE OF PoLTicAL POWER at
19-149 (1975); Deutsch, supra note 52; Schwartz, supra note 52. See also Fine, Federal Grand
Jury Investigations of Political Dissidents, 7 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 432 (1972); Antell,
The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153 (1965). See generally
1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52 §§ 8.1-8.13.
260. Arenella, supra note 108 at 484; Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in
Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 802 (1974); M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS, supra
note 57 at 16 ("Like most substantial institutions of any age, the grand jury has always had
friends and detractors. It has been assailed as inefficient, an obstruction, a pointless rubber
stamp for the prosecutor. . ."). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, §
15.2(a) at 282; C. WmiEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES
AND CONCEMS § 23.02(a), at 512 (2d ed. 1986).
261. Lewis, supra note 61 at 39.
262. Id. at 57.
263. Campbell, Eliminate 4he Grand Jury, 64 J. CRi. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 174, 178-79
(1973) (arguing that the grand jury is an "alterego of prosecutor," has outlived its reputation
as the bulwark of democracy, and should be abolished by constitutional amendment).
264. See Deutsch, supra note 52 at 1189:
[T]he grand jury has never met its stated purpose of protecting the individual against
the government. In fact, the grand jury has evolved into a prosecutor's tool of
investigation, a use never contemplated by the Founding Fathers.... Unfortunately,
the courts have continued to ignore the government's transformation of the grand
jury's power, relying instead upon the fiction that the grand jury is an independent
citizens panel which safeguards the accused against abuse by the government.
(footnote omitted).
Id. See also Arenella, supra note 108 at 539 ("While the grand jury was enshrined in our
Constitution because of its reputed ability to protect the innocent from unfounded prosecution,
few scholars take its screening function seriously today." [footnotes omitted]); Lewis, supra
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judge maintained that "'the grand jury is the total captive of the
prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict
anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before any grand jury.
'261
While the institution is not without its supporters,2 6 the debate
about the capabilities of the grand jury to serve its traditional
screening function has proceeded in the face of a remarkable paucity
of empirical evidence. 267 Studies of grand juries and the indictment
process are almost without exception patchy, primarily anecdotal,
and/or extremely dated. None have specifically considered the per-
formance of grand juries in potentially capital cases.
The most comprehensive attempt to study the functioning of grand
juries was completed by Wayne Morse in 1931.268 He compiled
note 61 at 66:
It is revolting to discover that there is no better reason for the continuation of a
practice detrimental to the rights of the individual than that it existed in the time
of Henry II. The Grand Jury no longer serves nor, given contemporary conditions,
can it serve its constitutional function of protecting the citizen from arbitrary and
oppressive prosecution by the state. Accordingly, the only rational course of action
requires abolition of the institution.
Id. See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GoALS, COURTS STAND. 4.4, at 74 (1973) (providing that "[g]rand jury indictment should not
be required in any criminal prosecution," although "[tihe grand jury should remain available
for investigation and charging in exceptional cases."); Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61
GEo. L.J. 1, 35 (1972) ("[T]he grand jury has changed radically in function. It is no longer
a group of peers sitting to protect citizens; instead, it is an arm of the State, more powerful
than ever before, serving the ends of the prosecution."); M. FRANKEL & G. NArTALIS, supra
note 57 at 21-22:
The show is run by the prosecutors .... The prosecutors decide what is to be
investigated, who will be brought before the grand jurors, and-practically and
generally speaking-who should be indicted for what .... [para.] Day in and day
out, the grand jury affirms what the prosecutor calls upon it to affirm-investigating
as it is led, ignoring what it is never advised to notice, falling to indict or indicting
as the prosecutor 'submits' that it should. Not surprisingly, the somewhat technical,
somewhat complex, occasionally arcane language of indictments is drafted by the
prosecutor and handed to the grand jury foreman or forelady for the signature
which is almost invariably fixed.
Id.
265. Campbell, supra note 263 at 174. See Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D.
229, 253 (1972). See also Pike, Are Grand Juries Getting Out of Line?, 84 U.S. NEws &
WORLD RPT. at 65 (1978).
266. See, e.g., Sullivan & Nachman, supra note 61; Schwartz, supra note 52 at 770; R.
YOUNGER, supra note 52. See generally 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, § 15.2(a) at
282-85; G. EDWARDS, supra note 52 at 1; Whyte, supra note 61 at 485-87.
267. Evidence concerning grand juries' indictment decisions is reported infra at notes 268-
298 and accompanying text. The author contacted several organizations to attempt to collect
additional information, including the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National
Center for State Courts, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Vera
Institute, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. The quest was not
fruitful. Apparently, most data concerning grand juries are collected, if at all, at the local
level; few statewide, regional or national statistics are available.
268. Morse, supra note 12 at 101, 217, 295.
1989 / The Grand Jury and Capital Punishment
responses from 162 district attorneys269 in 21 different states270 con-
cerning cases considered by the grand juries in their jurisdictions
during the fall and winter of 1929-1930. The district attorneys pro-
vided information about 7414 cases; 7061 of the cases were reviewed
at the request of the prosecutors, while the grand juries initiated
consideration of the 353 remaining cases. 27'
The district attorneys reported that the grand juries declined to
return true bills of indictment in, or "no true billed, ' 272 1170 of the
7061 cases (16.6 percent) that the prosecutors had requested they
consider. Grand juries took similar action in 72 of the 353 cases
(20.4 percent) that they had reviewed upon their own initiative. 273 In
most of the no true bill cases, however, the district attorneys claimed
to be in agreement with the grand juries' actions.
The prosecutors indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with
the grand juries' decisions in 6119 of the cases that they initiated.
They disagreed with grand juries' refusing to return true bills of
indictment in 19.5 percent of the cases (184 of 943) in which such
action was taken.2 74 The prosecutors reported that they disagreed
with true bill decisions-i.e., they believed that a no true bill was in
order, yet grand juries returned true bills of indictment-in just 2.5
percent of the cases (131 of 5176).275 Morse thus concluded that,
"When the total cases are combined ... it is seen that in only 315
269. District attorneys were asked to complete data cards for each case considered by the
grand juries. Only 162 of the 1237 district attorneys requested to participate in the survey did
so, a response rate of 13.1%. Id. at 128, Table 1. This low rate calls into question the
representativeness of the responses and thus the ability to generalize the results.
270. The states were Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Id. at
128. Unfortunately, the results are not reported separately for the individual states, nor are
regional groupings made, nor rural-urban results analyzed separately.
271. Morse differentiated between the 1633 cases (22%) involving alleged liquor law
violations and the 5781 non-liquor offenses, to account for any unusual attitudes that might
concern liquor-related offenses during this era of prohibition. Among the 5781 non-liquor
offenses, 3301 (57.1%) involved crimes against property, 1433 (24.8%) crimes against the
person, and 1047 (18.1%) crimes against morals or safety, miscellaneous others, or crimes that
were not reported. Id. at 129-32.
272. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
273. Morse, supra note 12 at 134-45. Grand juries no true billed 17.3% (954 of 5520) of
the non-liquor cases initiated by district attorneys, compared to 14.0% (216 of 1541) of the
liquor cases that district attorneys initiated. Id.
274. This includes 131 of the 758 decisions (17.3%) to no true bill in non-liquor cases,
and 53 of the 185 no true bill decisions (28.7%) in liquor cases. Morse, supra note 12 at 149
Table VII-B.
275. Prosecutors disagreed with 86 of the 3998 true bill decisions (2.2%) in non-liquor
cases, and 45 of the 1178 true bills (3.8%) in liquor cases. Id. at 151 Table VIII-B.
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cases, or 5.15 percent, out of 6,119 cases initiated by the prosecutors
in which they expressed an opinion was there a disagreement between
the opinion of the prosecutors and the grand jury dispositions. "
276
Morse's study usually is cited for this proposition, i.e., that pro-
secutors disagree with grand juries' indictment decisions in only about
five percent of all cases considered. 277 This finding, as Morse himself
suggested, might be taken to support those who "say that... grand
juries 'rubber stamp' the wishes of prosecutors." 27 Morse concluded
that grand juries basically are "a fifth wheel in the administration
of criminal justice.''279 The contention that these data demonstrate
that grand juries are obsequious and superfluous is overstated, how-
ever, if not wrong.
No true bill decisions were made in nearly 17 percent of the cases
that prosecutors submitted for grand jury consideration. The district
attorneys' after-the-fact reports that they agreed with these decisions
in about 80 percent of the cases 210 may well have been influenced by
the grand jury action, and are hardly verifiable objectively. Most
significantly, however, characterizing prosecutorial and grand jury
disagreement as existing in only five percent of these cases masks
the skewed distribution of these disagreements. Prosecutors disagreed
with no true bill decisions at a rate nearly eight times greater than
that of their disagreements with grand juries' decisions to return true
bills of indictment (19.5 percent vs. 2.5 percent)281 If the grand jury's
"buffering" function is at issue, surely the former statistic is the
more meaningful one.
But the real significance of grand jury and prosecutorial disagree-
ment about indictment decisions goes beyond simple percentages.
Most cases presented to grand juries are "open and shut" due to
the relaxed evidentiary standards which require only probable cause
or prima facie evidence of the accused's guilt. 2 Relatively few cases
276. Id. at 151.
277. See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAvE & J. IstAi, supra note 52 at 282 n.6; Deutsch, supra note 52 at
1175 n.76; Lee, The Grand Jury in Ohio: An Empical Study, 4 U. DAYTON L. Rnv. 325, 349 (1979);
Note, An Examination of the Grand Jury in New York, 2 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. Ptoas., 88, at 98;
KAiusAR, MODERN CAL PRoca 'R: CAsES, Commmmrrs AND QuEmsoNs 1022 (5th ed. 1980).
278. Morse, supra note 12 at 154.
279. Id. (Part II) at 329.
280. See supra notes 274-275, and accompanying text. Morse suggests that district attorneys
sometimes may be required by law to submit cases for grand jury action, if a complaint is
filed with a magistrate; that they would not choose to act upon a significant number of such
complaints if they had the discretion to do otherwise; and that they often recommend that
grand juries not return true bills. Morse, supra note 12 at 141.
281. See supra notes 274 & 275, and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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can be expected to be controversial, or even close. Yet it is precisely
in this minority of cases that the grand jury, if it does in fact serve
as a check against unwarranted prosecutions, occupies its most crucial
role.23 Jerome Hall has suggested that the five percent rate of
disagreement between prosecutors and grand juries reported by Morse
represents
an enormous number considering the circumstances, and the stan-
dard of evaluation used.... Not a scintilla of fact is shown
regarding any of these 353 cases. In any of a dozen or so real
senses these cases may be far more important for justice-and that
is what is referred to-than all of the other 7000 odd cases com-
bined.2
Citing the same data relied upon by Morse, Hall drew quite different
inferences. "The statistics showing the very large dissent of the
prosecutors from the grand juries in the cases where the grand jury
'no billed' would suggest, as does the large number of 'no true
billed' cases, that the grand jury is a very potent check upon over-
zealous prosecutors" .215
Morse's finding that the grand juries declined to return true bills
of indictment in about 17 percent of the cases they reviewed is toward
the upper end of the range reported in other studies. The no true
bill rates of various grand juries have been reported as ranging from
virtually nil to over twenty percent.2 1 6 These conclusions often are
283. Dession, From Indictment to Information-Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J.
163, 176-79 (1932). This article contains insightful commentary about Morse's study, and about
a related investigation of grand juries contained in Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prose-
cutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MicH. L. Rv. 403 (1931).
284. Hall, Analysis of Criticism of the Grand Jury, 22 J. Craim. L. & CRDI[NotoGy 692,
696 (1932). "The job that really wants being done is an investigation of the finer questions
regarding the division of routine cases from extraordinary ones, of certain routine matters
from others, of centers and localities (usually urban) presenting many unique conditions from
rural communities and small towns; of particular crimes of special public concerns from
others." Id. at 704.
285. Id. at 698. "Assuming these figures, [i.e., that 1170 of the 7061 cases in which grand
jury action was initiated by prosecutors were no true billed], to be accurate, they indicate on
their face that the grand jury is by no means a mere rubber stamp, but on the contrary, is a
definite, important check upon over-zealous prosecutors and the examining magistrates." Id.
at 697.
286. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 590, 586 P.2d 916, 919, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 435, 438 (1978) (parties stipulated that "between January 1, 1974, and June 30, 1977,
235 cases were presented to the San Francisco grand jury and indictments were returned in all
235."). California allows prosecutions to be initiated by information, suggesting that the
requests for indictments referred to in Hawkins occurred in atypical cases, probably those in
which district attorneys desired to avoid a preliminary hearing. Id. See also Sullivan & Nachman,
supra note 61 at 1050 n.16 ("During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, [federal] grand
juries returned 17,419 indictments and only 68 'no true bills' [or 0.39%].") (citing Statistical
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provided summarily, without mention of the underlying data, expla-
nation of the methodology, discussion of the prosecutors' obligations
relative to the grand juries, discrimination between types of cases,
or many other important details that would help ascribe meaning to
them. Morse's 60-year old study thus remains the richest and most
ambitious, even though it suffers from some of the same weaknesses.
Morse also asked prosecutors to provide information about cases
they initiated in which grand juries either upgraded or downgraded
the charges lodged by committing magistrates who bound suspects
over for grand jury action. Grand juries made changes in the charges
much less frequently than they made no true bill decisions, doing so
in 206 of 7061 cases (2.9 percent). They increased the charges in 93
of these 206 cases, and decreased them in the other 113 .287 Interest-
Report of U.S. Attorneys' Office, Fiscal Year 1984, Report 1-21 (introductory materials p.
2.); Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and Inter-
national Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 738 (1977) (Federal
grand juries in 1976 returned approximately 23,000 indictments, with 123 no true bills, or
0.53%). See generally People v. Lewis, 88 111. 2d 129, 430 N.E.2d 1346, 1376 (1981) (Simon,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982) (noting that delegates at Illinois State
Constitution Ratifying Convention "bandied about" the figure that "95 percent of the cases
presented to a grand jury by the State's Attorney resulted in prosecution," and further noting
the observation of one delegate with personal experience serving on a grand jury that "41 of
the 385 prosecutions [or 10.6%] that were sought by the State's Attorney were denied"); Note,
Some Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 8 ST. L. REv. 631, 644, 653-54 (1956)
(in 1954 only three percent of felony prosecutions in California were commenced by indictment
instead of information; California district attorneys responding to a questionnaire reported
that in 1955 grand juries did not return true bills of indictment in 17 of 289 cases (5.9%) that
the prosecutors initiated); Lee, supra note 277 at 341, Table 6 (reporting results of survey
wherein Ohio prosecutors and judges estimated the frequency with which Ohio grand juries
disagreed with prosecutors' charging requests; 74.6% of prosecutors and 70.5% of judges
estimated disagreement rate at less than five percent; 13.5% of prosecutors and 17.0% of
judges estimated five to ten percent disagreement; 8.5% of prosecutors and 5.7% of judges
estimated 10-15% disagreement; 3.4% of prosecutors and 6.8% of judges estimated 15-25%
disagreement; no estimates exceeded a 25% disagreement rate); Carp, The Behavior of Grand
Juries: Acquiescence or Justice, 55 Soc. Sci. Q. 853, 857, Table 1 (1975) (Harris County
(Houston), Texas grand jury sitting from November, 1971 through February, 1972 did not
follow prosecutors' indictment recommendations in 64 of 918 cases (7.0%)); National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, supra note 264 at 75 (summarily noting
that, in most cities in which they are used, grand juries no true bill less than 20% of the
cases they consider, and fixing such rate at two to three percent in Philadelphia, seven percent
in Cleveland, and 20% in Washington, D.C.); Rowland, The Relationship Between Grand
Jury Composition and Performance, 60 Soc. Sci. Q. 323, 324-25 (1979) (studying 38 different
grand juries sitting in Harris County (Houston), Texas between 1972-1975, and reporting that the
mean no true bill rate of such grand juries was 11.5%, with a range of 5-21%); Note, An Eamination
of the Grand Jury in New York, 2 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. Pitoa., 88, at 99 n.93, citing 10 N.Y.
Admintrative Bd. of the Judicial Conference Ann. Rep., Leg. Doc. No. 90, Table 31, at 417 (1965)
(between July 1, 1963 and June 30, 1964 grand juries in New York City returned no true bills for
2046 of 15,971 defendants considered (12.8%); in New York State as a whole 3476 no true bills were
returned by grand juries for 27,436 defendants considered (12.7%)).
287. Morse, supra note 12 at 154-59. Morse suggests that many of the grand juries' charge
alterations occurred at the request of district attorneys, but provides no evidence on this point.
Id. at 159.
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ingly, a significant amount of the grand juries' charge alterations
and no true bill decisions took place in homicide cases.
Among the 113 cases in which grand juries downgraded charges
were seven first degree murder charges that were reduced to second
degree murder or manslaughter, and four manslaughter charges that
were reduced either to driving offenses, or in one case, to a lesser
degree of manslaughter. s8 Additionally, nine of the 108 murder
charges initiated by prosecutors (8.3 percent) were no true billed by
grand juries, including two cases in which prosecutors reported that
they disagreed with the grand juries' actions.289 Forty-nine of the 120
manslaughter charges (40.8 percent) initiated by prosecutors were no
true billed. This large proportion probably reflects that many of the
homicides stemmed from automobile accidents. 2"° District attorneys
recorded their disagreement with the grand juries' decisions in five
of the 49 cases. 291
It would be difficult to characterize these results as evidencing that
grand juries give only perfunctory consideration to criminal homicide
indictments, or that they rubber stamp district attorneys' charging
decisions. The results suggest just the opposite. They are consistent
with other studies which report that grand juries spend a dispropor-
tionate amount of time deliberating upon "crimes of passion,"
including murder, 292 and that grand jurors disagree among one an-
other, and with prosecutors' charging recommendations, in a com-
paratively high proportion of such cases. 293 That such debate and
288. Id. at 156, Table XII; id. at 159.
289. Id. at 141, Table IV-A, 148. Grand juries also no true billed one of the eight murder
cases in which they, rather than a prosecutor, initiated consideration of the charge. Id. at 135,
Table III.
290. Id. at 141, Table IV-A, 142. Grand juries also no true billed two of the four
manslaughter cases that they considered at their own initiative. Id. at 145, Table V.
291. Id. at 148.
292. Carp, supra note 286, surveyed individuals serving on Harris County (Houston), Texas
grand juries between 1969 and 1972. He reported that upwards of 80 percent of the cases
considered by the grand jurors were voted upon without discussion. Id. at 856-58. However,
"grand juries do discriminate in the amount of time allotted to specific categories of cases,"
and "might spend several hours investigating and discussing a prominent murder or rape case
. " Id. at 858. Most grand jurors reported that they spent the most time deliberating in
drug cases, and alleged "crimes of passion," such as murder and rape. They discussed about
a third of such cases. Id. at 858-59.
293. Most grand jurors in Carp's study opined that drug cases and "crimes of passion"
(including murder and rape) generated the greatest amount of internal dissension, with no
other category of crime receiving prominent mention as creating disharmony. Id. at 859-60.
Most of the grand jurors listed drug cases (44%) and crimes of passion (18%) as most likely
to result in grand juries' refusing to follow prosecutors' recommendations, with six other
categories of crimes mentioned by fewer respondents (ranging from 3-11%). Id. at 860-61.
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disagreement are generated makes perfect sense in light of the po-
tential seriousness of criminal homicide charges, and the fine and
largely subjective lines that define different types and degrees of
criminal homicide.294 These findings also jibe with the notion that
the true measure of the grand jury's role as a buffer lies in a
relatively small but highly significant class of cases.295
Potentially capital crimes epitomize this type of case. Grand juries
historically have risen to the task of acting as a buffer between the
prosecution and the accused when life is in the balance. 29 6 Radzinow-
icz provides interesting corroboration of this with information about
English and Welsh grand juries from 1805 to 1810, and their decisions
to decline to return true bills of indictment against individuals who
had been committed for trial. They did so in almost 5000 cases
among the nearly 29,000 that they considered, or over 17 percent of
them.297 Radzinowicz inferred that many of the no true bills were
returned because of grand jurors' desires to nullify the possibility of
a capital sentence.
[T]he considerable proportion of one out of every five or six persons
committed for trial was not prosecuted. Although [this] does not
indicate to what extent this was due to the fact that so many statutes
imposed capital punishment, it may reasonably be assumed that the
grand juries were not entirely impervious to the feelings which so
materially influenced the judges, the petty juries and the Crown,
and that they, too, must have considered death an excessively severe
Nakell's and Hardy's study of North Carolina's administration of the death penalty, supra
note 159, suggests that grand jury indictment practices in criminal homicide cases vary widely
in the state's several judicial districts. Grand juries from some districts returned first degree
murder charges in virtually all homicide cases, while others did so in only about 10-25% of
the criminal homicides. B. NAXELL & K. HARDY supra note 159 at 123-31. They did not report
the frequency with which grand juries deviated from prosecutors' charging requests.
294. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 282-285 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
297. 1 L. RADziowicz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COiON LAw AND ITS ADMNISTRATION
FROM 1750, at 92 (1948) (footnote omitted), where the following is provided:
TOTAL NUMMER OF PERSONS COMMITTED FOR TRIAL AND THE TOTAL NUMEBR OF BILLS
1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810
Committed 4,605 4,346 4,446 4,735 5,330 5,146
for trial
(all offences) 730 766 801 886 887 858
No bills found and
not prosecuted
[15.9%] [17.6%] [18.0%] [18.7%] [16.6%] [16.7%]
When the above figures are summed, grand juries over the period 1805-1810 declined to return
true bills of indictment in 4958 of 28,578 cases, or in 17.3% of the cases considered.
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penalty for at least some of the offenses for which it was imposed.29
Grand juries have a special role to perform in potentially capital
cases. Because of the seriousness and finality of death penalty deci-
sions, and the very real possibility that prosecuting and sentencing
authorities may abuse their discretion in such cases, 299 the traditional
buffering function of grand juries looms as especially important.
Beyond that, death penalty decisions involve unique moral judgments.
It is particularly appropriate for a citizens' panel drawn from the
community to screen criminal accusations that could result in the
accused being punished with death in order to help affirm the moral
legitimacy of the administration of capital punishment.
2. The Grand Jury and Community Participation in Capital
Prosecutions
The death penalty "is an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct," 3°° a way of saying to the condemned
that, "You are not fit for this world, take your chance elsewhere." 30
Capital cases ultimately involve interrelated factual and moral judg-
ments. 02 Grand juries, of course, are far removed from the sentencing
298. Id. at 92-93 (footnotes omitted). In the early 19th century in England several felonies,
at least nominally, carried mandatory death penalties. See supra notes 157-159 and accompa-
nying text. As Radzinowicz intimates, a variety of techniques existed to avoid rigid application
of the death penalty in all felony cases. See RADzmowrrz, supra note 297 at 91-97. See
generally D. HAY, P. LniEBAuGFI, J. RuLa, E. THOMPSON & C. WiNsLow, AaBION's FATAl.
TanE: Clu- AND Socmry jN EIGHTEENTH CENTURy ENGLAND (1975); supra notes 125 & 127.
299. See supra notes 232-253, and accompanying text.
300. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality decision) (footnote omitted).
"Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme
cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous
an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death." Id.
428 U.S. at 184 (footnote omitted).
301. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting
Stephefi, Capital Punishments, 69 FRAsER's MAGAZINE 753, 763 (1864)).
302. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 560 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("The capital sentencing jury is asked to make a moral decision about whether a
particular individual should live or die. Despite the objective factors that are introduced in an
attempt to guide the exercise of the jurors' discretion, theirs is largely a subjective judgment.");
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (evidence introduced at a capital sentencing
hearing must have "some bearing on the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral guilt."')
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-
58 (1987) (authorizing death penalty for major participants in felony murders who do not
actually kill if mens rea of "reckless indifference to the value of human life" is established,
as such "may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an 'intent to kill."'); California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (The death penalty
"is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges normally
understand such rules, but rather is ultimately understood only as an expression of the
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phase of capital trials, where the idiosyncratic and normative com-
ponents of decisions that may result in a sentence of death are fully
developed and assume priority. Nevertheless, the grand juries' in-
dictment decisions can significantly affect the class of death penalty-
eligible cases. 30 3 Beyond this, their very participation as gatekeepers
in the capital punishment process promotes other important values
related to the grand jury's buffering function.
The death penalty symbolizes society's denunciation of morally
reprehensible conduct and, conversely, its validation of civilized and
normative standards of behavior. 304 Largely because of this, com-
munity participation in the administration of capital punishment has
long been considered desirable, if not constitutionally required. This
explains the long-standing involvement of juries in capital sentencing
in most states, while jury sentencing otherwise is uncommon.3
05
Whether the death penalty is a "cruel and unusual" punishment,
and thus in conflict with the eighth amendment, has been assessed
in part by reference to the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society. ' ' 3s These standards, in turn, have
community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral entitlement to live .... ")
(footnote omitted); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
"Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth: the defendant, in fact,
did or did not commit the acts constituting the crime charged.... In contrast, the law
provides only limited standards for assessing the validity of a sentencing decision. The
sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out just deserts as he sees them."
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Gillers, supra note
172 at 54-56; W. BERNs, FOR CAPrrA. PUNISHMENT: CRIM AN I THE MoR.ArrY oF Tm DEATH
PENALTY 153-76 (1979).
303. See supra notes 125, 127 & 202 and accompanying text.
304. See Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic Politics, 5 LAW
& PoLicy Q. 157 (1983); Tyler & Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response
to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & Soc'y REv. 21 (1982); W. BERNs, supra note 302
at 153-76; Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other Than Deterrence, 14 CaMs.
LAW BULL. 34, 40-43 (1978). See generally J. ANDENAEs, PUNIIsMENT AND DETERRENcE (1974);
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 949 (1966).
305. Gillers, supra note 172 at 13-19. Gillert notes that, as of 1980, 27 of the 35 states
authorizing capital punishment relied exclusively on jury sentencing, while six entrusted capital
sentencing decisions exclusively to judges, and two gave final sentencing authority to judges
after advisory juries made sentencing recommendations. Id. at 14 & nn. 49-52. He points out
that the eight states that did not allow juries to make capital sentencing decisions gave
sentencing authority to judges only after the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). It seems reasonable to conclude that "[t]heir adoption of judge sentencing is an
apparent attempt to meet Furman's unclear commands." Id. at 18 (footnote omitted). In
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the Court observed that seven of the 37 states
authorizing capital punishment did not give final authority to juries to impose capital sentences.
In four of those states judges made capital sentencing decisions alone, while in the other three
judges imposed sentence after receiving a recommendation from an advisory jury. Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 463 & n.9.
306. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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been given content through various indicia of community attitudes
about the death penalty, including jury sentencing decisions in po-
tentially capital cases °.3 0 As the Court said in Witherspoon v. Illinois:
[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform in
making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system-a link without which the
determination of capital punishment could hardly reflect "the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 3
0
In Spaziano v. Florida3°9 the Court affirmed that jury sentencing
is not constitutionally required in capital cases. One very important
source of community input 310 to death penalty decisions consequently
is eliminated in the four states that rely exclusively on judges to
impose capital sentences.31 1 Such input is only advisory in the three
additional states that use juries to make non-binding capital sentenc-
ing recommendations to judges, who have final sentencing author-
307. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-82.
308. 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion). When Witherspoon was decided the sentencing jury made a death penalty
decision without either legislative guidance, or the benefit of a sentencing hearing that was
separate from the guilt trial, i.e., before Furman v. Georgia invalidated such capital punishment
systems. See supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text. Although the Court has ruled that
jury sentencing in capital cases is not constitutionally required, (Spaziano v. Florida), when
jury sentencing is used it remains an important barometer of community attitudes toward the
death penalty. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 794-95 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois,
supra at 519 n.15).
309. 468 U.S. 447 (1984). See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
310. Under Florida law judges have the final authority to make capital sentencing decisions,
but juries are retained to hear evidence at a penalty hearing and to make a recommendation
about whether the death penalty should be imposed. Judges may deviate from a jury's
recommendation that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed only if 'the facts suggesting
a sentence of death . . . [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ."' Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977), quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d
908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (emphasis added in the Dobbert opinion). In Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447 (1984) the Court specifically upheld this practice, relying in part upon the premise
that "[i]mposing the sentence in individual cases is not the sole or even the primary vehicle
through which the community's voice can be expressed.... The community's voice is heard
at least as clearly in the legislature when the death penalty is authorized and the particular
circumstances in which death is appropriate are defined." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462.
311. The four states are Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska. See ARiz. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703(B) (1978); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(b) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301
(1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2520 (1985). In Nevada, additionally, a panel of three judges is
authorized to make the sentencing decision in capital cases in which the trial juries, which
normally impose sentence, are unable to reach a unanimous verdict about whether to impose
a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment. Nay. REv. STAT. §§ 175.554, 175.556
(1985).
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ity.312 Five of the states that rely upon judicial sentencing in death
penalty proceedings-Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Montana and Ne-
braska-also authorize capital trials to begin by prosecutors' infor-
mation, rather than grand jury indictment. 13
In these states a highly anomalous situation exists whereby a citizen
can be put on trial for his or her life at the initiative of one public
official, the prosecutor, and can be sentenced to death by another,
the judge. The only "buffer" between the accused and the state is
the trial jury, which has the lawful authority to consider only whether
the defendant committed the alleged crime, and makes no direct
contribution to either the charging or sentencing decision. The critical
discretionary decisions that precede and follow the guilt determination
phase of capital trials are under the complete control of the very
officials that the framers intended to keep in check when they
provided for constitutional amendments requiring indictment and
trial by grand and petit juries. 314
312. The three states are Alabama, Florida and Indiana. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46(a),
13A-5-47(a),(e) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(2),(3) (West 1985); IND. CODn ANN. § 35-
50-2-9(e) (West 1985).
313. See supra notes 109-112, 311 & 312. In addition, Nevada, which allows for judicial
sentencing when juries are unable to reach a unanimous sentencing verdict in capital trials,
(see supra note 311), does not require that capital crimes be prosecuted by indictment. See
supra note 109. Florida, which authorizes judges to impose sentence in capital cases after
considering a jury's advisory verdict, (see supra notes 310 & 312), requires prosecution by
indictment or presentment only for capital crimes, and otherwise allows the use of a prosecutor's
information. See supra note 112. Alabama, which also makes jury verdicts in capital sentencing
proceedings only advisory, (supra note 312), requires that all felonies be prosecuted by
indictment, except non-capital cases in which the accused pleads guilty. See supra note 110.
314. With respect to the grand jury's role as a buffer against arbitrary prosecutorial
decision-making, see supra notes 118-127 and accompanying text. The classic statement con-
cerning the criminal trial jury's analogous function is made in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155-56 (1968):
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression
by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and
experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought
to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher
authority.... Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge.... IT]he jury trial provisions in
the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise
of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty
of the citizens to one judge or a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so
typical of our State and Federal governments in other respects, found expression in
the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination
of guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial
in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must
therefore be respected by the States. (Footnote omitted).
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56.
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Even in states in which trial juries make death penalty decisions,
grand juries have important contributions to make to the adminis-
tration of capital punishment laws. Grand juries have the authority
to decline to return true bills of indictment, or to indict for a lesser
offense, in order to spare "individual citizens [against] the trouble,
expense, and anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is
established ... by such a jury. . ."I" The burdens associated with
capital trials are undoubtedly unique, 316 and grand juries can be
expected to take their deliberations most seriously when their indict-
ment decisions may place the accused's life in jeopardy.
3 17
If properly instructed about the statutory criteria that distinguish
death penalty-eligible offenders from others,31 grand juries can pre-
liminarily narrow the class of cases in which the capital sanction may
be imposed. This narrowing function, which must comply with
objective, legislative standards, is constitutionally required in capital
cases.31 9 Many alleged criminal homicides can be excluded as poten-
tially capital ones at the indictment stage.320 To not allow the grand
jury to make such review seems inconsistent with its traditional task
of pretermitting vexatious, arbitrary or oppressive trials.
The participation of lay citizens in authorizing capital prosecutions
thus may be practically important in helping to winnow the class of
potentially capital crimes and in helping to guard against arbitrary
prosecutorial decisionmaking. Community participation also has sym-
bolic significance, by helping to legitimize the use of the death
penalty,3 1 and in inspiring community confidence in its just appli-
315. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887) (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344
(1857)). See supra note 186, and accompanying text.
316. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981). See supra note 185 and accompanying
text. See generally Tabak, supra note 231 at 809-10 (noting the strain felt by defense lawyers
in capital trials).
317. See supra notes 202, 292-295 and accompanying text.
318. See infra notes 375-391 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
320. Cf. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 555 (1988) ("It seems clear
to us ... that the narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment may be
provided in either of two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital
offenses,... so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this concern, or the legislature may
more broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating
circumstances at the penalty phase."). See also infra notes 361-391 and accompanying text.
321. Addressing the role of sentencing juries in capital cases, Justice Stevens observed that
"the legitimacy of capital punishment ... critically depends upon whether its imposition in a
particular case is consistent with the community's sense of values." Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See id. at 475-90. Grand
jury decisions have a distinct place in legitimizing criminal prosecutions, which is one reason
that irregularities in the composition of an indicting jury are not considered harmless even if
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cation.3 22 Grand juries must be given a meaningful opportunity to
perform such functions, however, necessitating modifications in the
procedures that are currently used to initiate capital trials in most
states.
B. The Grand Jury's Role in Modern Systems of Capital
Punishment
At a minimum, grand juries must be given both the information
and the decisional authority necessary to accomplish their essential
functions under modern death penalty legislation, i.e., to serve as a
buffer or safeguard against arbitrary prosecutorial and judicial de-
cisionmaking, and to foster community participation in and the
administration of capital punishment. Grand juries thus should be
apprised of the definitional lines that separate capital and non-capital
homicides, 323 including those that nominally apply only at the sen-
the accused is subsequently convicted by a properly constituted petit jury. Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). See also Ford v. Kentucky, 462
U.S. 984, 987 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). "[T]he fact that a
body of the petit jury's peers has seen fit to return an indictment may be a powerful sign to
the petit jury that the charges are well founded." Id. "[O]nce a state chooses to employ grand
juries, those grand juries become integral elements in the system of criminal justice in that
state. Law is not a process by which a society actually arrives at objective truth, but rather a
means for structuring the truth-seeking process so that the answers it yields will be accepted
as morally legitimate by the community; it is this acceptance that enables the verdicts of the
jury system to be treated as 'true."' Id. at 987-88.
322. Cf. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 482 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (addressing the trial jury's place in capital sentencing decisions). "ITihe
jury serves to ensure that the criminal process is not subject to the unchecked assertion of
arbitrary governmental power; community participation is 'critical to public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system."' Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975)). See R. YOUNGER, supra note 52 at 52-60, 245-46; 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 52:
[S]upporters contend that grand jury review clearly comes out ahead when the
symbolic impact of the information and indictment processes are compared. What
the grand jury loses through a non-adversary, secret proceeding is more than offset
by its inclusion of community representatives in the screening process. Participation
of laymen contributes to public confidence in the criminal justice system and thereby
justifies grand jury review even in cases that are "open and shut.";
2 W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 52 at 285. See also Dession, supra note 283 at 164
("Unless the people through their own representatives are able to voice the local sentiment
concerning the law, and the local sense of justice, they will feel decidedly insecure, and the
Grand Jury is the particular body that breathes the spirit of the community.") (quoting
Medalie, Grand Jury's Value - Presentments - Fraudulent Bankrupts, 9 The Panel 16 No. 2,
1931) (emphasis in original); Lewis, supra note 61, at 40.
323. The discussion here is limited to criminal homicides, the only type of offense the
Court has expressly recognized as permitting the capital sanction. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976). The Court ruled in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), that the death penalty
was excessive punishment for the rape of an adult, and in Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917
(1977) (summary disposition) invalidated the death penalty as punishment for kidnapping.
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tencing phase of capital trials. They should be given specific notice
of all prosecutions in which true bills of indictment will expose the
accused to death penalty eligibility. To make meaningful use of such
information, grand juries should be given the explicit prerogative of
returning true bills that foreclose the possibility of capital punishment
upon conviction.
Crimes punishable by death are unique in several respects. They
must entail sufficient harm,324 and be committed with the requisite
personal culpability, 32 5 to make capital punishment a constitutionally
permissible response. These limitations reflect the social judgment
that this uniquely severe form of punishment must be reserved for
especially heinous and aggravated crimes, which are distinguishable
from other serious offenses. These limitations also explain the his-
torical distinctions between murder and manslaughter, 326 between first
and second degree murder, 327 and account for the contemporary
separation of capital and non-capital murder.
The Supreme Court has made this separation basic to modern
capital punishment statutes. States initially must define a class of
offenses for which the death penalty may be imposed through the
use of objective, legislative criteria 28 that distinguish a relatively
narrow array of crimes from those not punishable by death.
329
Defendants convicted of one of this truncated category of homicides
are eligible for the death penalty, but may not automatically be
sentenced to die.
330
At the "selection stage" of capital proceedings, the sentencer
determines which specific offenders will die from among those who,
Some crimes that do not involve the death of a victim have not been ruled out as punishable
by death, e.g., treason and espionage. See generally Lawton, Statement on the Constitutionality
of a Proposed Federal Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AmERICA at 318 supra note
154 (excerpt of testimony at hearings on S. 1382 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2-8 (1978)).
324. E.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-99 (1977) (capital punishment excessive for
rape of adult woman).
325. E.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (defendant guilty of felony murder,
yet not sufficiently culpable for imposition of death penalty, in that there was no evidence
that he actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill homicide victims).
326. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692-96 (1975).
327. See supra notes 154, 158 & 159 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
329. Gillers, supra note 172 at 23-26. "The state must decide who may die before a
sentencer decides who will. This is the definition stage .... [I]n order to punish murder with
execution the murder must be accompanied by aggravating factors clearly stated; and whether
the evidence and the aggravating factors sufficiently distinguish one murder from another, so
that an execution will not be arbitrary, is a federal question." Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted).
330. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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by virtue of having crossed the threshold of death penalty-eligibility,
may be punished with death.33 The sentencer must have essentially
unbounded discretion at this stage to consider and act upon individual
offense and offender circumstances in mitigation of punishment.
3 2
This discretion includes a prerogative to be merciful, on a case-
specific basis."' Such plenary discretion in some respects is in tension
with the antecedent definition stage requirement that the class of
potential death penalty recipients be determined according to objec-
tive criteria that channel and circumscribe discretion.
34
Given the nature of the decision and the wealth of information
that may be relevant, grand juries have little to contribute to the
affirmative selection of the capital offenders who ultimately are
sentenced to death. Their screening and input are extremely germane,
however, to the definition stage of capital prosecutions, where they
can be expected to serve as a check on prosecutorial authority to
initiate trials that may result in the death penalty. This is an especially
important opportunity for the community to have a voice in capital
331. Gillers, supra note 172 at 26-38.
332. E.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). But see California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987) (upholding instruction "informing jurors that they 'must
not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling' during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial . . .
333. E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987):
In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's
discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to
narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to
decline to impose the death sentence. "[T]he sentencer ... [cannot] be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978)).
334. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring):
This case squarely presents the tension that has long existed between two central
principles of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), we concluded that "where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination
of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action." In capital sentencing, therefore, discretion must be "'controlled by clear
and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application."' Id. at
198, 96 S.Ct, at 2936 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612,
615 (1974)) ..... On the other hand, this Court has also held that a sentencing
body must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evidence regarding the
defendant's character or background, and the circumstances of the particular of-
fense .... [citations omitted].
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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proceedings in jurisdictions in which trial juries do not make death
penalty decisions.
335
Grand juries almost universally are precluded from performing in
this capacity, however, even where indictments rather than infor-
mations are used to commence criminal actions. In almost all juris-
dictions grand juries consider only whether an indictment should be
returned for the crime of murder, or some variant such as first
degree murder. They rarely review the criteria that become operative
at the sentencing stage, which differentiate between potentially capital
murders and those that may not be punished by death. The distinc-
tions between "crime" and "sentencing" factors in this context are
formalistic-fictions, really.3 36 Their observance seriously undermines
the grand jury's ability either to serve as a buffer against arbitrary
capital prosecutions, or to represent the community's sentiments in
the prosecution of capital crimes.
In most jurisdictions a relatively broad or generic category of
murder must be proved at the guilt stage of a trial if a death penalty
hearing is to ensue. In South Carolina, for example, murder is
defined simply as "the killing of any person with malice aforethought,
either express or implied. 3 37 Florida defines first degree murder as
"It]he unlawful killing of a human being.. .[w]hen perpetrated from
a premeditated design to effect ... death," or during the perpetration
of named felonies, or if proximately caused by the distribution of
certain illicit drugs.338 In Oklahoma first degree murder consists of
causing the death of another "unlawfully and with malice afore-
thought," or during the commission of designated felonies, or causing
the death of a child under specified circumstances. 3 9 First degree
murder in Nebraska is causing the death of another "purposely and
with deliberate and premeditated malice," in the perpetration of
335. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
336. See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
337. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
338. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04(l)(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1986). The felonies include
narcotics trafficking, arson, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, escape, aggravated
child abuse, aircraft piracy or the use of a destructive device or bomb. Id. § 782.04(1)(a)(2).
The offender must be older than 18 to be guilty of first degree murder for a death proximately
caused by the distribution of opium or opium derivatives. Id. § 782.04(l)(a)(3).
339. QICLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West 1983). "Malice" is defined as the "deliberate
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external
circumstances capable of proof." Id. § 701.7(A). Commission of a criminal homicide during
the named felonies-forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, escape, first degree burglary
and first degree arson-is first degree murder even absent proof of malice. Id. § 701.703).
The death of a child resulting from "the injuring, torturing, maiming or using of unreasonable
force" also constitutes first degree murder. Id. § 701.7(C).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
specified felonies, or by administering poison, or if through perjury
or the subornation of perjury the offender "purposely procures the
conviction and execution of any innocent person." 314
In none of these states is conviction for murder sufficient to place
the offender at risk of being punished with death. There is a higher
threshold defining death penalty eligibility, one which is crossed only
when the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more
statutory aggravating circumstances accompanied the commission of
the crime.3 41 The aggravating factors typically concern victim char-
acteristics, offender characteristics, or circumstances of the crime.
For the most part, aggravating factors or "special circumstances ' 342
involve issues of historical fact, such as whether a peace officer343 or
a child 344 was killed, whether the offender had a prior murder
conviction3 45 or was in the service of a prison sentence,34 6 or whether
the murder was com iitted for hire, 347 pecuniary gain,348 or during
the perpetration of a felony. 349 Some of the statutory aggravating
factors are less objective, but still essentially factual. They include
whether the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," 350
340. NED. Rv. STAT. §§ 28-303(1)-(3) (1985). Killings during the perpetration of the
following felonies are first degree murder: sexual assault in the first degree, arson, robbery,
kidnapping, hijacking any means of transportation, and burglary. Id. § 28-303(2).
341. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN4. tit. 21,
§ 701.11 (West Supp. 1988). Case law in Florida and Nebraska requires that statutory
aggravating circumstances be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 386 So.
2d 538, 542 (Fla. 1980); State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433 (1984).
342. In California juries in capital cases are directed to consider "special circumstances"
rather than aggravating and mitigating factors. See infra note 388.
343. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(5)0) (West Supp. 1988); OKRA. STAT. Am. tit. 21, § 701.12(8) (West 1983); NEB.
Rv. STAT. §§ 29-2523(l)(g) (1985).
344. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (child 11 years of age
or younger).
345. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. Am. § 921.141(5)(b)
(West Supp. 1988) (prior conviction for capital felony); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 29-2523(l)(a)
(1985).
346. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(a) (vest Supp. 1988); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
701.12(6) (West 1983).
347. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); OKa. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 701.12(3) (West 1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(c) (1985).
348. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(5)(f) (vest Supp. 1988); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(l)(c) (1985).
349. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(a)-(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(5)(d) (West Supp. 1988).
350. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
701.12(4) (West 1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(d) (1985) ("The murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality
and intelligence."). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(i) (West Supp. 1988) (homicide
"committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or
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was committed by an offender with "a substantial history of serious
assaultive or terrorizing activity, ' 351 or whether there exists "a prob-
ability that the defendant would commit acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society.' '352 Proof of aggravating
circumstances is made at the sentencing stage of capital trials in these
jurisdictions, rather than at the guilt-determination stage.
The selection of offenders who actually will receive the death
penalty is made in the final stage of capital punishment deliberations,
only after statutory aggravating factors have been established. This
is a much less structured decision. Because selecting who should die
essentially is a moral judgment, 353 such decisions are guided by fewer
objective criteria than is the prior identification of offenders who
are eligible for capital punishment. In most capital punishment
jurisdictions, 354 and in the four states mentioned above, the sentencing
authority is directed to engage in some balancing of aggravating
35
legal justification."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(g) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) ("Murder
was committed while in the commission of... physical torture.").
351. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(a) (1985). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(b)
(West Supp. 1988) ("The defendant was previously convicted of ... a felony involving the
use or threat of violence to the person."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(1) (West 1983)
("The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence
to the person.").
352. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (Vest 1983).
353. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
354. Three states have adopted capital sentencing schemes similar to the one approved by
the Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Texas statute deviates from
the more typical model, which identifies statutory aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances
and requires some balancing of them for the determination of sentence. See Tax. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1989); Tax. CODE CiM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp.
1989). See also ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 163.095, 163.150 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31
(Supp. 1988), 19.2-264.4 (Supp. 1988). The Texas alpd Oregon statutes define rather narrow
categories of first degree murder, and provide for the death penalty if the jury, after a
sentencing hearing, supplies appropriate answers to three questions. The critical question is
"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society ..... " See Tax. CRnA. CODE PROC. ANN. §
37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989); ORE. Ray. STAT. § 163.150(2)(b) (1985). Virginia's scheme
differs in that before the death penalty may be imposed the jury must find either that "there
is a probability ... that [the accused] would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society" or "that his conduct in committing the
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C)
(Supp. 1988). Further, the Virginia statute does not purport to "mandate" a death sentence
upon affirmative findings of the above, unlike the Texas and Oregon statutes. The apparently
mandatory language in the latter statutes nevertheless has been interpreted to allow the sentencer
to consider mitigating circumstances, and decline to impose the death penalty, when appropriate.
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-74 (1976); OBE. REv. STAT. § 163.150(b) (1985) (expressly
including mitigating circumstances).
355. Most states limit the aggravating circumstances which may be considered to those
enumerated in the statutes, as do South Carolina, Florida, and Oklahoma. S.C. CODE ANN.
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and mitigating circumstances pertinent to the offense and the offender
prior to making a death penalty decision.5 6 Mitigating circumstances
often are itemized in capital sentencing statutes, as they are in South
Carolina,35 7 Florida358 and Nebraska .3 9 They need not be, however,
as in Oklahoma's legislation. If mitigating factors are enumerated in
statutes they may not be exclusive; all relevant evidence in mitigation
of punishment is admissible.3 °
The statutes employed in these four states are representative of the
capital sentencing framework most commonly used in this country:
broad types of murder are defined as capital crimes; further proof
of statutory aggravating factors must be made at a separate sentencing
hearing to establish threshold eligibility for the death penalty; and
from this relatively narrow category of offenders the sentencer selects
who shall die only after considering the individual offense and
offender's circumstances, which might further aggravate the crime
or be used in mitigation of punishment.3 6' The states differ, however,
§ 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 1985); OICLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 1988). Nebraska apparently allows aggravating
circumstances not included in the sentencing statute to be considered. See NEB. Rav. STAT. §
2521 (1985); State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N.W.2d 433, 446, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028
(1984). The United States Supreme Court has specifically upheld Georgia's capital sentencing
scheme, which allows the jury to consider nonstatutory factors in aggravation of a capital
offense, as long as at least one statutory aggravating circumstance has been established. See
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
356. See S.C. CODE Am. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT, ANN. §
921.141(3) (West 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (Vest 1988); Nan. Rv. STAT. §
29-2522 (1985).
357. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(I)-(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
358. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(6)(a)-(g) (West 1985).
359. NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 29-2523(2)(a)-(g) (1985).
360. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1
(1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (plurality opinion). See supra notes 332-334 and accompanying text.
361. The other states which fit this basic framework, with many different variations, are
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Washington and Wyoming. See Aim. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703 (1978), 13-1105
(Supp. 1985); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-102 , 16-11-103 (Supp. 1988); DELA. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 636, 4209 (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1984), §§ 17-10-30, 17-10-31 (1982);
IDAHO CODE § 18-4003 (1979), § 19-2515 (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1(a),
(b)-(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 507.020, 532.025 (Baldwin 1985);
MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 407-410, 412(b) (1982), § 413 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAr.
§§ 565.020, 565.031-565.032 (Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102, 46-18-302 through
46-18-306 (1985); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 175.552, 200.030(1), 200.030(4), 200.033, 200.035 (1985);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(a), (c) (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2.1(A) (1984),
§§ 31-20A-2 through 31-20A-6 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981), § 15A-2000 (1983);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2502 (Purdon 1983), tit. 42, § 9711 (Purdon Supp. 1988); S.D.
CODrFmD LAWS ANN. § 22-16-4 (Supp. 1986), §§ 23A-27A-l through 23A-27A-6 (1979 & Supp.
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-202, 39-2-203 (1982); WvAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030
(1977), §§ 10.95.020 through 10.95.080 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101, 6-2-102 (1983).
1989 / The Grand Jury and Capital Punishment
in the extent of authority given governmental officials to initiate and
make sentencing decisions in capital prosecutions, and in the corre-
sponding degree of opportunity that lay citizens have to provide
input into the administration of their respective death penalty systems.
In South Carolina a grand jury must authorize the prosecution of
serious crimes by presentment or indictment, 6 2 and jury sentencing
is required in capital cases. 363 Florida requires that capital trials be
commenced by grand jury action, 364 while judges impose sentence in
capital cases after receiving a recommendation from an advisory
jury 65 In Oklahoma capital charges may be made by a prosecutor's
information,366 and trial juries decide whether offenders should be
sentenced to death.367 Nebraska allows all crimes to be prosecuted
by information, 36 and gives judges exclusive sentencing authority in
capital cases. 369 These four jurisdictions thus represent the four
possible variations of grand jury and trial jury involvement in crim-
inal prosecutions that may result in a sentence of death.3 70
362. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 11 (requiring grand jury action for the prosecution of crimes
where punishment exceeds 30 days imprisonment or a fine of $200, and providing that legislature
may authorize the accused to waive indictment).
363. S.C. CODE AN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1987) (Also providing that "[ilf
trial by jury has been waived by the defendant and the State, or if the defendant pleaded
guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before the court.").
364. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 15(a) (requiring trial for capital crimes by presentment or
indictment by grand jury, but for all other felonies authorizing prosecution either by grand
jury action or by a prosecutor's information).
365. FLA. STAT. Am. §§ 921.141(2), (3) (West 1985). See note 310, supra, discussing
circumstances under which trial judge may impose death sentence over jury's recommendation
of a sentence of life imprisonment.
366. Or a. CONST. art. II, § 17 (authorizing crimes to be prosecuted upon presentment,
indictment or information, and specifying that "[n]o person shall be prosecuted for a felony
by information without having had a preliminary examination before an examining magistrate,
or having waived such preliminary examination.").
367. OKLA. STAT. Ar. tit. 21, § 701.10 (Vest Supp. 1988) (further providing that "[i]f
the trial jury has been waived by the defendant and the state, or if the defendant pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before the court.").
368. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 10 (providing for felony prosecutions by presentment or
indictment by grand jury, but further allowing that "the Legislature may by law provide for
holding persons to answer for criminal offenses on information of a public prosecutor; and
may by law abolish, limit, change, amend or otherwise regulate the grand jury system.");
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1601 (1985) ("The several courts of this state shall possess and may
exercise the same power and jurisdiction to hear, try and determine prosecutions upon
information, for crimes ... as they possess and may exercise in cases of the like prosecutions
upon indictments.").
369. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2520, 29-2522 (1985) (sentences for capital crimes imposed by
trial judge, or three-judge panel upon the request or disqualification of the trial judge).
370. Other states with capital punishment legislation fall into the following categories:
(1) Grand jury indictment - jury sentencing: Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas
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States such as Oklahoma and Nebraska, which do not require that
capital trials commence by grand jury presentment or indictment, do
so upon the presumed continued vitality of Hurtado v. California."'
Lay citizens in these jurisdictions of course have no direct checks on
the authority of prosecutors to put criminal defendants on trial for
their lives. In states such as South Carolina and Florida, grand juries
nominally are required to authorize capital prosecutions, but their
ability to exercise any meaningful screening function is severely
handicapped. This is because the aggravating circumstances that must
be proved in order to make an offender eligible for the death penalty
typically are construed as sentencing factors, rather than as a part
and Virginia;
(2) Grand jury indictment - judge sentencing: Alabama;
(3) Information - jury sentencing: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming;
(4) Information - judge sentencing: Arizona, Idaho, Indiana and Montana.
See supra notes 109-113, 311-313. Pennsylvania authorizes trial by information upon the
initiative of courts of common plea and the approval of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See
supra note 109. Capital sentencing by a judge or panel of judges, instead of a jury, is
authorized in Nevada when the sentencing jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict on
punishment. See supra note 311.
371. The courts in several of the death penalty jurisdictions which authorize the trial of
capital crimes by information have adhered to Hurtado's approval of this practice. See, e.g.,
State v. Michael, 103 Ariz. 46, 436 P.2d 595, 596-97 (1968), appeal after remand 107 Ariz.
126, 483 P.2d 541 (1971) (pre-Furman capital case); Boone v. State, 230 Ark. 821, 823, 327
S.W.2d 87, 88 (1959) (pre-Furman capital case); In re Terry, 4 Cal. 3d 911, 926, 484 P,2d
1375, 1386, 95 Cal. Rptr. 31, 42, cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 980 (1971) (pre-Furman capital
case); Sergent v. People, 177 Colo. 354, 361, 497 P.2d 983, 987 (1972) (pre-Furman first
degree murder conviction); State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 512 A.2d 140 (1986); Meade v.
Warden, 184 Conn. 601, 603 n.4, 440 A.2d 246, 248 n.4 (1981); People v. Redmond, 67 111.
2d 242, 246, 367 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1977) (non-capital crime), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1078
(1978); Music v. State, 489 N.E.2d 949, 951 (Ind. 1986) (dictum); Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d
78, 94 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986); Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 468
A.2d 101, 118-19 (1983), appeal after remand, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072, cert. denied, 479
U.S. 890 (1986); State v. Coleman, 460 S.W.2d 719, 727 (Mo. 1970) (pre-Furman capital case);
State v. Corliss, 105 Mont. 40, 430 P.2d 632, 634 (1967) (pre-Furman capital trial), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1968); State v. Burchett, 224 Neb. 444, 457, 399 N.W.2d 258, 267
(1986); Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 342, 455 P.2d 34, 37 (Nev. 1969) (pre-Furman capital
case), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 935 (1972), on remand, 88 Nev. 539, 501 (P.2d 651 (1972);
United States ex rel. Morford v. Hocker, 268 F. Supp. 864, 866-70 651 (1972); United States
ex rel. Morford v. Hocker, 268 F. Supp. 864, 866-70 (D. Nev. 1967) (pre-Furman capital
conviction in Nevada state court), aff'd, 394 F.2d 169 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 944
(1968); State v. Franklin, 79 N.M. 608, 446 P.2d 883 (1968) (pre-Furman non-capital case),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 (1969); Bowen v. State, 715 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984) cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911 (1985); Hudgens v. Clark, 218 F. Supp. 95, 96 (D. Ore.
1963) (pre-Furman capital case from Oregon state court); State v. Williamson, 86 S.D. 485,
489, 198 N.W.2d 518, 520 (1972) (pre-Furman non-capital case); State v, Jeffries, 105 Wash.
398, 423, 717 P.2d 722, 737, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986); State v. Ng, 104 Wash. 763,
774, 713 P.2d 63, 69-70 (1985); Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Wyo. 1982) (non-capital
case).
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of the crime.372 They thus are not considered to be within the purview
of grand juries. Because murder tends to be defined broadly in such
jurisdictions, 373 grand jurors are not likely to know which of their
indictments actually will subject the accused to the risk of capital
punishment.
State courts generally agree that capital defendants are entitled to
advance notice of the aggravating circumstances that the prosecution
intends to rely upon at the sentencing stage of a trial. However, they
typically consider such notice to be provided by the sentencing statute,
or hold that it may be supplied independently of an indictment.
3 74
372. A number of courts in jurisdictions that require that capital prosecutions be commenced
by grand jury indictment or presentment have made this distinction. See, e.g., Lightbourne v.
State, 438 So. 2d 380, 384-85 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Bowden v. Zant,
244 Ga. 260, 264, 260 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980); Dix v.
Newsome, 584 F. Supp. 1052, 1071 (N.D. Ga. 1984); State v. Liner, 373 So. 2d 121, 123 (La.
1979), appeal after remand, 397 So. 2d 506 (La. 1981); State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d 300, 303-
04 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998 (1980); State v. Price, 195. N.J. Super. 285, 296,
478 A.2d 1249, 1256-57 (1984); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 685, 325 S.E.2d 181, 185-86
(1985); State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 420, 284 S.E.2d 437, 453-54 (1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 932 (1982); State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 456, 290 S.E.2d 1, 3-4, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
932 (1982); State v. Berry, 592 S.W.2d 553, 562 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980);
Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 624-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 190
(1988); Aranda v. State, 640 S.W.2d 766, 770 ('rex. Crim. App. 1982). Courts in several states
that authorize the prosecution of capital crimes by information also have ruled that the
aggravating factors which must be proved before a murder may be punished with death do
not have to be included within the charging instrument. See, e.g., State v. Richmond, 136
Ariz. 312, 666 P.2d 57, 60-61, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho
405, 631 P.2d 187, 195-96 (1981), appeal after remand, 104 Idaho 809, 663 P.2d 1111 (1983);
People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 29, 447 N.E.2d 353, 366-67, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983);
Brewer v. State, 275 Ind. 338, 363, 417 N.E.2d 889, 905-06 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1122 (1982); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993
(1984); State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 684 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137 (1983);
Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 677, 601 P.2d 407, 412-13 (1979); Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d
815, 819 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), opin. on reh., 665 P.2d 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983);
Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54, 61-63 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150
(1983), appeal after remand, 718 P.2d 354 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871
(1986); Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 822 (Utah), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); State
v. Kincaid, 103 Wash. 2d 304, 309, 692 P.2d 823, 826-29 (1985).
373. See supra notes 337-340 and accompanying text.
374. See, e.g., State v. Richmond 136 Ariz. 312, 666 P.2d 57, 60-61, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 986 (1983); State v. Blazak, 131 Ariz. 598, 643 P.2d 694, 697, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
882 (1982); Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964, 970 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982),
appeal after remand, 469 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1985); Mines v. State, 390 So. 2d 332, 336 (Fla.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 916 (1981); Bowden v. Zant, 244 Ga. 260, 263, 260 S.E.2d 465,
468 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33,
42 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187,
195-96 (1981), appeal after remand, 104 Idaho 809, 663 P.2d 1111 (1983); People v. Davis,
95 Ill. 2d 1, 29, 447 N.E.2d 353, 366-67, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983); Brewer v. State,
275 Ind. 338, 363, 417 N.E.2d 889, 905-06 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1222 (1982); State
v. Martin, 376 So. 2d 300, 303-04 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998 (1980); State v.
Liner, 373 So. 2d 121, 122-23 (La. 1979), appeal after remand, 397 So. 2d 506 (La. 1981);
State v. Trimble, 638 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1188 (1983);
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This too cavalierly merges the notice function of the charging instru-
ment, and the rationale behind the grand jury's certifying that the
accusations made in it are founded upon adequate cause. An infor-
mation, or a bill of particulars, clearly may advise the accused of
the aggravating circumstances that allegedly make a murder a capital
murder. The formal notice supplied through such instruments, how-
ever, is not preceded by the substantive review and associated safe-
guards that are reflected in a grand jury's true bill of indictment.
Until statutory aggravating factors are recognized-for purposes
of grand jury review-as functional equivalents of elements of the
crime of capital murder,3 75 those subjected to trials that may culmi-
Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 677, 601 P.2d 407, 413 (1979); State v. Young, 312 N.C.
669, 325 S.E.2d 181, 185-86 (1985); State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 422, 284 S.E.2d 437,
453-54 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982); Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d 815, 819 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1982), opin. on reh., 665 P.2d 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Butler, 277
S.C. 452, 456, 290 S.E.2d 1, 3-4, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 932 (1982); State v. Berry, 592 S.W.2d
553, 562 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); Aranda v. State, 640 S.W.2d 766, 770
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 822-23 (Utah), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 891 (1980).
375. See notes 177-205, and accompanying text supra, and especially the discussion pertinent
to Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). Cf. Butler v. South Carolina, 459 U.S. 932,
934 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari):
South Carolina's death penalty statute requires that proof of aggravating circum-
stances be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In my view the reasonable doubt
standard is constitutionally mandated. We have previously recognized that a capital
sentencing proceeding is in many respects analogous to a trial on the issue of guilt
or innocence. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. '430, 438 (1981). Since the death
penalty may be imposed only if the State proves at least one aggravating circumstance,
an aggravating circumstance is functionally an element of the crime of capital murder
.... (Emphasis added).
Butler v. South Carolina, 459 U.S. at 934 (Marshall, J., dissinting from denial of certiorari).
See also State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981) (holding that Oregon's death
penalty legislation, as it then existed, violated the state constitution's right to trial by jury).
After the defendant was convicted of the crime of murder, which required that a killing be
committed "intentionally," the death penalty could be imposed only after the judge, who then
had the authority to sentence, also concluded, inter alia, that the homicide was committed
"deliberately." Although the latter finding was denominated a sentencing consideration rather
than an element of the crime of murder, the court held that the deliberation requirement was
a part of the act declared by the legislature to be criminal, and thus had to be established by
a jury rather than a judge. State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 399, 623 P.2d 630, 642. The Oregon
statute subsequently was amended to provide that the jury make this and other findings at
the sentencing stage of capital trials. See ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.150(2)(b) (1985). See generally
State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188, 226 n.27 (1987) (For purposes of considering
whether the statutory aggravating factors in New Jersey's death penalty legislation are uncon-
stitutionally vague, "functionally, the aggravating factors in the Act are indistinguisha-
ble... from the elements of a crime," and citing other state cases to this effect). "The
aggravating factors... form, in effect, elements of the offense defendants must have committed
to come within the class" of persons eligible for the death penalty under New Jersey law. Id.
106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d at 326 (Handier, J., dissenting). But see Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S.
147, 156 (1986) (for double jeopardy purposes, the aggravating circumstances specified in
Arizona's death penalty statute "are not separate penalties or offenses, but are 'standards to
guide the making of [the] choice' between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprison-
ment.") (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981)).
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nate with the death penalty will be exposed to the very dangers that
prompted the framers of the Constitution to require that capital
crimes be prosecuted only upon the indictment or presentment of a
grand jury. While the eighth amendment's implicit prohibitions against
the arbitrary infliction of capital punishment have not been extended
to prosecutorial decisionmaking,3 76 numerous studies have demon-
strated that prosecutors' charging decisions are a major source of
the arbitrariness that continues to plague the application of reformed
death penalty legislation.377 Grand juries were given footing in the
Constitution expressly to guard against arbitrary prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking, even if "cruel and unusual punishments" protections
do not reach this stage of criminal prosecutions. There is both a real
need, and a firm constitutional basis, for requiring more rigorous
grand jury review of potential capital prosecutions.
Requiring that the aggravating factors which distinguish capital
murder from murder simpliciter be reviewed by the grand jury, and
made a part of the indictment, would be neither impractical nor
onerous. Statutory aggravating factors typically are factual and his-
torical in nature;378 there would be little need to produce information
to substantiate them that would not be directly related to the hom-
icide, and already available in connection with the general murder
charge. Prosecutorial discretion to be merciful in capital cases,
379
through subsequent plea agreements or declining to seek the death
penalty upon conviction, would in no way be constrained. The grand
jury action would simply guard against offenses arbitrarily being
included within the death penalty-eligible range.
Many jurisdictions already require that in capital trials prosecutors
provide the accused with pre-trial notice of aggravating factors, or
evidence to be introduced in aggravation of punishment.38 0 Several
376. See supra notes 214-229 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 232-242, and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 343-349 and accompanying text. Not all aggravating factors are so
objective in nature, e.g., whether a homicide was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." See
text accompanying notes 350-352. It seems especially important that grand juries give meaning
to aggravating circumstances of this nature. These are more normative judgments, and there
is greater room for the exercise of discretion in making such determinations than for other
types of aggravating factors. See generally Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating
Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. REv. 941 (1986).
379. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976), quoted in part supra note 214;
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 307 (1987).
380. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985) (pretrial notice required of evidence
to be offered in aggravation, except for proof of offense or special circumstances specified);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(a) (vest Supp. 1988) (requiring allegation, on a page separate
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jurisdictions, additionally, have statutes that mandate that the win-
nowing of murders to capital murders take place, in substantial part,
at the charging and guilt-determination stages of capital proceed-
ings.381 These states, unlike the ones considered previously, define
capital murders relatively narrowly by incorporating aggravating cir-
cumstances as elements of crimes, or by imposing analogous pleading
and proof requirements if the death penalty is sought.112
Ohio and California have capital punishment legislation of this
nature. 3 Each state has broadly defined a category of serious crim-
from the rest of the charging instrument, of aggravating circumstances); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025 (Baldwin 1984) (only evidence in aggravation made known prior to trial admissible);
MD. C0LM. LAW CODE ANN. § 412(b) (Supp. 1988) (written notification of intent to seek death
penalty and aggravating circumstances upon which state intends to rely required at least 30
days prior to trial); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04 (Page 1937) (requiring
specification of aggravating circumstance in indictment if state seeks death penalty); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 1989) (only evidence in aggravation made known
prior to trial admissible); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (evidence
in aggravation admissible only if state has provided defendant with written pretrial notice);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.040 (Supp. 1989) (contemplating that defendant be "charged"
with aggravated first degree murder, and notice of special proceeding to determine death
penalty be served within 30 days of defendant's arraignment upon such charge); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-102(c) (Michie 1988) (only evidence in aggravation that state has made known to
defendant prior to trial admissible). Where such notice is not required by statute it often must
be supplied upon the accused's filing a request for a bill of particulars. See generally the cases
cited in note 374, supra.
381. The Supreme Court, in upholding Louisiana's death penalty statutes, ruled that it is
constitutionally permissible to have this narrowing of the class of death-penalty eligible
offenders take place at the guilt-determination stage, rather than at the sentencing phase.
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1989). See supra note 320.
382. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a) (Supp. 1988); Ex parte Arthur, 472 So. 2d 665,
667 (Ala.) on remand, 472 So. 2d 670 (Ala. 1985) (holding aggravating factors enumerated in
this section must be alleged in capital murder indictment to constitute crime of capital murder);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-10-101(a) (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2, 190.4 (Deering 1985)
(broadly defined first degree murder, but requirement that aggravating specification be charged
and specially found to create eligibility for death penalty); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b
(West 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2) (Supp.
1988); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (1986); Omao REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01, 2929.022,
2929.04 (Page 1987) (broadly defined aggravated murder, but specification in indictment of
one or more aggravating circumstances required before death penalty may be imposed); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 163.095 (1987); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Supp. 1988).
383. See infra notes 384-390, and accompanying text. Indiana's legislation also resembles
this type on its face. A relevant provision states that, "The state may seek a death sentence
for murder by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the
existence of at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b). In the
sentencing hearing after a person is convicted of murder the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of at least one (1) of the aggravating factors alleged." IND.
STAT. ANN. § 35-50-2-9(a) (West Supp. 1988). The state supreme court has ruled, however,
that the prosecution's failure to make a special allegation, in accordance with the statute, and
attach same to the instrument charging murder, does not preclude the state from seeking the
death penalty, at least when the accused had adequate notice of its intent to do so. Brewer v.
State, 275 Ind. 338, 363, 417 N.E.2d 889, 905-06 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1222 (1982).
0
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inal homicide, called aggravated murder in Ohio,384 and first degree
murder in California.385 Punishment for these crimes is either death
or life imprisonment. 86 In Ohio the death penalty may be imposed
if and only if the indictment charging aggravated murder includes
one or more of the specifications of aggravating circumstances that
are enumerated in the capital sentencing statute. The trial verdict
also must specifically indicate that the accused is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of aggravated murder and one of the specifica-
tions.387 In California, an information state, the process is similar.
The death penalty may be imposed following a first degree murder
conviction only if at least one statutory special circumstance has been
both charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.3 88 In each state,
384. Aggravated murder consists of purposely causing the death of another "with prior
calculation and design" or "while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing
immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or
arson, aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape." Omo REv.
CODE AN. § 2903.01(A), (B) (Page 1987). "No person shall be convicted of aggravated
murder unless he is specifically found to have intended to cause the death of another." Id. §
2903.01(D) (Page 1987).
385. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice afore-
thought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988). "All murder which is perpetrated by means
of a destructive device or explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate
metal or armor, poison, lying in walt, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 228 [relating to
the commission of a lewd or lascivious act against a child under 14], is murder of the first
degree ...." Id. § 189 (West 1988).
386. Omo Rav. CODE ANN.. § 2929.02(A) (Page 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (Deering
1985).
387. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(A), (B), (C)(2) (Page 1987). At least one of eight
specifications must be alleged in the indictment and proved. Id. § 2929.04(A)(1)-(8). They
include
(1) assassination of the United States President or Vice President, or the governor
or lieutenant governor of Ohio, or candidates for such offices,
(2) murder for hire
(3) murder to escape detection or apprehension for another crime,
(4) murder by a prisoner,
(5) murder by an offender with prior murder-related convictions, or who killed or
attempted to kill two or more persons,
(6) murder of a peace officer,
(7) murder committed during the course of named felonies, and
(8) the murder of a witness to a crime to prevent or retaliate for the witness'
testimony.
Id.
388. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1(b), 190.4(a) (Deering 1985). The special circumstances
normally are to be proved at the guilt phase of the trial, unless a prior conviction is alleged.
Id. § 190.1(a),(b). If the jury finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, but is unable
to reach a unanimous verdict concerning the truth of the charged special circumstances, the
trial judge is to discharge the jury and convene a new one to determine the existence of the
special circumstances. Id. § 190.4(a). At least one of 19 special circumstances enumerated in
the statute must be charged and proved before the accused is eligible for the death penalty.
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once eligibility for the death penalty has been determined, a sen-
tencing hearing is conducted so that additional evidence may be
considered prior to the sentencer's imposition of either the death




The Ohio and California statutes illustrate that the aggravating
circumstances which define the threshold of death penalty-eligibility,
whether construed as formal elements of a crime, or simply denom-
inated sentencing factors to be considered after conviction, are known
at the charging stage of capital prosecutions, and it is feasible to
require that they be specified at this stage.39  In Ohio a capital
prosecution cannot be commenced unless a grand jury has specifically
reviewed and alleged the existence of aggravating circumstances which,
if proven, make an offense punishable by death. There are real
differences between such a scheme and those employed in jurisdictions
such as South Carolina and Florida, where grand jury indictments
Id. § 190.2(a)(I)-(19). These include
(1) intentional murder for financial gain,
(2) murder by one previously convicted of first or second degree murder,
(3) conviction for more than a single murder at the proceeding in question,
(4) murder by a concealed destructive device,
(5) murder to prevent a lawful arrest or to escape from custody,
(6) murder by a destructive device placed in the mail,
(7) murder of a peace officer,
(8) or of a federal law enforcement officer,
(9) or of a firefighter,
(10) or of a witness to a crime to prevent or retaliate for testimony,
(11) or of a prosecuting attorney,
(12) or of a judge,
(13) or of a governmental official,
(14) the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity ... [which means] a conscienceless, or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim,"
(15) murder by lying in wait,
(16) murder because of the victim's race, color, religion or nationality,
(17) murder during the commission of named felonies,
(18) the murder was "intentional and involved the infliction of torture..., [which]
requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no matter how long its
duration," and
(19) murder by poison.
Id.
389. Oxuo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03(D), 2929.04(B), (C) (Page 1987); CAL. PNA. CODE
§§ 190.3, 190.4(e) (Deering 1985).
390. This also holds true for less objective aggravating circumstances, such as the category
of murders that are "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity
... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (Deering 1985). See also id. § 190.2(a)(18) (murder
involving torture, which "requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no matter
how long its duration.") (see supra note 388). The former aggravating circumstance was
declared unconstitutionally vague under both the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution in People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d
76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982).
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expose the accused to the risk of a capital trial by generally alleging
the commission of murder or first degree murder. 91 The Ohio model
is clearly the superior one, in that it allows grand juries to represent
the community's sentiments about the trial of cases as capital crimes,
and provides more effective safeguards against arbitrary capital pro-
secutions. In states in which grand juries already are required to
authorize criminal prosecutions, there is no reason to deny grand
jury review of what may be the most significant of all aspects of a
charging decision, whether to treat a homicide as a potentially capital
crime.
Grand jury initiation of capital prosecutions should be mandatory
in states such as California, Oklahoma and Nebraska, which presently
allow prosecutors to commence all criminal trials by information.
This may entail something of a trade-off in protections to the accused,
in that adversarial preliminary hearings, which may be obligatory
absent grand jury action, may be sacrificed if grand jury accusations
are used.392 This would not be inevitable, however, since preliminary
hearings are often conducted prior to a grand jury's consideration
of indictments in jurisdictions in which indictments are used. 393 The
respective safeguards afforded by preliminary hearings and grand
jury review, in any event, are debatable. Although one procedure
might be more desirable than the other for strategic or trial prepa-
ration purposes,39 4 this does not diminish the force of the constitu-
391. See supra notes 337-338, 341-352 and accompanying text. If prosecutors were required
to specifically allege statutory aggravating circumstances, and thus declare that they may seek
the death penalty in a murder prosecution, this would have the collateral consequence of
importing more regularity to the charging process, making it more visible publicly, and more
amenable to review. This would be especially desirable in light of the Supreme Court's
declination to require that prosecutors adhere to formal charging guidelines in capital cases.
See supra notes 213-229 and accompanying text.
392. See, e.g., People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 155-57, 469 N.E.2d 119, 129-30 (1984),
(rejecting defendant's claim that the prosecution delayed a preliminary hearing, in bad faith,
to secure a grand jury indictment, thus causing the defendant to lose the opportunity for a
preliminary hearing) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1985); State v. Thomas, 674 S.W.2d 131,
135-36 (Mo. App. 1984) (rejecting defendant's claim of constitutional entitlement to preliminary
hearing instead of grand jury indictment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1223 (1985).
393. The California Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution's equal protection
clause to require that preliminary hearings be allowed in all felony prosecutions, including
those in which the prosecutor has elected to proceed by indictment instead of information.
Post-indictment preliminary hearings thus may be required in some cases. Hawkins v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978). See Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Ct. of California for County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
394. See generally Carlson, Representation at Preliminary Hearing, in 1 CaUsmAL DEFENSE
TEcmQUEs §§ 8.01-8.15 (1987); F. BAMEY & H. RoTnsLATTr, Succissru. TECHNIQUES FOR
CanNAL TRums §§ 14-27 (1971).
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tional arguments for compulsory grand jury review of potentially
capital criminal accusations.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court rejected a claim that racial factors had
unconstitutionally influenced the administration of Georgia's death
penalty in McCleskey, 95 it widely was perceived that the last of the
broad-based challenges to capital punishment had been resolved." 6
This may or may not prove true.3 97 The call for compulsory grand
jury review of state capital prosecutions, however, is neither novel-
dating back to 1884 and Hurtado v. California39 -nor necessarily
antithetical to capital punishment. It is little more than a claim that
Hurtado did not settle the issue for death penalty systems as presently
administered, and a suggestion that meaningful grand jury review of
state capital proceedings would simultaneously diminish the potential
for arbitrariness, and promote the appearance of fairness in the
prosecution of capital crimes.
Grand juries originally were conceived to expand the king's au-
thority in administering justice, and thus to enhance his power and
revenues. 399 Their purpose was radically different by the time the
fifth amendment was adopted. Instead of doing the bidding of the
government, grand juries were considered a vital check against op-
pressive and arbitrary prosecutions. These citizens' panels, drawn
395. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
396. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 23, 1987, at Al, col - ("The ruling ended what
death penalty opponents had called their last sweeping challenge to capital punishment.");
Burt, supra note 153:
The Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp marks the end of an era in
the jurisprudence of the death penalty. In disregarding the petitioner's claim that he
adequately had proven systemic race bias in the administration of capital punishment,
the Court rejected the last generic challenge that had been on the agenda of the
abolitionist attorneys from the outset of their litigative campaign in the early 1960s.
After McCleskey, nothing appears left of the abolitionist claim in the courts-
nothing but the possibility of small-scale tinkering with the details of administration
and, of course, persistent claims in lower courts of specific errors in the multitude
of cases where the sentence is imposed. (Footnotes omitted).
Burt, supra note 153 at 1741.
397. Cf. Kaufman, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, ATLArnc MoNTmLY 47, 66 (Dec.,
1963), quoted in L. BAKER, MnRANDA: Canm, LAw AND PoLrrics at 185 (1983) ("Whenever I
am told that a landmark decision in a criminal case has settled matters once and for all,'
federal Judge Irving Kaufman once wrote, 'I am reminded of the gentleman of the 1850s who
suggested that the Government close the patent office because 'there was nothing left to be
invented."').
398. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
399. See supra notes 61-63, and accompanying text.
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from the concerned communities, were to act as safeguards against
abuses of official power and give expression to local mores and
attitudes as they helped enforce the laws.40 The framers of the fifth
amendment considered these protections most important in the most
serious accusations. They specifically required that "capital," as well
as "otherwise infamous crime"'4'4 be prosecuted only upon grand
jury presentment or indictment.
When the fifth amendment was adopted toward the end of the
18th century, many felonies in this country were punishable by death,
and the death penalty followed automatically upon conviction .402 All
of the original states, in addition to the federal government, required
that the prosecution of serious felonies be initiated by presentment
or indictment. 403 Much in the administration of capital punishment
had changed by the time the Supreme Court reviewed Joseph Hur-
tado's murder conviction and capital sentence, and much had yet to
change in corresponding constitutional doctrine.
California was one of several western states that authorized the
prosecution of felonies by information. When Hurtado was brought
to trial upon an information charging murder in the first degree, and
was convicted thereon, the jury had unfettered discretion to fix his
sentence at either life imprisonment or death.4° Capital appeals were
decided under the same legal principles as other cases. Death was
not yet "different" in the eyes of the law, and due process was in
its nascent stages of development. Understandably, much stated in
the Hurtado opinion is terribly outmoded.405 On both factual and
jurisprudential grounds Hurtado's result can no longer be squared
with the law that governs the administration of modern systems of
capital punishment.
Despite the sweeping reforms in death penalty legislation that
followed the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,4
there is persistent evidence that arbitrariness still permeates the ad-
ministration of capital punishment. In many jurisdictions extralegal
influences, including the race of homicide victims4°7 and the place of
400. See supra notes 73-93, and accompanying text.
401. U.S. CONST. amend V. See supra note 1, and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 156-158, and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 80-83, and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 154-156, and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 128-174, and accompanying text.
406. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra notes 162-174, and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 232-240 and accompanying text.
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the commission of crimes, 4°s appear to significantly influence prose-
cutors' charging decisions in capital cases. The Supreme Court has
refrained from imposing any unique constitutional restrictions upon
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in capital proceedings, 409 and
as a result district attorneys have essentially unregulated authority to
commence capital prosecutions in the 21 death penalty jurisdictions
that allow the use of informations.4 10 In almost all of the fifteen
capital punishment states that require capital crimes to be prosecuted
by presentment or indictment, 41' grand jury review is not likely to
be meaningful because of its limited nature.
Grand juries usually return indictments only for general types of
criminal homicide, such as first degree murder, for which a conviction
will not automatically or necessarily expose the offender to the risk
of capital punishment. Statutory aggravating circumstances relevant
to the alleged homicide victim, the manner in which the crime was
committed, or the offender's status or criminal record must be proved
under most statutes before the threshold of death penalty-eligibility
is established. Grand juries almost never review the foundation of
such allegations. 4 2 They consequently are stripped of authority to
screen the prosecution of "capital" crimes, unless they return true
bills of indictment for only second degree murder, manslaughter, or
some other crime that does not expose the accused to the risk of a
capital trial.
If grand juries were given the power and the opportunity to
consider the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravating
circumstances that allegedly transform a murder into a capital crime,
they almost certainly would serve as more than "rubber stamps" of
prosecutorial initiatives. Grand juries usually do return true bills
upon the indictments submitted by prosecutors, which is not surpris-
ing. The great majority of cases are clear-cut, especially as only
probable cause or prima facie evidence of the accused's guilt needs
408. See supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 211-229, and accompanying text.
410. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Mar-
yland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania
(local option upon approval by Pennsylvania Supreme Court, (see supra note 109), South
Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming (see supra note 370).
411. The 15 death penalty states in which capital trials must be initiated by grand jury
action are Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virgina.
In Ohio, grand jury consideration of potential death penalty cases is significantly different
from the review given in other states. See supra notes 383-391, and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 328-374, and accompanying text.
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to be established. Where the lines between offense types are ambig-
uous, however, the evidence subject to different interpretations, and
the greatest stakes are on the line, grand jurors are most likely to
exercise their discretion with circumspection, and not simply buckle
to prosecutors' wishes. 413 Potentially capital cases are of this variety,
and in them the community's voice deserves to be registered most
clearly.
414
The circumstances that must be proved before a criminal homicide
is punishable by death should specifically be reviewed by a grand
jury before the accused is required to endure the rigors of a capital
trial.4 5 This is not a decision, as the framers of the fifth amendment
recognized, that should be entrusted to the exclusive discretion of
prosecuting attorneys. 416 Even if statutory aggravating circumstances
are not formally denominated elements of the crime of capital
murder, nor need be proved at the guilt stage of capital trials,417 they
should be submitted to grand juries for consideration and appropriate
action. If grand jurors are denied the opportunity to consider these
threshold criteria for death penalty-eligibility, their prior review of
prosecutions for "capital" crimes cannot truly be effectuated.
Blackstone expressed assurances that no British subject could be
condemned to die "unless by the unanimous vote of 24 of his equals
and neighbors, ' 41 8 i.e., by twelve on the grand jury and twelve on
the petit jury. In some jurisdictions today defendants are brought to
trial by action of a prosecutor, upon an information, and sentenced
to death by a judge, only after circumstances never considered by
413. See supra notes 282-285, 292-295, and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 300-322, and accompanying text.
415. Cf. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). See supra notes 185-186, and
accompanying text.
416. Hurtado's lawyer, A.L. Hart, summarized the argument eloquently in the brief that
he submitted to the Supreme Court.
At this time in California the only thing left to protect the individual against the
loss of reputation and jeopardy involved in a final and public trial for an infamous
offense, at the option of a hostile public prosecutor, is a determination of a common
Justice of the Peace, whose subserviency to the District Attorney is not only possible,
but has already been remarked in many instances. And thus one by one will the old
landmarks of personal security and civil liberty be swept away by our people, whose
estimate of their value is formed upon but a slight reading of the reasons which, in
remote times, poihted so forcibly to their necessity, unless they are presented and
restrained by the organic law of the Nation.
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 42-43, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), reprinted in
LANDmmAR BRFs, supra note 11 at 439-40. See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
554-55 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
417. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); See also supra notes 196-200 and
accompanying text.
418. 4 Blackstone, supra note 12 at 301. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
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the trial jurors are alleged and established. 4 9 Such practices were
unacceptable at common law and at the time the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted. They are suspect
now in light of contemporary death penalty jurisprudence and un-
relenting evidence that reflects arbitrariness in the prosecution of
capital crimes. Hurtado v. California is no longer a stable bulwark
against the grand jury's resuming its historic protective functions in
safeguarding the administration of modern systems of capital pun-
ishment.
419. See supra note 313, and accompanying text.
